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From: Bernd Eckenfels <ecki@lina.inka.de>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: /dev/random: really secure?
Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2000 04:49:03 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <E148aFT-0001WO-00@calista.inka.de> (raw)

In article <20001218102218.A428@albireo.ucw.cz> you wrote:
> Even if you were able to predict all entropy sources, to predict the generated
> random numbers you would need to invert the cryptographic hash used there.

If you can predict ALL input in the pool, including the initial boot state
you can just rerun the PNRG algorithm and get the random numbers (as long as
you even can predict read access to the device).

But thats not the real-world Attack. The Real world attack is more to reduce
the randomness in terms of stochastic tests can detect some patterns like
unequal distribution or cycles. Those will lower the strengt of some
algorithms...

Greetings
Bernd
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             reply	other threads:[~2000-12-20  4:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2000-12-20  3:49 Bernd Eckenfels [this message]
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2000-12-20  3:41 Bernd Eckenfels
2000-12-20 17:58 ` Jamie Lokier
2000-12-17 21:50 Karel Kulhavy
2000-12-18  0:18 ` David Schwartz
2000-12-18  8:21   ` Karel Kulhavy
2000-12-18 20:38   ` Jamie Lokier
2000-12-18 21:33     ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2000-12-18 22:15       ` Andreas Dilger
2000-12-19  9:27         ` Daniel Stone
2000-12-19 11:49       ` Kurt Garloff
2000-12-19 12:48         ` Peter Samuelson
2000-12-19 16:51         ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2000-12-19 17:39         ` Pavel Machek
2000-12-18 21:58     ` David Schwartz
2000-12-18  8:49 ` David Feuer
2000-12-18  9:22 ` Martin Mares
2000-12-19  6:49 ` Philipp Rumpf

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