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From: "Richard B. Johnson" <root@chaos.analogic.com>
To: Scott Robert Ladd <coyote@coyotegulch.com>
Cc: Andrew Walrond <andrew@walrond.org>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: BK2CVS problem
Date: Thu, 6 Nov 2003 08:59:22 -0500 (EST)	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.53.0311060838180.3117@chaos> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <3FAA4C26.9080900@coyotegulch.com>

On Thu, 6 Nov 2003, Scott Robert Ladd wrote:

> Andrew Walrond wrote:
> > Somebody getting access to and inserting exploits directly into the linux
> > source is not something we should take lightly. Whilst we understand the
> > limits of the problem, the fact that it happened at all could get /.'d out of
> > all proportion and be used to seriously undermine linux's reputation
>
> Well, it's hit /. and OSNews already this morning.
>
> Mainstream media is now aware of Linux; for better or worse, someday, an
> issue like this is going to leak beyond Slashdot onto the pages of the
> Wall Street Journal and ZDNet. Maybe not this time -- but eventually.
>
> Open development is the ultimate in honesty -- and honesty leaves us
> vulnerable to being bitten by the ignorati and anti-freedom forces.
>
> --
> Scott Robert Ladd
> Coyote Gulch Productions (http://www.coyotegulch.com)
> Software Invention for High-Performance Computing

This may not really be the problem. It is well known that
anybody who has the capabilities of inserting a module into
the most secure kernel in the universe, could have designed
the module to give the current caller root privs when some
module function is executed.

$ whoami
cracker
$ od /dev/TROJAN
$ whoami
root
$

The kernel sources can be inspected using automation, looking
for accesses to 'current'. The expected patterns can be ignored.
Accesses to current->XXX,current->YYY,current->YYY, etc., could be
reviewed. However, this doesn't stop the clever programmer who
creates a pointer that, using a difficult-to-follow path, has
access to these structure members.

So, basically, any open-source kernel is vulnerable. Also any
closed-source kernel is also vulnerable. We already know that
M$ had hundreds of bugs, perhaps more, that allowed a hacker
complete unrestricted access to a machine on the network. We
also know that there are deliberate back-doors inserted to
allow governments to inspect the contents of these computers
(search on magic lantern and carnivor).


Cheers,
Dick Johnson
Penguin : Linux version 2.4.22 on an i686 machine (797.90 BogoMips).
            Note 96.31% of all statistics are fiction.



  reply	other threads:[~2003-11-06 13:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2003-11-05 20:45 Larry McVoy
2003-11-05 20:58 ` Matthew Dharm
2003-11-05 22:23   ` Larry McVoy
2003-11-05 22:33     ` Zwane Mwaikambo
2003-11-05 22:51       ` Andries Brouwer
2003-11-06  7:07         ` Brian McGroarty
2003-11-06 11:41           ` Andrew Walrond
2003-11-06 12:02             ` nosp
2003-11-06 12:02             ` Xavier Bestel
2003-11-06 13:27             ` Scott Robert Ladd
2003-11-06 13:59               ` Richard B. Johnson [this message]
2003-11-05 22:48 Chad Kitching
2003-11-05 22:53 ` Zwane Mwaikambo
2003-11-05 23:03 ` Larry McVoy
2003-11-06  0:52   ` Tomas Szepe
2003-11-06  1:57     ` Andreas Dilger
2003-11-06  2:20       ` Linus Torvalds
2003-11-06  3:01       ` Larry McVoy
2003-11-06 10:40         ` Matthias Andree
2003-11-06  4:09   ` Scott Robert Ladd
2003-11-06 10:06     ` bert hubert
2003-11-06 13:22       ` Theodore Ts'o
2003-11-06 14:43         ` Rik van Riel
2003-11-06 15:56       ` Linus Torvalds

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