From: Bodo Eggert <7eggert@gmx.de>
To: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>
Cc: 7eggert@gmx.de, David Madore <david.madore@ens.fr>,
Linux Kernel mailing-list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: capabilities patch (v 0.1)
Date: Tue, 9 Aug 2005 23:36:00 +0200 (CEST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.58.0508092259570.9779@be1.lrz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20050809205206.GW7762@shell0.pdx.osdl.net>
On Tue, 9 Aug 2005, Chris Wright wrote:
> * Bodo Eggert (harvested.in.lkml@7eggert.dyndns.org) wrote:
> > Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org> wrote:
> > > * David Madore (david.madore@ens.fr) wrote:
> > >> * Second, a much more extensive change, the patch introduces a third
> > >> set of capabilities for every process, the "bounding" set. Normally
> > >
> > > this is not a good idea. don't add more sets. if you really want to
> > > work on this i'll give you all the patches that have been done thus far,
> > > plus a set of tests that look at all the execve, ptrace, setuid type of
> > > corner cases.
> >
> > How are you going to tell processes that may exec suid (or set-capability-)
> > programs from those that aren't supposed to gain certain capabilities?
>
> typically you'd expect exec suid will reset to full caps.
ACK, but
1) I wouldn't want an exploited service to gain any privileges, even by
chaining userspace exploits (e.g. exec sendmail < exploitstring). For
most services, I'd like CAP_EXEC being unset (but it doesn't exist).
2) There are environments (linux-vserver.org) which limit root to a subset
of capabilities. I think they might use that feature, too. Off cause a
simple "suid bit" == "all capabilities" scheme won't work there.
--
"Just because you are paranoid, do'nt mean they're not after you."
-- K.Cobain
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2005-08-09 21:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <4zuQJ-20d-11@gated-at.bofh.it>
[not found] ` <4zv0l-2b8-11@gated-at.bofh.it>
2005-08-09 20:21 ` Bodo Eggert
2005-08-09 20:52 ` Chris Wright
2005-08-09 21:05 ` David Madore
2005-08-09 21:36 ` Bodo Eggert [this message]
2005-08-09 21:48 ` David Madore
2005-08-10 0:53 ` David Wagner
2005-08-09 22:24 ` Chris Wright
2005-08-09 22:58 ` Bodo Eggert
2005-08-09 5:26 David Madore
2005-08-09 5:37 ` Chris Wright
2005-08-09 20:36 ` David Madore
2005-08-09 20:28 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2005-08-09 20:48 ` David Madore
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