* [PATCH 2/2 -mm] capabilities: introduce per-process capability bounding set (v4)
2007-10-03 22:27 [PATCH 1/2 -mm] capabilities: define CONFIG_COMMONCAP Serge E. Hallyn
@ 2007-10-03 22:30 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-10-03 22:43 ` James Morris
2007-10-03 22:42 ` [PATCH 1/2 -mm] capabilities: define CONFIG_COMMONCAP James Morris
1 sibling, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Serge E. Hallyn @ 2007-10-03 22:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: lkml, Chris Wright, Andrew Morgan, linux-security-module
>From d93ecb90d82f9e2b7f48c74f5e6ed97cac3683c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Date: Fri, 28 Sep 2007 10:33:56 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 2/2 -mm] capabilities: introduce per-process capability bounding set (v4)
The capability bounding set is a set beyond which capabilities
cannot grow. Currently cap_bset is per-system. It can be
manipulated through sysctl, but only init can add capabilities.
Root can remove capabilities. By default it includes all caps
except CAP_SETPCAP.
This patch makes the bounding set per-process. It is inherited
at fork from parent. Noone can add elements. CAP_SYS_ADMIN is
required to remove them. The reason for that is to stop an
unprivileged user from removing key capabilities, then running
a setuid root binary (or one with file capabilities) which
assumes it got all, not some, of the capabilities it needs
and fails unsafely partway through. Perhaps a new capability
should be introduced rather than using CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Or,
since I don't have a *concrete* example of an exploit, perhaps
any user should be able to drop capabilities from his capbset.
One example use of this is to start a safer container. For
instance, until device namespaces or per-container device
whitelists are introduced, it is probably wise to take CAP_MKNOD
away from a container.
The following hacky test program will get and set the bounding
set. For instance
./bset get
(lists capabilities in bset)
./bset strset cap_sys_admin
(starts shell with new bset)
(use capset, setuid binary, or binary with
file capabilities to try to increase caps)
===========================================================
bset.c:
===========================================================
unsigned long newval;
int cmd_getbcap;
char *captable[] = {
"cap_dac_override",
"cap_dac_read_search",
"cap_fowner",
"cap_fsetid",
"cap_kill",
"cap_setgid",
"cap_setuid",
"cap_setpcap",
"cap_linux_immutable",
"cap_net_bind_service",
"cap_net_broadcast",
"cap_net_admin",
"cap_net_raw",
"cap_ipc_lock",
"cap_ipc_owner",
"cap_sys_module",
"cap_sys_rawio",
"cap_sys_chroot",
"cap_sys_ptrace",
"cap_sys_pacct",
"cap_sys_admin",
"cap_sys_boot",
"cap_sys_nice",
"cap_sys_resource",
"cap_sys_time",
"cap_sys_tty_config",
"cap_mknod",
"cap_lease",
"cap_audit_write",
"cap_audit_control",
"cap_setfcap"};
char *inttocap(unsigned long v)
{
char *str = NULL;
int i;
str = malloc(1);
str[0] = '\0';
for (i=0; i<31; i++) {
if (v & (1 << (i+1))) {
char *tmp = captable[i];
str = realloc(str, strlen(str)+2+strlen(tmp));
sprintf(str+strlen(str), ",%s", tmp);
}
}
return str;
}
int getbcap(void)
{
unsigned long bcap;
int ret;
unsigned int ver;
ret = prctl(PR_GET_CAPBSET, &ver, &bcap);
if (ret == -1)
perror("prctl");
if (ver != _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION)
printf("wrong capability version: %lu not %lu\n",
ver, _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION);
printf("prctl get_bcap returned %lu (ret %d)\n", bcap, ret);
printf("that is %s\n", inttocap(bcap));
return ret;
}
int setbcap(unsigned long val)
{
int ret;
ret = prctl(PR_SET_CAPBSET, _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION, val);
return ret;
}
int usage(char *me)
{
printf("Usage: %s get\n", me);
printf(" %s set <newval>\n", me);
printf(" %s strset capability_string\n", me);
printf(" capability_string is for instance:\n");
printf(" cap_sys_admin,cap_mknod,cap_dac_override\n");
return 1;
}
unsigned long captoint(char *cap)
{
if (strcmp(cap, "cap_dac_override") == 0)
return 1;
else if (strcmp(cap, "cap_dac_read_search") == 0)
return 2;
else if (strcmp(cap, "cap_fowner") == 0)
return 3;
else if (strcmp(cap, "cap_fsetid") == 0)
return 4;
else if (strcmp(cap, "cap_kill") == 0)
return 5;
else if (strcmp(cap, "cap_setgid") == 0)
return 6;
else if (strcmp(cap, "cap_setuid") == 0)
return 7;
else if (strcmp(cap, "cap_setpcap") == 0)
return 8;
else if (strcmp(cap, "cap_linux_immutable") == 0)
return 9;
else if (strcmp(cap, "cap_net_bind_service") == 0)
return 10;
else if (strcmp(cap, "cap_net_broadcast") == 0)
return 11;
else if (strcmp(cap, "cap_net_admin") == 0)
return 12;
else if (strcmp(cap, "cap_net_raw") == 0)
return 13;
else if (strcmp(cap, "cap_ipc_lock") == 0)
return 14;
else if (strcmp(cap, "cap_ipc_owner") == 0)
return 15;
else if (strcmp(cap, "cap_sys_module") == 0)
return 16;
else if (strcmp(cap, "cap_sys_rawio") == 0)
return 17;
else if (strcmp(cap, "cap_sys_chroot") == 0)
return 18;
else if (strcmp(cap, "cap_sys_ptrace") == 0)
return 19;
else if (strcmp(cap, "cap_sys_pacct") == 0)
return 20;
else if (strcmp(cap, "cap_sys_admin") == 0)
return 21;
else if (strcmp(cap, "cap_sys_boot") == 0)
return 22;
else if (strcmp(cap, "cap_sys_nice") == 0)
return 23;
else if (strcmp(cap, "cap_sys_resource") == 0)
return 24;
else if (strcmp(cap, "cap_sys_time") == 0)
return 25;
else if (strcmp(cap, "cap_sys_tty_config") == 0)
return 26;
else if (strcmp(cap, "cap_mknod") == 0)
return 27;
else if (strcmp(cap, "cap_lease") == 0)
return 28;
else if (strcmp(cap, "cap_audit_write") == 0)
return 29;
else if (strcmp(cap, "cap_audit_control") == 0)
return 30;
else if (strcmp(cap, "cap_setfcap") == 0)
return 31;
}
unsigned long parse_cap_string(char *capstring)
{
unsigned long tmp, newval = 0;
char *token = strtok(capstring, ",");
while (token) {
tmp = captoint(token);
if (tmp < 0)
return -1;
newval |= 1<<tmp;
token = strtok(NULL, ",");
}
return newval;
}
int read_args(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (strcmp(argv[1], "get") == 0) {
cmd_getbcap = 1;
return 0;
}
if (strcmp(argv[1], "strset") == 0) {
newval = parse_cap_string(argv[2]);
if (newval < 0)
return newval;
return 0;
}
if (strcmp(argv[1], "set") != 0)
return 1;
if (argc != 3)
return 1;
newval = strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 10);
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int ret;
if (argc<2)
return usage(argv[0]);
if ((ret=read_args(argc, argv)))
return ret;
if (cmd_getbcap)
return getbcap();
ret = setbcap(newval);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
return execl("/bin/bash", "/bin/bash", NULL);
}
===========================================================
Changelog:
Enforce current-> capabilities are subsets of the
new bounding set.
Return -EINVAL if no capabilities.
As suggested by Andrew Morgan, send the capability
version along with the bset for prctl(PR_SET_CAPBSET)
and PR_GET_CAPBSET)
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
---
include/linux/capability.h | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
include/linux/init_task.h | 1 +
include/linux/prctl.h | 4 ++++
include/linux/sched.h | 2 +-
include/linux/security.h | 5 -----
include/linux/sysctl.h | 3 ---
kernel/fork.c | 1 +
kernel/sys.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
kernel/sysctl.c | 35 -----------------------------------
kernel/sysctl_check.c | 7 -------
security/commoncap.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
11 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 57 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index 7a8d7ad..d853b0d 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -197,7 +197,6 @@ typedef __u32 kernel_cap_t;
#define CAP_IPC_OWNER 15
/* Insert and remove kernel modules - modify kernel without limit */
-/* Modify cap_bset */
#define CAP_SYS_MODULE 16
/* Allow ioperm/iopl access */
@@ -254,6 +253,7 @@ typedef __u32 kernel_cap_t;
arbitrary SCSI commands */
/* Allow setting encryption key on loopback filesystem */
/* Allow setting zone reclaim policy */
+/* Allow taking bits out of capability bounding set */
#define CAP_SYS_ADMIN 21
@@ -332,6 +332,17 @@ typedef __u32 kernel_cap_t;
#define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET to_cap_t(~0 & ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP))
#define CAP_INIT_INH_SET to_cap_t(0)
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
+/*
+ * Because of the reduced scope of CAP_SETPCAP when filesystem
+ * capabilities are in effect, it is safe to allow this capability to
+ * be available in the default configuration.
+ */
+# define CAP_INIT_BSET CAP_FULL_SET
+#else
+# define CAP_INIT_BSET CAP_INIT_EFF_SET
+#endif
+
#define CAP_TO_MASK(x) (1 << (x))
#define cap_raise(c, flag) (cap_t(c) |= CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
#define cap_lower(c, flag) (cap_t(c) &= ~CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
@@ -377,6 +388,17 @@ static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(kernel_cap_t c)
int capable(int cap);
int __capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMMONCAP
+extern int cap_prctl_setbset(unsigned long new_bset);
+extern int cap_prctl_getbset(unsigned long *bset);
+#else
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+static inline int cap_prctl_setbset(unsigned long new_bset)
+{ return -EINVAL; }
+static inline int cap_prctl_getbset(unsigned long *bset)
+{ return -EINVAL; }
+#endif
+
#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
#endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/init_task.h b/include/linux/init_task.h
index cae35b6..5c84d14 100644
--- a/include/linux/init_task.h
+++ b/include/linux/init_task.h
@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ extern struct group_info init_groups;
.cap_effective = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET, \
.cap_inheritable = CAP_INIT_INH_SET, \
.cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET, \
+ .cap_bset = CAP_INIT_BSET, \
.keep_capabilities = 0, \
.user = INIT_USER, \
.comm = "swapper", \
diff --git a/include/linux/prctl.h b/include/linux/prctl.h
index e2eff90..a7de023 100644
--- a/include/linux/prctl.h
+++ b/include/linux/prctl.h
@@ -63,4 +63,8 @@
#define PR_GET_SECCOMP 21
#define PR_SET_SECCOMP 22
+/* Get/set the capability bounding set */
+#define PR_GET_CAPBSET 23
+#define PR_SET_CAPBSET 24
+
#endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 4f21af1..7c21341 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -973,7 +973,7 @@ struct task_struct {
uid_t uid,euid,suid,fsuid;
gid_t gid,egid,sgid,fsgid;
struct group_info *group_info;
- kernel_cap_t cap_effective, cap_inheritable, cap_permitted;
+ kernel_cap_t cap_effective, cap_inheritable, cap_permitted, cap_bset;
unsigned keep_capabilities:1;
struct user_struct *user;
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index ff3f857..e2d2f06 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -34,11 +34,6 @@
#include <linux/xfrm.h>
#include <net/flow.h>
-/*
- * Bounding set
- */
-extern kernel_cap_t cap_bset;
-
extern unsigned securebits;
struct ctl_table;
diff --git a/include/linux/sysctl.h b/include/linux/sysctl.h
index e99171f..3771782 100644
--- a/include/linux/sysctl.h
+++ b/include/linux/sysctl.h
@@ -103,7 +103,6 @@ enum
KERN_NODENAME=7,
KERN_DOMAINNAME=8,
- KERN_CAP_BSET=14, /* int: capability bounding set */
KERN_PANIC=15, /* int: panic timeout */
KERN_REALROOTDEV=16, /* real root device to mount after initrd */
@@ -968,8 +967,6 @@ extern int proc_dostring(struct ctl_table *, int, struct file *,
void __user *, size_t *, loff_t *);
extern int proc_dointvec(struct ctl_table *, int, struct file *,
void __user *, size_t *, loff_t *);
-extern int proc_dointvec_bset(struct ctl_table *, int, struct file *,
- void __user *, size_t *, loff_t *);
extern int proc_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *, int, struct file *,
void __user *, size_t *, loff_t *);
extern int proc_dointvec_jiffies(struct ctl_table *, int, struct file *,
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index f85731a..df13a01 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -1082,6 +1082,7 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
p->security = NULL;
#endif
+ p->cap_bset = current->cap_bset;
p->io_context = NULL;
p->audit_context = NULL;
cgroup_fork(p);
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index 796299c..cff511f 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -1739,7 +1739,23 @@ asmlinkage long sys_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
case PR_SET_SECCOMP:
error = prctl_set_seccomp(arg2);
break;
-
+ case PR_GET_CAPBSET: {
+ unsigned long bset;
+ error = cap_prctl_getbset(&bset);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+ error = put_user(_LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION,
+ (__u32 __user *)arg2);
+ if (error)
+ break;
+ error = put_user(bset, (unsigned long __user *)arg3);
+ return error;
+ }
+ case PR_SET_CAPBSET:
+ if (arg2 != _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ error = cap_prctl_setbset(arg3);
+ break;
default:
error = -EINVAL;
break;
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index b11d22b..7bff6a2 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -363,15 +363,6 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
.proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_taint,
},
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES
- {
- .procname = "cap-bound",
- .data = &cap_bset,
- .maxlen = sizeof(kernel_cap_t),
- .mode = 0600,
- .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_bset,
- },
-#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES */
#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD
{
.ctl_name = KERN_REALROOTDEV,
@@ -1882,26 +1873,6 @@ static int do_proc_dointvec_bset_conv(int *negp, unsigned long *lvalp,
return 0;
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES
-/*
- * init may raise the set.
- */
-
-int proc_dointvec_bset(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
- void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
-{
- int op;
-
- if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE)) {
- return -EPERM;
- }
-
- op = is_global_init(current) ? OP_SET : OP_AND;
- return do_proc_dointvec(table,write,filp,buffer,lenp,ppos,
- do_proc_dointvec_bset_conv,&op);
-}
-#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES */
-
/*
* Taint values can only be increased
*/
@@ -2315,12 +2286,6 @@ int proc_dointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
return -ENOSYS;
}
-int proc_dointvec_bset(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
- void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
-{
- return -ENOSYS;
-}
-
int proc_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl_check.c b/kernel/sysctl_check.c
index 3c9ef5a..41c7f16 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl_check.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl_check.c
@@ -38,10 +38,6 @@ static struct trans_ctl_table trans_kern_table[] = {
{ KERN_NODENAME, "hostname" },
{ KERN_DOMAINNAME, "domainname" },
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES
- { KERN_CAP_BSET, "cap-bound" },
-#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES */
-
{ KERN_PANIC, "panic" },
{ KERN_REALROOTDEV, "real-root-dev" },
@@ -1535,9 +1531,6 @@ int sysctl_check_table(struct ctl_table *table)
(table->strategy == sysctl_ms_jiffies) ||
(table->proc_handler == proc_dostring) ||
(table->proc_handler == proc_dointvec) ||
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES
- (table->proc_handler == proc_dointvec_bset) ||
-#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES */
(table->proc_handler == proc_dointvec_minmax) ||
(table->proc_handler == proc_dointvec_jiffies) ||
(table->proc_handler == proc_dointvec_userhz_jiffies) ||
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 43f9027..5be15bb 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -36,9 +36,6 @@
# define CAP_INIT_BSET CAP_INIT_EFF_SET
#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
-kernel_cap_t cap_bset = CAP_INIT_BSET; /* systemwide capability bound */
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_bset);
-
/* Global security state */
unsigned securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT; /* systemwide security settings */
@@ -307,7 +304,8 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
/* Derived from fs/exec.c:compute_creds. */
kernel_cap_t new_permitted, working;
- new_permitted = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_permitted, cap_bset);
+ new_permitted = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_permitted,
+ current->cap_bset);
working = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_inheritable,
current->cap_inheritable);
new_permitted = cap_combine (new_permitted, working);
@@ -580,3 +578,34 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
}
+/*
+ * cap_prctl_setbset currently requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN. The reason is
+ * my fear that an ordinary user could selectively take capabilities
+ * out, then run a setuid root binary or binary with file capabilities,
+ * which would perform part of a dangerous action with CAP_SOMECAP1,
+ * then fail to perform the second part of the action because
+ * CAP_SOMECAP2 is not in bset, leaving things in an unsafe state,
+ * i.e a sensitive file owned by the non-root user because CAP_CHOWN
+ * was not allowed.
+ */
+int cap_prctl_setbset(unsigned long new_bset)
+{
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (!cap_issubset(new_bset, current->cap_bset))
+ return -EPERM;
+ current->cap_bset = new_bset;
+ current->cap_effective = cap_intersect(current->cap_effective,
+ new_bset);
+ current->cap_permitted = cap_intersect(current->cap_permitted,
+ new_bset);
+ current->cap_inheritable = cap_intersect(current->cap_inheritable,
+ new_bset);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int cap_prctl_getbset(unsigned long *bset)
+{
+ *bset = current->cap_bset;
+ return 0;
+}
--
1.5.1.1.GIT
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