mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Like Xu <like.xu.linux@gmail.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
	Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
	x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] KVM: x86/pt: Ignore all unknown Intel PT capabilities
Date: Tue, 11 Jan 2022 00:57:03 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YdzV33X5w6+tCamI@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220110034747.30498-1-likexu@tencent.com>

On Mon, Jan 10, 2022, Like Xu wrote:
> From: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
> 
> Some of the new Intel PT capabilities (e.g. SDM Vol3, 32.2.4 Event
> Tracing, it exposes details about the asynchronous events, when they are
> generated, and when their corresponding software event handler completes
> execution) cannot be safely and fully emulated by the KVM, especially
> emulating the simultaneous writing of guest PT packets generated by
> the KVM to the guest PT buffer.
> 
> For KVM, it's better to advertise currently supported features based on
> the "static struct pt_cap_desc" implemented in the host PT driver and
> ignore _all_ unknown features before they have been investigated one by
> one and supported in a safe manner, leaving the rest as system-wide-only
> tracing capabilities.
> 
> Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
> ---
> v1 -> v2 Changelog:
> - Be safe and ignore _all_ unknown capabilities. (Paolo)
> 
> Previous:
> https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20220106085533.84356-1-likexu@tencent.com/
> 
>  arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 ++
>  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> index 0b920e12bb6d..439b93359848 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> @@ -901,6 +901,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)
>  			break;
>  		}
>  
> +		/* It's better to be safe and ignore _all_ unknown capabilities. */

No need to justify why unknown capabilities are hidden as that's very much (supposed
to be) standard KVM behavior.

> +		entry->ebx &= GENMASK(5, 0);

Please add a #define somewhere so that this is self-documenting, e.g. see
KVM_SUPPORTED_XCR0.

And why just EBX?  ECX appears to enumerate features too, and EDX is presumably
reserved to enumerate yet more features when EBX/ECX run out of bits.

And is there any possibility of a malicious user/guest using features to cause
problems in the host?  I.e. does KVM need to enforce that the guest can't enable
any unsupported features?

>  		for (i = 1, max_idx = entry->eax; i <= max_idx; ++i) {
>  			if (!do_host_cpuid(array, function, i))
>  				goto out;
> -- 
> 2.33.1
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2022-01-11  0:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-01-10  3:47 Like Xu
2022-01-11  0:57 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2022-01-11  4:20   ` Like Xu
2022-01-11  6:24     ` Like Xu
2022-01-11  7:59     ` Xiaoyao Li
2022-01-11  8:15       ` Like Xu

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=YdzV33X5w6+tCamI@google.com \
    --to=seanjc@google.com \
    --cc=jmattson@google.com \
    --cc=joro@8bytes.org \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=like.xu.linux@gmail.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=vkuznets@redhat.com \
    --cc=wanpengli@tencent.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

Powered by JetHome