From: Like Xu <like.xu.linux@gmail.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] KVM: x86/pt: Ignore all unknown Intel PT capabilities
Date: Tue, 11 Jan 2022 14:24:18 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <a50909dd-fbe5-8e9c-4b98-784d3d0db178@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <80b40829-0d25-eb84-7bd7-f21685daeb20@gmail.com>
On 11/1/2022 12:20 pm, Like Xu wrote:
>> And is there any possibility of a malicious user/guest using features to cause
>> problems in the host? I.e. does KVM need to enforce that the guest can't enable
>> any unsupported features?
>
> If a user space is set up with features not supported by KVM, it owns the risk
> itself.
I seem to have misunderstood it. KVM should prevent and stop any malicious guest
from destroying other parts on the host, is this the right direction ?
>
> AFAI, the guest Intel PT introduces a great attack interface for the host and
> we only use the guest supported PT features in a highly trusted environment.
>
> I agree that more uncertainty and fixes can be triggered in the security motive,
> not expecting too much from this patch. :D
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-01-11 6:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-01-10 3:47 Like Xu
2022-01-11 0:57 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-01-11 4:20 ` Like Xu
2022-01-11 6:24 ` Like Xu [this message]
2022-01-11 7:59 ` Xiaoyao Li
2022-01-11 8:15 ` Like Xu
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