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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	x86@kernel.org, Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [patch 1/3] x86/fpu: Prevent FPU state corruption
Date: Mon, 2 May 2022 15:16:16 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Ym/ZoAIvawVUljjz@zn.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220501193102.588689270@linutronix.de>

On Sun, May 01, 2022 at 09:31:43PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> The latter is checking whether some other context already uses FPU in the
> kernel, but if that's not the case then it allows FPU to be used
> unconditionally even if the calling context interupted a fpregs_lock()

Unknown word [interupted] in commit message.
Suggestions: ['interrupted', ...

>  /*
>   * Can we use the FPU in kernel mode with the
>   * whole "kernel_fpu_begin/end()" sequence?

While at it, drop the "we": "Can the FPU be used in kernel mode... "

> - *
> - * It's always ok in process context (ie "not interrupt")
> - * but it is sometimes ok even from an irq.
>   */
>  bool irq_fpu_usable(void)
>  {
> -	return !in_interrupt() ||
> -		interrupted_user_mode() ||
> -		interrupted_kernel_fpu_idle();
> +	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(in_nmi()))
> +		return false;
> +
> +	/* In kernel FPU usage already active? */
> +	if (this_cpu_read(in_kernel_fpu))
> +		return false;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * When not in NMI or hard interrupt context, FPU can be used:

"... can be used in:"

> +	 *
> +	 * - Task context is safe except from within fpregs_lock()'ed
> +	 *   critical regions.
> +	 *
> +	 * - Soft interrupt processing context which cannot happen
> +	 *   while in a fpregs_lock()'ed critical region.

But those are only nitpicks. With those fixed:

Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

Thx.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

  reply	other threads:[~2022-05-02 13:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-05-01 19:31 [patch 0/3] " Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-01 19:31 ` [patch 1/3] " Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-02 13:16   ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2022-05-05  0:42   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-01 19:31 ` [patch 2/3] x86/fpu: Rename irq_fpu_usable() Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-02 13:57   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-05-01 19:31 ` [patch 3/3] x86/fpu: Make FPU protection more robust Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-02 14:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-05-02 15:58     ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-03  9:06       ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-05-04 15:36         ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-04 15:55           ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-04 16:45             ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-04 19:05               ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-04 21:04                 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-04 23:52                   ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-05  0:55                     ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-05  1:11                       ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-05  1:21                         ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-05 11:02                           ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-05 11:34                             ` David Laight
2022-05-05 11:35                               ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-05 11:53                                 ` David Laight
2022-05-06 22:34                               ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-07 13:50                                 ` David Laight
2022-05-05 13:48                             ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-06 22:15                 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-03  9:03   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-05-02 10:02 ` [patch 0/3] x86/fpu: Prevent FPU state corruption Filipe Manana
2022-05-02 12:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-05-04 15:40 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-04 18:05   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-18  1:02   ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-18 11:14     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-18 11:18       ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-18 13:09     ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-18 14:08       ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-25 20:36         ` Jason A. Donenfeld

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