From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
x86@kernel.org, Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Subject: Re: [patch 3/3] x86/fpu: Make FPU protection more robust
Date: Mon, 2 May 2022 16:35:10 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Ym/sHqKqmLOJubgE@zn.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220501193102.704267030@linutronix.de>
On Sun, May 01, 2022 at 09:31:47PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
> @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ struct fpu_state_config fpu_user_cfg __r
> struct fpstate init_fpstate __ro_after_init;
>
> /* Track in-kernel FPU usage */
> -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(bool, in_kernel_fpu);
> +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(bool, fpu_in_use);
>
> /*
> * Track which context is using the FPU on the CPU:
> @@ -50,6 +50,50 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(bool, in_kernel_fp
> DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fpu *, fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx);
>
> /**
> + * fpregs_lock - Lock FPU state for maintenance operations
"maintenance"?
> + *
> + * This protects against preemption, soft interrupts and in-kernel FPU
> + * usage on both !RT and RT enabled kernels.
> + *
> + * !RT kernels use local_bh_disable() to prevent soft interrupt processing
> + * and preemption.
> + *
> + * On RT kernels local_bh_disable() is not sufficient because it only
> + * serializes soft interrupt related sections via a local lock, but stays
> + * preemptible. Disabling preemption is the right choice here as bottom
> + * half processing is always in thread context on RT kernels so it
> + * implicitly prevents bottom half processing as well.
> + */
> +void fpregs_lock(void)
> +{
> + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT))
> + local_bh_disable();
> + else
> + preempt_disable();
So I'm wondering: can we get rid of this distinction and simply do
preempt_disable()?
Or can FPU be used in softirq processing too so we want to block that
there?
But even if, fpu_in_use will already state that fact...
...
> @@ -410,10 +433,9 @@ void kernel_fpu_begin_mask(unsigned int
> {
> preempt_disable();
>
> - WARN_ON_FPU(!kernel_fpu_usable());
> - WARN_ON_FPU(this_cpu_read(in_kernel_fpu));
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(!kernel_fpu_usable());
>
> - this_cpu_write(in_kernel_fpu, true);
> + this_cpu_write(fpu_in_use, true);
This starts to look awfully similar to fpregs_lock()...
>
> if (!(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD) &&
> !test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD)) {
> @@ -433,9 +455,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_fpu_begin_mask)
>
> void kernel_fpu_end(void)
> {
> - WARN_ON_FPU(!this_cpu_read(in_kernel_fpu));
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(!this_cpu_read(fpu_in_use));
>
> - this_cpu_write(in_kernel_fpu, false);
> + this_cpu_write(fpu_in_use, false);
> preempt_enable();
... and this to fpregs_unlock().
Can we use those here too instead of open-coding them mostly?
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-05-02 14:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-05-01 19:31 [patch 0/3] x86/fpu: Prevent FPU state corruption Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-01 19:31 ` [patch 1/3] " Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-02 13:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-05-05 0:42 ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-01 19:31 ` [patch 2/3] x86/fpu: Rename irq_fpu_usable() Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-02 13:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-05-01 19:31 ` [patch 3/3] x86/fpu: Make FPU protection more robust Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-02 14:35 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2022-05-02 15:58 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-03 9:06 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-05-04 15:36 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-04 15:55 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-04 16:45 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-04 19:05 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-04 21:04 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-04 23:52 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-05 0:55 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-05 1:11 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-05 1:21 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-05 11:02 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-05 11:34 ` David Laight
2022-05-05 11:35 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-05 11:53 ` David Laight
2022-05-06 22:34 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-07 13:50 ` David Laight
2022-05-05 13:48 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-06 22:15 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-03 9:03 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-05-02 10:02 ` [patch 0/3] x86/fpu: Prevent FPU state corruption Filipe Manana
2022-05-02 12:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-05-04 15:40 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-04 18:05 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-18 1:02 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-18 11:14 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-18 11:18 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-18 13:09 ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-18 14:08 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-25 20:36 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
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