From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, nslusarek@gmx.net,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] perf: Fix sys_perf_event_open() race against self
Date: Mon, 23 May 2022 11:48:43 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Yotmi2kM3mm+iPPU@FVFF77S0Q05N> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220520183806.GV2578@worktop.programming.kicks-ass.net>
Hi Peter,
On Fri, May 20, 2022 at 08:38:06PM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
>
> Norbert reported that it's possible to race sys_perf_event_open() such
> that the looser ends up in another context from the group leader,
> triggering many WARNs.
I'm hitting the same with my local arm64 Syzkaller instance, atop v5.18-rc6.
> The move_group case checks for races against itself, but the
> !move_group case doesn't, seemingly relying on the previous
> group_leader->ctx == ctx check. However, that check is racy due to not
> holding any locks at that time.
>
> Therefore, re-check the result after acquiring locks and bailing
> if they no longer match.
>
> Additionally, clarify the not_move_group case from the
> move_group-vs-move_group race.
>
> Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
> Reported-by: Norbert Slusarek <nslusarek@gmx.net>
> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
> ---
> kernel/events/core.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
>
> --- a/kernel/events/core.c
> +++ b/kernel/events/core.c
> @@ -12217,6 +12217,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
> * Do not allow to attach to a group in a different task
> * or CPU context. If we're moving SW events, we'll fix
> * this up later, so allow that.
> + *
> + * Racy, not holding group_leader->ctx->mutex, see comment with
> + * perf_event_ctx_lock().
> */
> if (!move_group && group_leader->ctx != ctx)
> goto err_context;
I assume that given we say we're not holding the mutex that this is truly racy,
and a concurrent write can happen at any time. If that's the case, shouldn't we
be using *_ONCE() to manipulate perf_event::ctx?
... or could we remove the racy read entirely, and just rely on the later
check with ctx->mutex held? We can always reach that by chance anyway, so
there's not a functional need to bail out early, and consistently using the
later test removes some potential for introducing similar races in future.
FWIW, with this patch as-is applied atop v5.18-rc6, I no longer see the issue
in testing with the reproducer Syzkaller came up with. That would normally take
a few seconds, but it now survives several minutes.
For posterity, that reproducer was:
----8<----
r0 = perf_event_open$cgroup(&(0x7f0000000100)={0x1, 0x80, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, @perf_config_ext}, 0xffffffffffffffff, 0x0, 0xffffffffffffffff, 0x0)
r1 = dup(r0)
perf_event_open(&(0x7f00000001c0)={0x0, 0x80, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x2, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, @perf_bp={0x0}}, 0xffffffffffffffff, 0x0, r1, 0x0) (async)
perf_event_open$cgroup(&(0x7f0000000100)={0x1, 0x80, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x10, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, @perf_bp={0x0, 0x5}, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xfffffffffffffffe, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x200000000000000}, 0xffffffffffffffff, 0x0, r1, 0x0)
---->8----
Thanks,
Mark.
> @@ -12282,6 +12285,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
> } else {
> perf_event_ctx_unlock(group_leader, gctx);
> move_group = 0;
> + goto not_move_group;
> }
> }
>
> @@ -12298,7 +12302,17 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
> }
> } else {
> mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex);
> +
> + /*
> + * Now that we hold ctx->lock, (re)validate group_leader->ctx == ctx,
> + * see the group_leader && !move_group test earlier.
> + */
> + if (group_leader && group_leader->ctx != ctx) {
> + err = -EINVAL;
> + goto err_locked;
> + }
> }
> +not_move_group:
>
> if (ctx->task == TASK_TOMBSTONE) {
> err = -ESRCH;
>
prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-05-23 10:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-05-20 18:38 Peter Zijlstra
2022-05-23 10:33 ` Ravi Bangoria
2022-11-16 22:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-11-17 10:33 ` Ravi Bangoria
2022-11-17 10:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-11-17 10:59 ` Ravi Bangoria
2022-11-17 11:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-11-17 13:38 ` Ravi Bangoria
2022-05-23 10:48 ` Mark Rutland [this message]
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