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From: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
To: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <iommu@lists.linux.dev>,
	<hch@infradead.org>, <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] swiotlb: fix a typo
Date: Wed, 31 Aug 2022 12:22:45 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Yw7iFQGpStC6YodP@gao-cwp> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cd53526d-2564-996b-7b0d-d1fe9f114590@arm.com>

On Tue, Aug 30, 2022 at 10:23:51AM +0100, Robin Murphy wrote:
>On 2022-08-26 10:50, Chao Gao wrote:
>> "overwirte" isn't a word. It should be "overwrite".
>> 
>> Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
>> ---
>> BTW, I am wondering if copying the original buffer to the tlb buffer
>> unconditionally will leak the original buffer to the VMM, especially
>> when VMM isn't trusted e.g., by confidential VMs. Would it be better
>> to zero the tlb buffer for dir == DMA_FROM_DEVICE?
>
>No, at the point of dma_map(), the buffer contents are owned by the caller,
>so if parts of that buffer are sensitive and shouldn't be exposed to DMA,
>then don't map the whole buffer for DMA. There are more DMA API
>implementations than SWIOTLB.
>

I am not sure if all existing drivers ensure that all buffers allocated
for DMA_FROM_DEVICE are zeroed/poisoned so that they don't have sensitive
data before dma_map(). If that isn't the case, bouncing the original contents
(left by the previous user of the buffer) effectively makes the contents
visible to host/VMM. I am afraid it may be a concern for confidential VMs.

>The whole point of bouncing the original contents here is that doing anything
>else effectively corrupts any part of the mapping that the device may end up
>*not* writing to - see the whole sordid original discussion (but don't be
>confused by the fact that the caller's original data happened to be zeros in
>that particular case).

Got it. Thanks for the explanation.

  reply	other threads:[~2022-08-31  4:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-08-26  9:50 Chao Gao
2022-08-30  9:23 ` Robin Murphy
2022-08-31  4:22   ` Chao Gao [this message]
2022-08-31  8:02     ` Robin Murphy
2022-09-07  8:39 ` Christoph Hellwig

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