From: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com>
To: "Tian, Kevin" <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
"jgg@nvidia.com" <jgg@nvidia.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>,
"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>,
"Josh Triplett" <josh@joshtriplett.org>,
"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
"rcu@vger.kernel.org" <rcu@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Yiwei Zhang <zzyiwei@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/5] KVM: VMX: Always honor guest PAT on CPUs that support self-snoop
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2024 16:55:04 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZfFp6HtYSmO4Q6sW@yzhao56-desk.sh.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <BN9PR11MB527688657D92896F1B19C2F98C2A2@BN9PR11MB5276.namprd11.prod.outlook.com>
> We'll certain fix the security hole on CPUs w/ self-snoop. In this case
> CPU accesses are guaranteed to be coherent and the vulnerability can
> only be exposed via non-coherent DMA which is supposed to be fixed
> by your coming series.
>
> But for old CPUs w/o self-snoop the hole can be exploited using either CPU
> or non-coherent DMA once the guest PAT is honored. As long as nobody
> is willing to actually fix the CPU path (is it possible?) I'm kind of convinced
We can cook a patch to check CPU self-snoop and force WB in EPT even for
non-coherent DMA if no self-snoop. Then back porting such a patch together
with the IOMMU side mitigation for non-coherent DMA.
Otherwise, IOMMU side mitigation alone is meaningless for platforms of CPU of
no self-snoop.
> by Sean that sustaining the old behavior is probably the best option...
Yes, as long as we think exposing secuirty hole on those platforms is acceptable.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-03-13 9:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-03-09 1:09 [PATCH 0/5] KVM: VMX: Drop MTRR virtualization, honor guest PAT Sean Christopherson
2024-03-09 1:09 ` [PATCH 1/5] KVM: x86: Remove VMX support for virtualizing guest MTRR memtypes Sean Christopherson
2024-03-11 7:44 ` Yan Zhao
2024-03-12 0:08 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-12 1:10 ` Dongli Zhang
2024-03-12 17:08 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-14 10:31 ` Dongli Zhang
2024-03-14 14:47 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-09 1:09 ` [PATCH 2/5] KVM: VMX: Drop support for forcing UC memory when guest CR0.CD=1 Sean Christopherson
2024-03-09 1:09 ` [PATCH 3/5] srcu: Add an API for a memory barrier after SRCU read lock Sean Christopherson
2024-03-09 1:09 ` [PATCH 4/5] KVM: x86: Ensure a full memory barrier is emitted in the VM-Exit path Sean Christopherson
2024-06-20 22:38 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-06-20 23:42 ` Paul E. McKenney
2024-06-21 0:52 ` Yan Zhao
2024-03-09 1:09 ` [PATCH 5/5] KVM: VMX: Always honor guest PAT on CPUs that support self-snoop Sean Christopherson
2024-03-11 1:16 ` Yan Zhao
2024-03-12 0:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-12 7:30 ` Tian, Kevin
2024-03-12 16:07 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-13 1:18 ` Yan Zhao
2024-03-13 8:52 ` Tian, Kevin
2024-03-13 8:55 ` Yan Zhao [this message]
2024-03-13 15:09 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-14 0:12 ` Yan Zhao
2024-03-14 1:00 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-25 3:43 ` Chao Gao
2024-04-01 22:29 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-30 9:35 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2024-08-30 11:05 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2024-08-30 13:47 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2024-08-30 13:52 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-30 14:06 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2024-08-30 14:37 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2024-08-30 16:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-02 8:23 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2024-09-02 1:44 ` Yan Zhao
2024-09-02 9:49 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2024-09-03 0:25 ` Yan Zhao
2024-09-03 15:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-03 16:20 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2024-09-04 2:28 ` Yan Zhao
2024-09-04 12:17 ` Yan Zhao
2024-09-05 0:41 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-05 9:43 ` Yan Zhao
2024-09-09 5:30 ` Yan Zhao
2024-09-09 13:24 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-09-09 16:04 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-10 1:05 ` Yan Zhao
2024-09-04 11:47 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2024-10-07 13:28 ` Linux regression tracking (Thorsten Leemhuis)
2024-10-07 13:38 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2024-10-07 14:04 ` Linux regression tracking (Thorsten Leemhuis)
2024-03-22 9:29 ` [PATCH 0/5] KVM: VMX: Drop MTRR virtualization, honor guest PAT Ma, Yongwei
2024-03-22 13:08 ` Yan Zhao
2024-03-25 6:56 ` Ma, XiangfeiX
2024-03-25 8:02 ` Ma, XiangfeiX
2024-06-05 23:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-06 0:03 ` Paul E. McKenney
2025-04-10 1:13 [PATCH 5/5] KVM: VMX: Always honor guest PAT on CPUs that support self-snoop Myrsky Lintu
2025-04-10 5:12 ` Yan Zhao
2025-04-10 10:05 ` Myrsky Lintu
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