From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: <x86@kernel.org>, Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/entry: Fix AC assertion
Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2020 16:58:43 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <a79f11e4-2b9f-ea8d-a032-dee84a500f73@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200824152135.GV1362448@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
On 24/08/2020 16:21, peterz@infradead.org wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 24, 2020 at 03:22:06PM +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>> On 24/08/2020 11:14, peterz@infradead.org wrote:
>>> The WARN added in commit 3c73b81a9164 ("x86/entry, selftests: Further
>>> improve user entry sanity checks") unconditionally triggers on my IVB
>>> machine because it does not support SMAP.
>>>
>>> For !SMAP hardware we patch out CLAC/STAC instructions and thus if
>>> userspace sets AC, we'll still have it set after entry.
>> Technically, you don't patch in, rather than patch out.
> True.
>
>>> Fixes: 3c73b81a9164 ("x86/entry, selftests: Further improve user entry sanity checks")
>>> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
>>> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
>>> ---
>>> arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h | 11 +++++++++--
>>> 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
>>> @@ -18,8 +18,15 @@ static __always_inline void arch_check_u
>>> * state, not the interrupt state as imagined by Xen.
>>> */
>>> unsigned long flags = native_save_fl();
>>> - WARN_ON_ONCE(flags & (X86_EFLAGS_AC | X86_EFLAGS_DF |
>>> - X86_EFLAGS_NT));
>>> + unsigned long mask = X86_EFLAGS_DF | X86_EFLAGS_NT;
>>> +
>>> + /*
>>> + * For !SMAP hardware we patch out CLAC on entry.
>>> + */
>>> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMAP))
>>> + mask |= X86_EFLAGS_AC;
>> The Xen PV ABI clears AC on entry for 64bit guests, because Linux is
>> actually running in Ring 3, and therefore susceptible to #AC's which
>> wouldn't occur natively.
> So do you then want it to be something like:
>
> if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMAP) ||
> (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64_BIT) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)))
>
> ? Or are you fine with the proposed?
Dealers choice, but this option would be slightly better overall.
(Are there any other cases where Linux will be running in Ring 3? I
haven't been paying attention to recent changes in PVOps.)
~Andrew
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-08-24 15:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-08-24 10:14 peterz
2020-08-24 14:22 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-08-24 15:21 ` peterz
2020-08-24 15:58 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2020-08-24 16:27 ` Jürgen Groß
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