From: "Jürgen Groß" <jgross@suse.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>, peterz@infradead.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/entry: Fix AC assertion
Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2020 18:27:46 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <f2929b26-5321-a0cb-49af-778842ba1f82@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <a79f11e4-2b9f-ea8d-a032-dee84a500f73@citrix.com>
On 24.08.20 17:58, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 24/08/2020 16:21, peterz@infradead.org wrote:
>> On Mon, Aug 24, 2020 at 03:22:06PM +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>> On 24/08/2020 11:14, peterz@infradead.org wrote:
>>>> The WARN added in commit 3c73b81a9164 ("x86/entry, selftests: Further
>>>> improve user entry sanity checks") unconditionally triggers on my IVB
>>>> machine because it does not support SMAP.
>>>>
>>>> For !SMAP hardware we patch out CLAC/STAC instructions and thus if
>>>> userspace sets AC, we'll still have it set after entry.
>>> Technically, you don't patch in, rather than patch out.
>> True.
>>
>>>> Fixes: 3c73b81a9164 ("x86/entry, selftests: Further improve user entry sanity checks")
>>>> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
>>>> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
>>>> ---
>>>> arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h | 11 +++++++++--
>>>> 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
>>>> @@ -18,8 +18,15 @@ static __always_inline void arch_check_u
>>>> * state, not the interrupt state as imagined by Xen.
>>>> */
>>>> unsigned long flags = native_save_fl();
>>>> - WARN_ON_ONCE(flags & (X86_EFLAGS_AC | X86_EFLAGS_DF |
>>>> - X86_EFLAGS_NT));
>>>> + unsigned long mask = X86_EFLAGS_DF | X86_EFLAGS_NT;
>>>> +
>>>> + /*
>>>> + * For !SMAP hardware we patch out CLAC on entry.
>>>> + */
>>>> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMAP))
>>>> + mask |= X86_EFLAGS_AC;
>>> The Xen PV ABI clears AC on entry for 64bit guests, because Linux is
>>> actually running in Ring 3, and therefore susceptible to #AC's which
>>> wouldn't occur natively.
>> So do you then want it to be something like:
>>
>> if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMAP) ||
>> (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64_BIT) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)))
>>
>> ? Or are you fine with the proposed?
>
> Dealers choice, but this option would be slightly better overall.
>
> (Are there any other cases where Linux will be running in Ring 3? I
> haven't been paying attention to recent changes in PVOps.)
I'm not aware of any other case running kernel code in ring 3.
Juergen
prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-08-24 16:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-08-24 10:14 peterz
2020-08-24 14:22 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-08-24 15:21 ` peterz
2020-08-24 15:58 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-08-24 16:27 ` Jürgen Groß [this message]
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