From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Eric Snowberg" <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>,
"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"David Woodhouse" <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
"Kanth Ghatraju" <kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com>,
"Konrad Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
"linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
"keyrings@vger.kernel.org" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
"open list" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: RFC: New LSM to control usage of x509 certificates
Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2023 13:08:47 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <a851227aaa75ab16b0d6dd93433e1ee1679715f9.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhRdU1CZJpPSEdSmui-Xirr0j261K=+SM7KiDwiPG-JSrQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, 2023-10-17 at 11:45 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 17, 2023 at 9:48 AM Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
> > On Thu, 2023-10-05 at 12:32 +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> > > > > > A complementary approach would be to create an
> > > > > > LSM (or a dedicated interface) to tie certificate properties to a set of
> > > > > > kernel usages, while still letting users configure these constraints.
> > > > >
> > > > > That is an interesting idea. Would the other security maintainers be in
> > > > > support of such an approach? Would a LSM be the correct interface?
> > > > > Some of the recent work I have done with introducing key usage and CA
> > > > > enforcement is difficult for a distro to pick up, since these changes can be
> > > > > viewed as a regression. Each end-user has different signing procedures
> > > > > and policies, so making something work for everyone is difficult. Letting the
> > > > > user configure these constraints would solve this problem.
> >
> > Something definitely needs to be done about controlling the usage of
> > x509 certificates. My concern is the level of granularity. Would this
> > be at the LSM hook level or even finer granaularity?
>
> You lost me, what do you mean by finer granularity than a LSM-based
> access control? Can you give an existing example in the Linux kernel
> of access control granularity that is finer grained than what is
> provided by the LSMs?
The current x509 certificate access control granularity is at the
keyring level. Any key on the keyring may be used to verify a
signature. Finer granularity could associate a set of certificates on
a particular keyring with an LSM hook - kernel modules, BPRM, kexec,
firmware, etc. Even finer granularity could somehow limit a key's
signature verification to files in particular software package(s) for
example.
Perhaps Mickaël and Eric were thinking about a new LSM to control usage
of x509 certificates from a totally different perspective. I'd like to
hear what they're thinking.
I hope this addressed your questions.
--
thanks,
Mimi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-10-17 17:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-09-08 21:34 [PATCH] certs: Restrict blacklist updates to the secondary trusted keyring Eric Snowberg
2023-09-11 13:29 ` Mimi Zohar
2023-09-11 16:51 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-09-11 22:17 ` Eric Snowberg
2023-09-11 23:08 ` Mimi Zohar
2023-09-12 2:00 ` Eric Snowberg
2023-09-12 11:54 ` Mimi Zohar
2023-09-12 17:11 ` Eric Snowberg
2023-09-12 22:47 ` Mimi Zohar
2023-09-13 2:40 ` Eric Snowberg
2023-09-13 10:21 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-09-13 22:29 ` Eric Snowberg
2023-09-14 8:34 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-10-05 10:32 ` RFC: New LSM to control usage of x509 certificates Mickaël Salaün
2023-10-05 14:05 ` Paul Moore
2023-10-17 13:39 ` Mimi Zohar
2023-10-17 15:45 ` Paul Moore
2023-10-17 17:08 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2023-10-17 17:29 ` Paul Moore
2023-10-17 17:58 ` Mimi Zohar
2023-10-17 18:51 ` Paul Moore
2023-10-17 19:34 ` Eric Snowberg
2023-10-18 14:14 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-10-18 23:12 ` Eric Snowberg
2023-10-19 9:12 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-10-19 23:08 ` Eric Snowberg
2023-10-20 15:05 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-10-20 15:26 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-10-20 15:53 ` Eric Snowberg
2023-09-11 22:04 ` [PATCH] certs: Restrict blacklist updates to the secondary trusted keyring Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-09-11 22:23 ` Eric Snowberg
2023-09-11 22:01 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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