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From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
	"Eric Snowberg" <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"David Woodhouse" <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
	"Kanth Ghatraju" <kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com>,
	"Konrad Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
	"keyrings@vger.kernel.org" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: RFC: New LSM to control usage of x509 certificates
Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2023 13:08:47 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <a851227aaa75ab16b0d6dd93433e1ee1679715f9.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhRdU1CZJpPSEdSmui-Xirr0j261K=+SM7KiDwiPG-JSrQ@mail.gmail.com>

On Tue, 2023-10-17 at 11:45 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 17, 2023 at 9:48 AM Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
> > On Thu, 2023-10-05 at 12:32 +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> > > > > > A complementary approach would be to create an
> > > > > > LSM (or a dedicated interface) to tie certificate properties to a set of
> > > > > > kernel usages, while still letting users configure these constraints.
> > > > >
> > > > > That is an interesting idea.  Would the other security maintainers be in
> > > > > support of such an approach?  Would a LSM be the correct interface?
> > > > > Some of the recent work I have done with introducing key usage and CA
> > > > > enforcement is difficult for a distro to pick up, since these changes can be
> > > > > viewed as a regression.  Each end-user has different signing procedures
> > > > > and policies, so making something work for everyone is difficult.  Letting the
> > > > > user configure these constraints would solve this problem.
> >
> > Something definitely needs to be done about controlling the usage of
> > x509 certificates.  My concern is the level of granularity.  Would this
> > be at the LSM hook level or even finer granaularity?
> 
> You lost me, what do you mean by finer granularity than a LSM-based
> access control?  Can you give an existing example in the Linux kernel
> of access control granularity that is finer grained than what is
> provided by the LSMs?

The current x509 certificate access control granularity is at the
keyring level.  Any key on the keyring may be used to verify a
signature.  Finer granularity could associate a set of certificates on
a particular keyring with an LSM hook - kernel modules, BPRM, kexec,
firmware, etc.  Even finer granularity could somehow limit a key's
signature verification to files in particular software package(s) for
example.

Perhaps Mickaël and Eric were thinking about a new LSM to control usage
of x509 certificates from a totally different perspective.  I'd like to
hear what they're thinking.

I hope this addressed your questions.

-- 
thanks,

Mimi


  reply	other threads:[~2023-10-17 17:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-09-08 21:34 [PATCH] certs: Restrict blacklist updates to the secondary trusted keyring Eric Snowberg
2023-09-11 13:29 ` Mimi Zohar
2023-09-11 16:51   ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-09-11 22:17     ` Eric Snowberg
2023-09-11 23:08       ` Mimi Zohar
2023-09-12  2:00         ` Eric Snowberg
2023-09-12 11:54           ` Mimi Zohar
2023-09-12 17:11             ` Eric Snowberg
2023-09-12 22:47               ` Mimi Zohar
2023-09-13  2:40                 ` Eric Snowberg
2023-09-13 10:21                   ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-09-13 22:29                     ` Eric Snowberg
2023-09-14  8:34                       ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-10-05 10:32                         ` RFC: New LSM to control usage of x509 certificates Mickaël Salaün
2023-10-05 14:05                           ` Paul Moore
2023-10-17 13:39                           ` Mimi Zohar
2023-10-17 15:45                             ` Paul Moore
2023-10-17 17:08                               ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2023-10-17 17:29                                 ` Paul Moore
2023-10-17 17:58                                   ` Mimi Zohar
2023-10-17 18:51                                     ` Paul Moore
2023-10-17 19:34                                       ` Eric Snowberg
2023-10-18 14:14                                         ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-10-18 23:12                                           ` Eric Snowberg
2023-10-19  9:12                                             ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-10-19 23:08                                               ` Eric Snowberg
2023-10-20 15:05                                                 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-10-20 15:26                                                   ` Roberto Sassu
2023-10-20 15:53                                                   ` Eric Snowberg
2023-09-11 22:04   ` [PATCH] certs: Restrict blacklist updates to the secondary trusted keyring Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-09-11 22:23     ` Eric Snowberg
2023-09-11 22:01 ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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