Re: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Set BHI_NO in guest when host is not affected by BHI

[Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>]

> +       /*
> +        * The following Intel CPUs are affected by BHI, but they don't have
> +        * the eIBRS feature. In that case, the default Spectre v2 mitigations
> +        * are enough to also mitigate BHI. We mark these CPUs with NO_BHI so
> +        * that X86_BUG_BHI doesn't get set and no extra BHI mitigation is
> +        * enabled.
> +        *
> +        * This avoids guest VMs from enabling extra BHI mitigation when this
> +        * is not needed. For guest, X86_BUG_BHI is never set for CPUs which
> +        * don't have the eIBRS feature. But this doesn't happen in guest VMs
> +        * as the virtualization can hide the eIBRS feature.
> +        */
> +       VULNWL_INTEL(IVYBRIDGE_X,               NO_BHI),
> +       VULNWL_INTEL(HASWELL_X,                 NO_BHI),
> +       VULNWL_INTEL(BROADWELL_X,               NO_BHI),
> +       VULNWL_INTEL(SKYLAKE_X,                 NO_BHI),
> +       VULNWL_INTEL(SKYLAKE_X,                 NO_BHI),

Isn't this at odds with the existing comment?

        /* When virtualized, eIBRS could be hidden, assume vulnerable */

Because it seems now that we've got two relatively conflicting pieces of
vulnerability information when running under a hypervisor.