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From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kvm: x86: disable KVM_FAST_MMIO_BUS
Date: Wed, 16 Aug 2017 23:25:35 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ac5c6c7e-1738-b1c6-96eb-6bdf198b67d2@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170816224815-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org>

On 16/08/2017 21:59, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 16, 2017 at 09:03:17PM +0200, Radim Krčmář wrote:
>> 2017-08-16 19:19+0200, Paolo Bonzini:
>>> On 16/08/2017 18:50, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
>>>> On Wed, Aug 16, 2017 at 03:30:31PM +0200, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
>>>>> While you can filter out instruction fetches, that's not enough.  A data
>>>>> read could happen because someone pointed the IDT to MMIO area, and who
>>>>> knows what the VM-exit instruction length points to in that case.
>>>>
>>>> Thinking more about it, I don't really see how anything
>>>> legal guest might be doing with virtio would trigger anything
>>>> but a fault after decoding the instruction. How does
>>>> skipping instruction even make sense in the example you give?
>>>
>>> There's no such thing as a legal guest.  Anything that the hypervisor
>>> does, that differs from real hardware, is a possible escalation path.
>>>
>>> This in fact makes me doubt the EMULTYPE_SKIP patch too.
>>
>> The main hack is that we expect EPT misconfig within a given range to be
>> a MMIO NULL write.  I think it is fine -- EMULTYPE_SKIP is a common path
>> that should have well tested error paths and, IIUC, virtio doesn't allow
>> any other access, so it is a problem of the guest if a buggy/malicious
>> application can access virtio memory.

Yes, I agree.  EMULTYPE_SKIP is fine because failed decoding still
causes an exception to be injected.  Maybe it's better to gate the
EMULTYPE_SKIP emulation on the exit qualification saying this is a write
and also not a page table walk---just in case.

>>>> how about we blacklist nested virt for this optimization?
>>
>> Not every hypervisor can be easily detected ...
> 
> Hypervisors that don't set a hypervisor bit in CPUID are violating the
> spec themselves, aren't they?  Anyway, we can add a management option
> for use in a nested scenario.

No, the hypervisor bit only says that CPUID leaf 0x40000000 is defined.
See for example
https://kb.vmware.com/selfservice/microsites/search.do?language=en_US&cmd=displayKC&externalId=1009458:
"Intel and AMD have also reserved CPUID leaves 0x40000000 - 0x400000FF
for software use. Hypervisors can use these leaves to provide an
interface to pass information from the hypervisor to the guest operating
system running inside a virtual machine. The hypervisor bit indicates
the presence of a hypervisor and that it is safe to test these
additional software leaves".

>> KVM uses standard features and SDM clearly says that the
>> instruction length field is undefined.
> 
> True. Let's see whether intel can commit to a stronger definition.
> I don't think there's any rush to make this change.

I disagree.  Relying on undefined processor features is a bad idea.

> It's just that this has been there for 3 years and people have built a
> product around this.

Around 700 clock cycles?

Paolo

  reply	other threads:[~2017-08-16 21:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-08-16 11:22 Paolo Bonzini
2017-08-16 12:07 ` Radim Krčmář
2017-08-16 13:37   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-08-16 14:06     ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2017-08-16 14:17       ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-08-17  8:15   ` David Hildenbrand
2017-08-16 12:58 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2017-08-16 13:05   ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-08-16 13:16     ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2017-08-16 13:30       ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-08-16 14:03         ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2017-08-16 16:50         ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2017-08-16 17:19           ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-08-16 19:03             ` Radim Krčmář
2017-08-16 19:59               ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2017-08-16 21:25                 ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2017-08-16 22:31                   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2017-08-17  9:00                     ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-08-17 12:14                       ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-08-17 13:23                         ` Radim Krčmář
2017-08-17 15:15                       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2017-08-17 13:51                     ` Radim Krčmář
2017-08-17 15:27                       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2017-08-16 19:47             ` Michael S. Tsirkin

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