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From: Lin Feng <linf@wangsu.com>
To: nicolas.bouchinet@clip-os.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-serial@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@ssi.gouv.fr>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>, Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
	Joel Granados <j.granados@samsung.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>,
	Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] coredump: Fixes core_pipe_limit sysctl proc_handler
Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2024 10:35:48 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <af2a2a7e-1604-4e24-bee6-f31498e0b25d@wangsu.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241112131357.49582-2-nicolas.bouchinet@clip-os.org>

Hi,

see comments below please.

On 11/12/24 21:13, nicolas.bouchinet@clip-os.org wrote:
> From: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@ssi.gouv.fr>
> 
> proc_dointvec converts a string to a vector of signed int, which is
> stored in the unsigned int .data core_pipe_limit.
> It was thus authorized to write a negative value to core_pipe_limit
> sysctl which once stored in core_pipe_limit, leads to the signed int
> dump_count check against core_pipe_limit never be true. The same can be
> achieved with core_pipe_limit set to INT_MAX.
> 
> Any negative write or >= to INT_MAX in core_pipe_limit sysctl would
> hypothetically allow a user to create very high load on the system by
> running processes that produces a coredump in case the core_pattern
> sysctl is configured to pipe core files to user space helper.
> Memory or PID exhaustion should happen before but it anyway breaks the
> core_pipe_limit semantic
> 
> This commit fixes this by changing core_pipe_limit sysctl's proc_handler
> to proc_dointvec_minmax and bound checking between SYSCTL_ZERO and
> SYSCTL_INT_MAX.
> 
> Fixes: a293980c2e26 ("exec: let do_coredump() limit the number of concurrent dumps to pipes")
> Signed-off-by: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@ssi.gouv.fr>
> ---
>  fs/coredump.c | 7 +++++--
>  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/coredump.c b/fs/coredump.c
> index 7f12ff6ad1d3e..8ea5896e518dd 100644
> --- a/fs/coredump.c
> +++ b/fs/coredump.c
> @@ -616,7 +616,8 @@ void do_coredump(const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo)
>  		cprm.limit = RLIM_INFINITY;
>  
>  		dump_count = atomic_inc_return(&core_dump_count);
> -		if (core_pipe_limit && (core_pipe_limit < dump_count)) {
> +		if ((core_pipe_limit && (core_pipe_limit < dump_count)) ||
> +		    (core_pipe_limit && dump_count == INT_MAX)) {

While comparing between 'unsigned int' and 'signed int', C deems them both
to 'unsigned int', so as an insane user sets core_pipe_limit to INT_MAX,
and dump_count(signed int) does overflow INT_MAX, checking for 
'core_pipe_limit < dump_count' is passed, thus codes skips core dump.

So IMO it's enough after changing proc_handler to proc_dointvec_minmax.

Others in this patch:
Reviewed-by: Lin Feng <linf@wangsu.com>

>  			printk(KERN_WARNING "Pid %d(%s) over core_pipe_limit\n",
>  			       task_tgid_vnr(current), current->comm);
>  			printk(KERN_WARNING "Skipping core dump\n");
> @@ -1024,7 +1025,9 @@ static struct ctl_table coredump_sysctls[] = {
>  		.data		= &core_pipe_limit,
>  		.maxlen		= sizeof(unsigned int),
>  		.mode		= 0644,
> -		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
> +		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax,
> +		.extra1		= SYSCTL_ZERO,
> +		.extra2		= SYSCTL_INT_MAX,
>  	},
>  	{
>  		.procname       = "core_file_note_size_limit",


  reply	other threads:[~2024-11-13  2:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-11-12 13:13 [PATCH 0/3] Fixes multiple sysctl proc_handler usage error nicolas.bouchinet
2024-11-12 13:13 ` [PATCH 1/3] coredump: Fixes core_pipe_limit sysctl proc_handler nicolas.bouchinet
2024-11-13  2:35   ` Lin Feng [this message]
2024-11-13 14:15     ` Nicolas Bouchinet
2024-11-14  1:34       ` Lin Feng
2024-11-14 14:25         ` Nicolas Bouchinet
2024-11-12 13:13 ` [PATCH 2/3] sysctl: Fix underflow value setting risk in vm_table nicolas.bouchinet
2024-11-13  2:37   ` Lin Feng
2024-11-12 13:13 ` [PATCH 3/3] tty: ldsic: fix tty_ldisc_autoload sysctl's proc_handler nicolas.bouchinet
2024-11-13  2:39   ` Lin Feng
2024-11-13  9:08   ` Jiri Slaby

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