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From: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	"Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@kernel.org>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@gmail.com>, "Ted Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
	LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC] Implement ambient capability set.
Date: Wed, 4 Feb 2015 15:51:53 -0600 (CST)	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.11.1502041542260.19035@gentwo.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20150204211617.GA20787@mail.hallyn.com>

On Wed, 4 Feb 2015, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:

> > task_no_new_privs(current) instead of ns_capable(current_user_ns(),
>
> ....  I'm ok with that.  And iiuc it shouldn't get in the way of
> Christoph's use case.  I'd just rather not have one set of convoluted
> new rules now, and the have to relax them later bc it turns out ppl
> needed that.
>
> Christoph, would your code run ok under NNP?

There are still binaries invoked that need more priviledges. Does not
work.

> > In fact, even with your proposal of writing a tool that does this and
> > then calls a helper, that helper might try to use privilege separation
> > and open a big hole because clearing pP is no longer sufficient to
> > drop privileges.  Changing the evolution rule as above would fix this.
>
> Yeah...  "because clearing pP is no longer sufficient to drop privileges"
> is reasonably convincing.

Well I'd rather have a way to avoid writing a tool. The best would be if
you could just set some caps and that would do it.

> > <bikeshed>
> > I don't like calling these "ambient".  I'd prefer something like
> > "ambiently inheritable," although that's a bit long-winded.
> > </bikeshed>

amb_inh?

Fixup patch:

Index: linux/security/commoncap.c
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/security/commoncap.c
+++ linux/security/commoncap.c
@@ -351,9 +351,10 @@ static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_cap
 		__u32 inheritable = caps->inheritable.cap[i];

 		/*
-		 * pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI)
+		 * pP' = (fA & fP) | (X & fP) | (pI & fI)
 		 */
-		new->cap_permitted.cap[i] = current_cred()->cap_ambient.cap[i] |
+		new->cap_permitted.cap[i] =
+			(current_cred()->cap_ambient.cap[i] & permitted) |
 			(new->cap_bset.cap[i] & permitted) |
 			(new->cap_inheritable.cap[i] & inheritable);

@@ -453,9 +454,13 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_bi
 		if (rc == -EINVAL)
 			printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: get_vfs_caps_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
 				__func__, rc, bprm->filename);
-		else if (rc == -ENODATA)
-			rc = 0;
-		goto out;
+		else if (rc != -ENODATA)
+			goto out;
+		rc = 0;
+		if (!cap_isclear(current_cred()->cap_ambient))
+			goto out;
+		*effective = true;
+		*has_cap = true;
 	}

 	rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_cap);
@@ -941,7 +946,10 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned
 		if (!cap_valid(arg2))
 			return -EINVAL;

-		new =prepare_creds();
+		if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), arg2))
+			return -EPERM;
+
+		new = prepare_creds();
 		if (arg3 == 0)
 			cap_lower(new->cap_ambient, arg2);
 		else

  parent reply	other threads:[~2015-02-04 21:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-02-04 18:49 Christoph Lameter
2015-02-04 20:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-02-04 21:16   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-02-04 21:24     ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-02-04 21:27       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-02-04 21:31         ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-02-04 21:51           ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-02-04 22:02             ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-02-04 22:32               ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-02-05  0:03                 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-02-04 21:57       ` Christoph Lameter
2015-02-04 22:29         ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-02-04 21:51     ` Christoph Lameter [this message]
2015-02-04 21:56       ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-02-04 22:01         ` Christoph Lameter
2015-02-04 22:02           ` [RFC] Implement ambient capability set V2 Christoph Lameter
2015-02-05  7:20 ` [RFC] Implement ambient capability set Michael Kerrisk

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