From: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@kernel.org>,
Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>,
Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@gmail.com>, "Ted Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC] Implement ambient capability set.
Date: Wed, 4 Feb 2015 15:57:33 -0600 (CST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.11.1502041555500.26435@gentwo.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrXJ3es8_wHr-ZSvqVbwdTam0AiP17axu7R8wYaVw4y-jw@mail.gmail.com>
On Wed, 4 Feb 2015, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> But someone will want to run *bash* as an untrusted user with, say,
> CAP_NET_BIND permitted and ambient. Then that user has a non-empty
> ambient set, and they can run a setuid-root program, and who knows
> what will go wrong? Requiring no_new_privs would prevent this type of
> failure entirely.
>
> If we need to relax that later, it's easy, I think. The rule's not
> that convoluted, and there's precedent for having new fancy features
> require setting no_new_privs first.
It would make the patch pointless. The case of having to run a setuid root
prpgrams from a shell that has the caps enabled is a routine thing for
testing etc.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-02-04 21:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-02-04 18:49 Christoph Lameter
2015-02-04 20:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-02-04 21:16 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-02-04 21:24 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-02-04 21:27 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-02-04 21:31 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-02-04 21:51 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-02-04 22:02 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-02-04 22:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-02-05 0:03 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-02-04 21:57 ` Christoph Lameter [this message]
2015-02-04 22:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-02-04 21:51 ` Christoph Lameter
2015-02-04 21:56 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-02-04 22:01 ` Christoph Lameter
2015-02-04 22:02 ` [RFC] Implement ambient capability set V2 Christoph Lameter
2015-02-05 7:20 ` [RFC] Implement ambient capability set Michael Kerrisk
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