From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@kernel.org>,
Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>,
Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] define convenient securebits masks for prctl users (v2)
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2009 08:09:24 +1100 (EST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.00.0911160808040.24730@tundra.namei.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cfd18e0f0911140042n265b95adve2121e143c21c8ad@mail.gmail.com>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: TEXT/PLAIN, Size: 5741 bytes --]
On Sat, 14 Nov 2009, Michael Kerrisk wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 29, 2009 at 10:51 PM, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> wrote:
> > On Thu, 29 Oct 2009, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> >
> >> Hi James, would you mind taking the following into
> >> security-testing?
> >
> >
> > Applied to
> > git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6#next
>
> It doesn't look like this change is in 2.6.32-rc7. Is it planned to
> push this out for 2.6.32?
No, this is being queued for the next kernel (2.6.33).
Currently, only fixes to regressions can be upstreamed for 2.6.32.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Michael
>
> >> The securebits are used by passing them to prctl with the
> >> PR_{S,G}ET_SECUREBITS commands. But the defines must be
> >> shifted to be used in prctl, which begs to be confused and
> >> misused by userspace. So define some more convenient
> >> values for userspace to specify. This way userspace does
> >>
> >> prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, SECBIT_NOROOT);
> >>
> >> instead of
> >>
> >> prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, 1 << SECURE_NOROOT);
> >>
> >> (Thanks to Michael for the idea)
> >>
> >> This patch also adds include/linux/securebits to the installed headers.
> >> Then perhaps it can be included by glibc's sys/prctl.h.
> >>
> >> Changelog:
> >> Oct 29: Stephen Rothwell points out that issecure can
> >> be under __KERNEL__.
> >> Oct 14: (Suggestions by Michael Kerrisk):
> >> 1. spell out SETUID in SECBIT_NO_SETUID*
> >> 2. SECBIT_X_LOCKED does not imply SECBIT_X
> >> 3. add definitions for keepcaps
> >> Oct 14: As suggested by Michael Kerrisk, don't
> >> use SB_* as that convention is already in
> >> use. Use SECBIT_ prefix instead.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
> >> Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
> >> Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
> >> Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
> >> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
> >> ---
> >> include/linux/Kbuild | 1 +
> >> include/linux/securebits.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++------
> >> 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/include/linux/Kbuild b/include/linux/Kbuild
> >> index 1feed71..5a53857 100644
> >> --- a/include/linux/Kbuild
> >> +++ b/include/linux/Kbuild
> >> @@ -330,6 +330,7 @@ unifdef-y += scc.h
> >> unifdef-y += sched.h
> >> unifdef-y += screen_info.h
> >> unifdef-y += sdla.h
> >> +unifdef-y += securebits.h
> >> unifdef-y += selinux_netlink.h
> >> unifdef-y += sem.h
> >> unifdef-y += serial_core.h
> >> diff --git a/include/linux/securebits.h b/include/linux/securebits.h
> >> index d2c5ed8..3340617 100644
> >> --- a/include/linux/securebits.h
> >> +++ b/include/linux/securebits.h
> >> @@ -1,6 +1,15 @@
> >> #ifndef _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H
> >> #define _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H 1
> >>
> >> +/* Each securesetting is implemented using two bits. One bit specifies
> >> + whether the setting is on or off. The other bit specify whether the
> >> + setting is locked or not. A setting which is locked cannot be
> >> + changed from user-level. */
> >> +#define issecure_mask(X) (1 << (X))
> >> +#ifdef __KERNEL__
> >> +#define issecure(X) (issecure_mask(X) & current_cred_xxx(securebits))
> >> +#endif
> >> +
> >> #define SECUREBITS_DEFAULT 0x00000000
> >>
> >> /* When set UID 0 has no special privileges. When unset, we support
> >> @@ -12,6 +21,9 @@
> >> #define SECURE_NOROOT 0
> >> #define SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED 1 /* make bit-0 immutable */
> >>
> >> +#define SECBIT_NOROOT (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT))
> >> +#define SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED))
> >> +
> >> /* When set, setuid to/from uid 0 does not trigger capability-"fixup".
> >> When unset, to provide compatiblility with old programs relying on
> >> set*uid to gain/lose privilege, transitions to/from uid 0 cause
> >> @@ -19,6 +31,10 @@
> >> #define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP 2
> >> #define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED 3 /* make bit-2 immutable */
> >>
> >> +#define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP))
> >> +#define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED \
> >> + (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED))
> >> +
> >> /* When set, a process can retain its capabilities even after
> >> transitioning to a non-root user (the set-uid fixup suppressed by
> >> bit 2). Bit-4 is cleared when a process calls exec(); setting both
> >> @@ -27,12 +43,8 @@
> >> #define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS 4
> >> #define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED 5 /* make bit-4 immutable */
> >>
> >> -/* Each securesetting is implemented using two bits. One bit specifies
> >> - whether the setting is on or off. The other bit specify whether the
> >> - setting is locked or not. A setting which is locked cannot be
> >> - changed from user-level. */
> >> -#define issecure_mask(X) (1 << (X))
> >> -#define issecure(X) (issecure_mask(X) & current_cred_xxx(securebits))
> >> +#define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS (issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
> >> +#define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED (issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED))
> >>
> >> #define SECURE_ALL_BITS (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) | \
> >> issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) | \
> >> --
> >> 1.6.1
> >>
> >
> > --
> > James Morris
> > <jmorris@namei.org>
> >
>
>
>
> --
> Michael Kerrisk
> Linux man-pages maintainer; http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/
> Author of "The Linux Programming Interface" http://blog.man7.org/
>
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
prev parent reply other threads:[~2009-11-15 21:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-10-29 16:40 Serge E. Hallyn
2009-10-29 21:51 ` James Morris
2009-11-14 8:42 ` Michael Kerrisk
2009-11-15 21:09 ` James Morris [this message]
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