Re: [RFC PATCH 0/2] keys: Address lookup_user_key() mutability

["Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>]

On Sun, Oct 04, 2026 at 08:54:06PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 24, 2026 at 08:55:16AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > The main objective in these patches is to remove to unneeded mutability
> > from key look ups. It does harm and brings no value so it is pretty obvious
> > to me that addressing this harmful behaviour is what we should do.
> > 
> > I based the first patch on what Jann suggested in [1]. Nothing too clever here
> > and I'm ofc open for further suggestions.
> > 
> > [1] https://lore.kernel.org/keyrings/CAG48ez0XjVSR=M--UBauTm8sJuc+ZbhKzaPa3a6wrSVHyoKevw@mail.gmail.com/
> > 
> > Jarkko Sakkinen (2):
> >   keys: Return user session keyring on lookup
> >   keys: Reject keyring creation with overridden credentials
> > 
> >  Documentation/security/keys/core.rst |  7 ++-
> >  security/keys/process_keys.c         | 65 +++++++++++++++-------------
> >  2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
> > 
> > --
> > 2.47.3
> > 
> 
> So.. should I move forward to with non-RFC v2?

Patch 2 absolutely makes sense, "doc, it hurts when I do this", "don't do
that then."

Regarding patch 1, that seems like quite a change in behavior, right?  I
don't see any docs or comments that promise the current behavior, but
has any userspace or subsystem come to depend on it?  I guess that, if so,
then it just has to create a link to the user session keyring like pam
(according to what I've read) does?

> Note that some tags (e.g., Fixes) are missing simply because this is RFC.
> 
> Br, Jarkko