From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/2] keys: Address lookup_user_key() mutability
Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2026 21:46:41 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <asPwkdi7ZdO4YoRu@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <asOhhCION3dwTAo+@hallyn.com>
On Mon, Oct 05, 2026 at 08:09:24AM -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> On Sun, Oct 04, 2026 at 08:54:06PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Thu, Sep 24, 2026 at 08:55:16AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > The main objective in these patches is to remove to unneeded mutability
> > > from key look ups. It does harm and brings no value so it is pretty obvious
> > > to me that addressing this harmful behaviour is what we should do.
> > >
> > > I based the first patch on what Jann suggested in [1]. Nothing too clever here
> > > and I'm ofc open for further suggestions.
> > >
> > > [1] https://lore.kernel.org/keyrings/CAG48ez0XjVSR=M--UBauTm8sJuc+ZbhKzaPa3a6wrSVHyoKevw@mail.gmail.com/
> > >
> > > Jarkko Sakkinen (2):
> > > keys: Return user session keyring on lookup
> > > keys: Reject keyring creation with overridden credentials
> > >
> > > Documentation/security/keys/core.rst | 7 ++-
> > > security/keys/process_keys.c | 65 +++++++++++++++-------------
> > > 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > --
> > > 2.47.3
> > >
> >
> > So.. should I move forward to with non-RFC v2?
>
> Patch 2 absolutely makes sense, "doc, it hurts when I do this", "don't do
> that then."
>
> Regarding patch 1, that seems like quite a change in behavior, right? I
> don't see any docs or comments that promise the current behavior, but
> has any userspace or subsystem come to depend on it? I guess that, if so,
> then it just has to create a link to the user session keyring like pam
> (according to what I've read) does?
Thanks a lot of responding.
I fully agree with you but I'd need help for evaluating things further.
1/2 based on Jann's email about the topic and my interpretation of the
suggestion. I neither used brains nor AI for this and consider the patch
merely as a conversation starter (and what a great success it was on doing
that) :-)
All feedback is good feedback at this point. I need supporting code to
remember/recall later on so at least this serves that purpose.
Br, Jarkko
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-05 18:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-24 5:55 Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-09-24 5:55 ` [RFC PATCH 1/2] keys: Return user session keyring on lookup Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-09-24 5:55 ` [RFC PATCH 2/2] keys: Reject keyring creation with overridden credentials Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-10-04 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH 0/2] keys: Address lookup_user_key() mutability Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-10-05 13:09 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2026-10-05 18:46 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
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