* [PATCH v2 0/2] crypto: caam - Fix RSA destination buffer handling
@ 2026-10-04 21:01 Changwei Zou
2026-10-04 21:01 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] crypto: caam - Fix wrong unmap operations Changwei Zou
` (2 more replies)
0 siblings, 3 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Changwei Zou @ 2026-10-04 21:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert, sahil.malhotra
Cc: davem, horia.geanta, pankaj.gupta, gaurav.jain, iuliana.prodan,
martin.kepplinger-novakovic, lukas, sahil.malhotra, changwei.zou,
linux-crypto, linux-kernel
This series fixes two issues in the rsa-caam driver.
Patch 1 fixes wrong unmap operations where rsa_pub_unmap() was called
regardless of the key type.
Patch 2 adds a bounce buffer to handle unaligned RSA destination
buffers on DMA-incoherent hardware such as i.MX8, fixing intermittent
-EKEYREJECTED errors when loading signed kernel modules.
Changes since v1:
- Patch 1: Add Fixes: tag; pick up Reviewed-by from Sahil Malhotra.
- Patch 2: Move the !bounce_buf check out of do_rsa_bounce_buf() into
the caller rsa_bounce_buf_done() so the helper is only entered when a
bounce buffer actually exists; add Reported-by/Closes and Tested-by
from Martin Kepplinger-Novakovic.
Link to v1:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/20260821045555.806471-1-changwei.zou@canonical.com/
Changwei Zou (2):
crypto: caam - Fix wrong unmap operations
crypto: caam - Use bounce buffer for unaligned RSA destination buffers
drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c | 123 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.h | 6 ++
2 files changed, 116 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v2 1/2] crypto: caam - Fix wrong unmap operations
2026-10-04 21:01 [PATCH v2 0/2] crypto: caam - Fix RSA destination buffer handling Changwei Zou
@ 2026-10-04 21:01 ` Changwei Zou
2026-10-04 21:02 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: caam - Use bounce buffer for unaligned RSA destination buffers Changwei Zou
2026-10-08 7:38 ` [PATCH v2 0/2] crypto: caam - Fix RSA destination buffer handling Herbert Xu
2 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Changwei Zou @ 2026-10-04 21:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert, sahil.malhotra
Cc: davem, horia.geanta, pankaj.gupta, gaurav.jain, iuliana.prodan,
martin.kepplinger-novakovic, lukas, sahil.malhotra, changwei.zou,
linux-crypto, linux-kernel
Both akcipher_do_one_req() and akcipher_enqueue_req() call rsa_pub_unmap()
regardless of the key type. priv_form only takes values FORM1/FORM2/FORM3
with no distinct public key enumerator.
Use key->d to distinguish public from private key operations, then
dispatch to the correct unmap function based on key->priv_form.
caam_rsa_set_priv_key_form() implicitly relies on zero-initialization
for priv_form. Set priv_form = FORM1 explicitly at the head of the function
for clarity and robustness.
Fixes: bf53795025a2 ("crypto: caam - add crypto_engine support for RSA algorithms")
Signed-off-by: Changwei Zou <changwei.zou@canonical.com>
Assisted-by: OpenCode:claude-sonnet-4.6
Reviewed-by: Sahil Malhotra <sahil.malhotra@nxp.com>
---
drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c
index cb001aa1de66..840271840cce 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c
@@ -379,6 +379,7 @@ static int akcipher_do_one_req(struct crypto_engine *engine, void *areq)
struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct caam_rsa_req_ctx *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req);
struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx_dma(tfm);
+ struct caam_rsa_key *key = &ctx->key;
struct device *jrdev = ctx->dev;
u32 *desc = req_ctx->edesc->hw_desc;
int ret;
@@ -391,7 +392,21 @@ static int akcipher_do_one_req(struct crypto_engine *engine, void *areq)
return ret;
if (ret != -EINPROGRESS) {
- rsa_pub_unmap(jrdev, req_ctx->edesc, req);
+ if (key->d) {
+ switch (key->priv_form) {
+ case FORM1:
+ rsa_priv_f1_unmap(jrdev, req_ctx->edesc, req);
+ break;
+ case FORM2:
+ rsa_priv_f2_unmap(jrdev, req_ctx->edesc, req);
+ break;
+ case FORM3:
+ rsa_priv_f3_unmap(jrdev, req_ctx->edesc, req);
+ break;
+ }
+ } else {
+ rsa_pub_unmap(jrdev, req_ctx->edesc, req);
+ }
rsa_io_unmap(jrdev, req_ctx->edesc, req);
kfree(req_ctx->edesc);
} else {
@@ -691,17 +706,19 @@ static int akcipher_enqueue_req(struct device *jrdev,
ret = caam_jr_enqueue(jrdev, desc, cbk, req);
if ((ret != -EINPROGRESS) && (ret != -EBUSY)) {
- switch (key->priv_form) {
- case FORM1:
- rsa_priv_f1_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
- break;
- case FORM2:
- rsa_priv_f2_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
- break;
- case FORM3:
- rsa_priv_f3_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
- break;
- default:
+ if (key->d) {
+ switch (key->priv_form) {
+ case FORM1:
+ rsa_priv_f1_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
+ break;
+ case FORM2:
+ rsa_priv_f2_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
+ break;
+ case FORM3:
+ rsa_priv_f3_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
+ break;
+ }
+ } else {
rsa_pub_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
}
rsa_io_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
@@ -992,6 +1009,8 @@ static int caam_rsa_set_priv_key_form(struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx,
size_t q_sz = raw_key->q_sz;
unsigned aligned_size;
+ rsa_key->priv_form = FORM1;
+
rsa_key->p = caam_read_raw_data(raw_key->p, &p_sz);
if (!rsa_key->p)
return -ENOMEM;
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: caam - Use bounce buffer for unaligned RSA destination buffers
2026-10-04 21:01 [PATCH v2 0/2] crypto: caam - Fix RSA destination buffer handling Changwei Zou
2026-10-04 21:01 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] crypto: caam - Fix wrong unmap operations Changwei Zou
@ 2026-10-04 21:02 ` Changwei Zou
2026-10-17 8:14 ` Stephane Debusne
2026-10-08 7:38 ` [PATCH v2 0/2] crypto: caam - Fix RSA destination buffer handling Herbert Xu
2 siblings, 1 reply; 8+ messages in thread
From: Changwei Zou @ 2026-10-04 21:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert, sahil.malhotra
Cc: davem, horia.geanta, pankaj.gupta, gaurav.jain, iuliana.prodan,
martin.kepplinger-novakovic, lukas, sahil.malhotra, changwei.zou,
linux-crypto, linux-kernel, Martin Kepplinger-Novakovic
The rsa-caam driver directly DMA-maps the destination buffer supplied by
the caller via req->dst without checking whether it meets the cacheline
alignment requirements of DMA-incoherent hardware such as i.MX8.
On CPUs with non-coherent DMA caches, if the destination buffer shares a
cacheline with other data (i.e. it is not cacheline-aligned), cache
writeback/invalidation during DMA can corrupt adjacent memory or cause
stale data to be read back. This manifests as intermittent -EKEYREJECTED
errors when loading signed kernel modules.
When any segment of req->dst is not cacheline-aligned in either its
start offset or length, allocate a single contiguous aligned bounce
buffer covering the full dst_len rounded up to a cacheline multiple,
redirect the operation to it, and copy the result back to the original
destination once the hardware has completed successfully.
Introduce a helper sg_is_dma_aligned() that checks both sg->offset and
sg->length for cacheline alignment. Checking sg->offset suffices for
the start address since physical pages are always page-aligned and
PAGE_SIZE is a multiple of dma_get_cache_alignment(). sg->length is
also checked to ensure the buffer end does not share a cacheline with
adjacent memory.
The intermittent error 'Key was rejected by service' on i.MX8 with CAAM
can be triggered when loading signed kernel modules:
for i in $(seq 1 100); do
sudo modprobe xfs 2>&1 && echo "SUCCESS on attempt $i" \
&& sudo rmmod xfs || echo "FAILED on attempt $i"
done
Reported-by: Martin Kepplinger-Novakovic <Martin.Kepplinger-Novakovic@ginzinger.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6029acc0f0ddfe25e2537c2866d54fd7f54bc182.camel@ginzinger.com
Signed-off-by: Changwei Zou <changwei.zou@canonical.com>
Assisted-by: OpenCode:claude-sonnet-4.6
Tested-by: Martin Kepplinger-Novakovic <martin.kepplinger-novakovic@ginzinger.com>
---
drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c | 80 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.h | 6 +++
2 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c
index 840271840cce..ec09c980a8e6 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c
@@ -59,6 +59,43 @@ static void rsa_io_unmap(struct device *dev, struct rsa_edesc *edesc,
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
}
+static int do_rsa_bounce_buf(struct akcipher_request *req,
+ struct caam_rsa_req_ctx *req_ctx, int req_err)
+{
+ int nents, err = 0;
+
+ /* Only copy back to the original destination on success */
+ if (!req_err) {
+ nents = sg_nents_for_len(req_ctx->orig_dst, req->dst_len);
+ if (nents < 0)
+ err = nents;
+ else if (sg_copy_from_buffer(req_ctx->orig_dst, nents,
+ req_ctx->bounce_buf,
+ req->dst_len) != req->dst_len)
+ err = -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ kfree(req_ctx->bounce_buf);
+ req_ctx->bounce_buf = NULL;
+ req->dst = req_ctx->orig_dst;
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static inline void rsa_bounce_buf_done(struct akcipher_request *req, int *err)
+{
+ struct caam_rsa_req_ctx *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req);
+ int cperr;
+
+ if (!req_ctx->bounce_buf)
+ return;
+
+ cperr = do_rsa_bounce_buf(req, req_ctx, *err);
+
+ if (!*err)
+ *err = cperr;
+}
+
static void rsa_pub_unmap(struct device *dev, struct rsa_edesc *edesc,
struct akcipher_request *req)
{
@@ -138,6 +175,7 @@ static void rsa_pub_done(struct device *dev, u32 *desc, u32 err, void *context)
rsa_pub_unmap(dev, edesc, req);
rsa_io_unmap(dev, edesc, req);
kfree(edesc);
+ rsa_bounce_buf_done(req, &ecode);
/*
* If no backlog flag, the completion of the request is done
@@ -181,6 +219,7 @@ static void rsa_priv_f_done(struct device *dev, u32 *desc, u32 err,
rsa_io_unmap(dev, edesc, req);
kfree(edesc);
+ rsa_bounce_buf_done(req, &ecode);
/*
* If no backlog flag, the completion of the request is done
@@ -246,6 +285,12 @@ static int caam_rsa_count_leading_zeros(struct scatterlist *sgl,
return tbytes - nbytes;
}
+static inline bool sg_is_dma_aligned(struct scatterlist *sg)
+{
+ return IS_ALIGNED(sg->offset, dma_get_cache_alignment()) &&
+ IS_ALIGNED(sg->length, dma_get_cache_alignment());
+}
+
static struct rsa_edesc *rsa_edesc_alloc(struct akcipher_request *req,
size_t desclen)
{
@@ -291,11 +336,34 @@ static struct rsa_edesc *rsa_edesc_alloc(struct akcipher_request *req,
req_ctx->fixup_src_len);
dst_nents = sg_nents_for_len(req->dst, req->dst_len);
+ req_ctx->bounce_buf = NULL;
+ req_ctx->orig_dst = req->dst;
+ if (req->dst_len > 0) {
+ struct scatterlist *sg;
+ int i;
+
+ for_each_sg(req->dst, sg, dst_nents, i) {
+ if (!sg_is_dma_aligned(sg)) {
+ req_ctx->bounce_buf =
+ kzalloc(ALIGN(req->dst_len,
+ dma_get_cache_alignment()),
+ flags);
+ if (!req_ctx->bounce_buf)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ sg_init_one(&req_ctx->dst, req_ctx->bounce_buf,
+ req->dst_len);
+ req->dst = &req_ctx->dst;
+ dst_nents = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
mapped_src_nents = dma_map_sg(dev, req_ctx->fixup_src, src_nents,
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (unlikely(!mapped_src_nents)) {
dev_err(dev, "unable to map source\n");
- return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ goto bounce_fail;
}
mapped_dst_nents = dma_map_sg(dev, req->dst, dst_nents,
DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
@@ -368,6 +436,10 @@ static struct rsa_edesc *rsa_edesc_alloc(struct akcipher_request *req,
dma_unmap_sg(dev, req->dst, dst_nents, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
src_fail:
dma_unmap_sg(dev, req_ctx->fixup_src, src_nents, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+bounce_fail:
+ kfree(req_ctx->bounce_buf);
+ req_ctx->bounce_buf = NULL;
+ req->dst = req_ctx->orig_dst;
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
@@ -409,6 +481,7 @@ static int akcipher_do_one_req(struct crypto_engine *engine, void *areq)
}
rsa_io_unmap(jrdev, req_ctx->edesc, req);
kfree(req_ctx->edesc);
+ rsa_bounce_buf_done(req, &ret);
} else {
ret = 0;
}
@@ -723,6 +796,7 @@ static int akcipher_enqueue_req(struct device *jrdev,
}
rsa_io_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
kfree(edesc);
+ rsa_bounce_buf_done(req, &ret);
}
return ret;
@@ -764,6 +838,7 @@ static int caam_rsa_enc(struct akcipher_request *req)
init_fail:
rsa_io_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
kfree(edesc);
+ rsa_bounce_buf_done(req, &ret);
return ret;
}
@@ -793,6 +868,7 @@ static int caam_rsa_dec_priv_f1(struct akcipher_request *req)
init_fail:
rsa_io_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
kfree(edesc);
+ rsa_bounce_buf_done(req, &ret);
return ret;
}
@@ -822,6 +898,7 @@ static int caam_rsa_dec_priv_f2(struct akcipher_request *req)
init_fail:
rsa_io_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
kfree(edesc);
+ rsa_bounce_buf_done(req, &ret);
return ret;
}
@@ -851,6 +928,7 @@ static int caam_rsa_dec_priv_f3(struct akcipher_request *req)
init_fail:
rsa_io_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
kfree(edesc);
+ rsa_bounce_buf_done(req, &ret);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.h b/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.h
index 96d03704c9be..efad91d6058f 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.h
@@ -103,6 +103,9 @@ struct caam_rsa_ctx {
* @src : input scatterlist (stripped of leading zeros)
* @fixup_src : input scatterlist (that might be stripped of leading zeros)
* @fixup_src_len : length of the fixup_src input scatterlist
+ * @dst : destination scatterlist backed by bounce buffer (if needed)
+ * @bounce_buf : DMA-aligned bounce buffer for destination (or NULL)
+ * @orig_dst : original destination scatterlist (before bounce substitution)
* @edesc : s/w-extended rsa descriptor
* @akcipher_op_done : callback used when operation is done
*/
@@ -110,6 +113,9 @@ struct caam_rsa_req_ctx {
struct scatterlist src[2];
struct scatterlist *fixup_src;
unsigned int fixup_src_len;
+ struct scatterlist dst;
+ u8 *bounce_buf;
+ struct scatterlist *orig_dst;
struct rsa_edesc *edesc;
void (*akcipher_op_done)(struct device *jrdev, u32 *desc, u32 err,
void *context);
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 0/2] crypto: caam - Fix RSA destination buffer handling
2026-10-04 21:01 [PATCH v2 0/2] crypto: caam - Fix RSA destination buffer handling Changwei Zou
2026-10-04 21:01 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] crypto: caam - Fix wrong unmap operations Changwei Zou
2026-10-04 21:02 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: caam - Use bounce buffer for unaligned RSA destination buffers Changwei Zou
@ 2026-10-08 7:38 ` Herbert Xu
2026-10-20 3:21 ` Changwei Zou
2 siblings, 1 reply; 8+ messages in thread
From: Herbert Xu @ 2026-10-08 7:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Changwei Zou
Cc: sahil.malhotra, davem, horia.geanta, pankaj.gupta, gaurav.jain,
iuliana.prodan, martin.kepplinger-novakovic, lukas,
sahil.malhotra, linux-crypto, linux-kernel
On Mon, Oct 05, 2026 at 08:01:58AM +1100, Changwei Zou wrote:
> This series fixes two issues in the rsa-caam driver.
>
> Patch 1 fixes wrong unmap operations where rsa_pub_unmap() was called
> regardless of the key type.
>
> Patch 2 adds a bounce buffer to handle unaligned RSA destination
> buffers on DMA-incoherent hardware such as i.MX8, fixing intermittent
> -EKEYREJECTED errors when loading signed kernel modules.
>
> Changes since v1:
> - Patch 1: Add Fixes: tag; pick up Reviewed-by from Sahil Malhotra.
> - Patch 2: Move the !bounce_buf check out of do_rsa_bounce_buf() into
> the caller rsa_bounce_buf_done() so the helper is only entered when a
> bounce buffer actually exists; add Reported-by/Closes and Tested-by
> from Martin Kepplinger-Novakovic.
>
> Link to v1:
> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/20260821045555.806471-1-changwei.zou@canonical.com/
>
> Changwei Zou (2):
> crypto: caam - Fix wrong unmap operations
> crypto: caam - Use bounce buffer for unaligned RSA destination buffers
>
> drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c | 123 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.h | 6 ++
> 2 files changed, 116 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
>
> --
> 2.43.0
Plesae check
https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261004210200.290119-1-changwei.zou%40canonical.com
Thanks,
--
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: caam - Use bounce buffer for unaligned RSA destination buffers
2026-10-04 21:02 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: caam - Use bounce buffer for unaligned RSA destination buffers Changwei Zou
@ 2026-10-17 8:14 ` Stephane Debusne
2026-10-17 10:20 ` Changwei Zou
0 siblings, 1 reply; 8+ messages in thread
From: Stephane Debusne @ 2026-10-17 8:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: changwei.zou
Cc: herbert, sahil.malhotra, sahil.malhotra, davem, horia.geanta,
pankaj.gupta, iuliana.prodan, martin.kepplinger-novakovic, lukas,
linux-crypto, linux-kernel, Stephane Debusne
Hi Changwei,
On i.MX8M Mini (CAAM era 9, non-coherent DMA, no IOMMU in front of the
CAAM), with both patches of this series applied on 6.18.57, rsa-caam
gives correct results again for callers whose destination buffer
shares a cache line with the request context:
- cfg80211 loads regulatory.db, which was rejected before;
- keyctl padd accepts a valid self-signed certificate, and
keyctl pkey_verify accepts 20 valid signatures (both failed with
EINVAL before);
- a test module comparing rsa-caam with rsa-generic over 200 public-key
operations per case (2048-bit key) reports no wrong result in any
case, including a destination placed right after the request context
(in place or not), crypto_akcipher_sync_encrypt() and
pkcs1(rsa-caam,sha256) verification. Without the series, these cases
failed in 198 to 200 of 200 operations, with bytes 0 to 23 of the
output holding stale data.
Only the public-key path was exercised. The requests did not use
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, so the crypto-engine path fixed by patch 1
was not reached.
Tested-by: Stephane Debusne <stephane.debusne@cynove.com>
I posted a series that addresses the same corruption on the caller
side, in crypto_akcipher_sync_prep() and rsassa_pkcs1_verify(), which
build these unaligned buffers:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/20261016090333.2247764-1-stephane.debusne@cynove.com/
The two approaches are complementary: with my series, the buffers from
these two callers are aligned and need no bounce, while your patch
covers any other caller.
Thanks,
Stephane
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: caam - Use bounce buffer for unaligned RSA destination buffers
2026-10-17 8:14 ` Stephane Debusne
@ 2026-10-17 10:20 ` Changwei Zou
2026-10-17 15:39 ` Stephane Debusne
0 siblings, 1 reply; 8+ messages in thread
From: Changwei Zou @ 2026-10-17 10:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stephane.debusne
Cc: changwei.zou, davem, herbert, jeffbarnes, horia.geanta,
iuliana.prodan, linux-crypto, linux-kernel, lukas,
martin.kepplinger-novakovic, pankaj.gupta, sahil.malhotra,
sahil.malhotra
Hi Stephane,
Thank you very much for your help with testing the patch.
In fact, I had previously submitted another patch to fix the bug on the caller side:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260731024446.786329-1-changwei.zou@canonical.com/
However, Herbert pointed out:
"In the Crypto API we don't ask the user to provide aligned data.
In general it's the driver's responsibility to ensure proper alignment."
https://lore.kernel.org/all/am2UMhd5CAhDiKBF@gondor.apana.org.au/
Therefore, I later switched to a driver-side solution.
I'll include your Tested-by tag when I submit the next version.
Thanks.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: caam - Use bounce buffer for unaligned RSA destination buffers
2026-10-17 10:20 ` Changwei Zou
@ 2026-10-17 15:39 ` Stephane Debusne
0 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Stephane Debusne @ 2026-10-17 15:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: changwei.zou
Cc: herbert, davem, jeffbarnes, lukas, horia.geanta, pankaj.gupta,
iuliana.prodan, sahil.malhotra, sahil.malhotra,
martin.kepplinger-novakovic, linux-crypto, linux-kernel
Hi Changwei,
On Sat, Oct 17, 2026 at 09:20:47PM +1100, Changwei Zou wrote:
> Therefore, I later switched to a driver-side solution.
Thanks for the explanation and the links. I have asked Herbert to drop
my series.
Stephane
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 0/2] crypto: caam - Fix RSA destination buffer handling
2026-10-08 7:38 ` [PATCH v2 0/2] crypto: caam - Fix RSA destination buffer handling Herbert Xu
@ 2026-10-20 3:21 ` Changwei Zou
0 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Changwei Zou @ 2026-10-20 3:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert
Cc: changwei.zou, davem, gaurav.jain, horia.geanta, iuliana.prodan,
jeffbarnes, stephane.debusne, linux-crypto, linux-kernel, lukas,
martin.kepplinger-novakovic, pankaj.gupta, sahil.malhotra,
sahil.malhotra
Hi Herbert,
Thanks for the review.
> If a caller provides an unaligned destination scatterlist where
> req->dst_len is larger than the actual RSA output size (such as
> key->n_sz), the bounce buffer is zero-initialized and sized to
> req->dst_len. [...] Could this corrupt adjacent data by copying zeroes
> over the trailing capacity of the caller's buffer? Should this copy
> only the actual hardware output size instead of the full buffer
> capacity?
There is no out-of-bounds access or adjacent-memory corruption: the
copy-back targets the caller's own dst (orig_dst) and is bounded by
req->dst_len, the buffer length the caller provided. It reads dst_len
bytes from the bounce buffer (sized ALIGN(dst_len, cacheline) >= dst_len)
and writes them into that same dst, so neither buffer is overrun.
That said, copying only the actual output size is a sensible improvement,
and I've applied it in v3: the copy-back is now bounded to the RSA output
size (key->n_sz) instead of req->dst_len. The hardware writes the full
modulus-width (n_sz) output - the RSA PDB has no separate output-length
field - and caam_rsa_enc()/caam_rsa_dec() guarantee dst_len >= n_sz, so
the trailing capacity of the caller's buffer is left untouched.
Another option, if keeping the full dst_len copy is preferred, is to seed
the bounce buffer with the caller's original destination contents before
the operation (rather than zero-initializing it) and copy all dst_len
bytes back afterwards. The hardware overwrites only [0, n_sz) with the
result, so [n_sz, dst_len) still holds the caller's original bytes and the
full copy-back leaves the trailing region unchanged. I went with the
simpler key->n_sz bound for v3, but I'm happy to switch to this if you
prefer.
Kind regards,
Changwei
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2026-10-20 3:21 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2026-10-04 21:01 [PATCH v2 0/2] crypto: caam - Fix RSA destination buffer handling Changwei Zou
2026-10-04 21:01 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] crypto: caam - Fix wrong unmap operations Changwei Zou
2026-10-04 21:02 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: caam - Use bounce buffer for unaligned RSA destination buffers Changwei Zou
2026-10-17 8:14 ` Stephane Debusne
2026-10-17 10:20 ` Changwei Zou
2026-10-17 15:39 ` Stephane Debusne
2026-10-08 7:38 ` [PATCH v2 0/2] crypto: caam - Fix RSA destination buffer handling Herbert Xu
2026-10-20 3:21 ` Changwei Zou
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