From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org,
serge@hallyn.com, akpm@osdl.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, baijiaju1990@gmail.com,
jjzuming@gmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KEYS: Protect user key quota access during instantiation
Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2026 16:00:12 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aszZ3KPvMMHLEJ0s@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <pm-key-management-objects-candidate-0001-v6-9876bf3e2116d47c065e@gmail.com>
On Mon, Oct 12, 2026 at 11:15:43AM +0800, Cen Zhang wrote:
> The owner account must remain alive throughout payload quota
> reservation. The user key type calls generic_key_instantiate(), which
> dereferences key->user in key_payload_reserve(), without holding
> key->sem. The construction mutex excludes other instantiators but does
> not exclude keyctl_chown_key().
I'm not following the term "owner account". It is neither an
actor in the concurrency scenario. What do you exactly mean
by it?
>
> A kernel caller can allocate an in-quota user key, retain its reference
> and instantiate it with a nonempty payload after publishing its serial.
> A concurrent task with Setattr permission and CAP_SYS_ADMIN can chown
> the still-uninstantiated key through KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL. If the key
> holds the last reference to its non-root account, instantiation has no
> authorization key, and the new owner has sufficient quota, this ordering
> is possible:
>
> Instantiator Chown task
> key_instantiate_and_link() keyctl_chown_key()
> lock key_construction_mutex down_write(key->sem)
> generic_key_instantiate()
> key_payload_reserve()
> load old = key->user
> transfer quota to new owner
> replace key->user
> up_write(key->sem)
> key_put(key)
> key_user_put(old)
> kfree(old)
> read old->uid
>
> Chown's final free falls between the old pointer load and the uid read.
> The read can therefore access freed struct key_user storage despite the
> caller retaining the key itself. Hold the read side of key->sem in a
> local user instantiation callback across generic_key_instantiate().
> Chown then cannot replace and release the account until the quota
> accesses finish. If chown goes first, instantiation takes the semaphore
> and uses the new account instead.
And account gets repeated here. I'm not sure hat accounts we are
talking about here.
I.e.
1. I get the scenario.
2. I read all of the text but I do not understand what I'm reading.
>
> Keep locking out of the shared helper, which is also called by
> big_key_update() with key->sem write-locked.
On the other hand this could be a bit more verbose.
>
> KASAN report as below:
>
> BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in key_payload_reserve+0x54d/0x560
>
>
> Fixes: 5801649d8b83 ("[PATCH] keys: let keyctl_chown() change a key's owner")
> Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>
> Assisted-by: LLM
>
> ---
>
> diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c
> index 6f88b507f92791bd9569673c5d6534d76c58a978..b6e09921c11658c09eb7d7954b2abd5b2b7017c1 100644
> --- a/security/keys/user_defined.c
> +++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c
> @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
> #include "internal.h"
>
> static int logon_vet_description(const char *desc);
> +static int user_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
>
> /*
> * user defined keys take an arbitrary string as the description and an
> @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ struct key_type key_type_user = {
> .name = "user",
> .preparse = user_preparse,
> .free_preparse = user_free_preparse,
> - .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate,
> + .instantiate = user_instantiate,
> .update = user_update,
> .revoke = user_revoke,
> .destroy = user_destroy,
> @@ -86,6 +87,19 @@ void user_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_free_preparse);
>
> +/*
> + * Keep the owner account stable while reserving quota during instantiation.
> + */
Also here as a kernel developer I do not comprehend what I do when I
keep "an own account stable". I don't have kernel idioms that match.
> +static int user_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
> +{
> + int ret;
> +
> + down_read(&key->sem);
> + ret = generic_key_instantiate(key, prep);
> + up_read(&key->sem);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> static void user_free_payload_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
> {
> struct user_key_payload *payload;
Not disagreeing with the fix but yeah would really like something else
than gibberish around the concurrency scenario.
Br, Jarkko
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-12 13:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-12 3:15 Cen Zhang
2026-10-12 13:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2026-10-12 13:03 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-10-12 13:30 ` Cen Zhang
2026-10-12 13:33 ` Cen Zhang
2026-10-12 13:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-10-12 13:59 ` Cen Zhang
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