From: "Serge Hallyn (AMD)" <sergeh@kernel.org>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: "Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
"Ada Smith" <adasmithgt@gmail.com>,
"Hungyu Lin" <dennylin0707@gmail.com>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Josef Bacik" <josef@toxicpanda.com>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"Serge Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
kernel-team@cloudflare.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6] Fix Landlock mediation of commoncap's capability checks
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2026 12:28:12 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <avSzvNROhDFEzdCl@shallyn-amd> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261110202436.2408244-1-mic@digikod.net>
On Tue, Nov 10, 2026 at 09:24:28PM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> Hi,
>
> This is series 1 of 3:
>
> * 1. fix Landlock mediation of commoncap's capability checks;
> 2. fix PR_SET_SECUREBITS mediation and add focused Landlock tests;
> 3. fix Landlock mediation of capabilities guarding LSM policies.
>
> LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE, merged for v7.4, denies capabilities
> through the LSM capable hook, but commoncap's mmap_addr, capset and
> vm_enough_memory hooks call cap_capable() directly. A domain that
> denies a capability can therefore still:
>
> - map memory below vm.mmap_min_addr (CAP_SYS_RAWIO), which defeats a
> mitigation for kernel NULL pointer dereferences;
> - add inheritable capabilities outside of its permitted set
> (CAP_SETPCAP), which lets a privileged sandbox without no_new_privs
> gain capabilities through execve(), although the domain still
> restricts their use;
> - use the admin memory reserve with vm.overcommit_memory=2
> (CAP_SYS_ADMIN).
>
> As SELinux does, patches 2 to 4 add Landlock's own check to these hooks,
> with commoncap's conditions, so they only deny what commoncap granted
> because of the capability. Patch 1 factors out the shared check. Patch
> 5 adds tests, including audit tests, that fail without the fixes. Patch
> 6 fixes the documentation, which overstated what the permission
> restricts and how its denials show.
>
> Two other direct capability-set checks are fixed separately:
>
> - PSI triggers (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE):
> https://patch.msgid.link/20261106120004.90041-1-dennylin0707@gmail.com
> - user namespace uid 0 mapping (CAP_SETFCAP):
> https://patch.msgid.link/20261110144205.2404088-1-mic@digikod.net
>
> Regards,
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn (AMD) <sergeh@kernel.org>
>
> Mickaël Salaün (6):
> landlock: Factor out capability denial checks
> landlock: Mediate CAP_SYS_RAWIO for mappings below mmap_min_addr
> landlock: Mediate CAP_SETPCAP for inheritable capabilities
> landlock: Mediate CAP_SYS_ADMIN for the admin memory reserve
> selftests/landlock: Test capability checks outside the capable hook
> landlock: Fix capability restriction documentation
>
> Documentation/security/landlock.rst | 8 +-
> Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 8 +-
> include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 6 +-
> security/landlock/cap.c | 110 +++-
> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c | 535 ++++++++++++++++++++
> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h | 4 +-
> 6 files changed, 650 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
>
>
> base-commit: 7475ea8b58616b33c04afb976cf0fbaad9dd63fb
> --
> 2.56.0
>
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-11 18:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-10 20:24 Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-10 20:24 ` [PATCH 1/6] landlock: Factor out capability denial checks Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-10 20:24 ` [PATCH 2/6] landlock: Mediate CAP_SYS_RAWIO for mappings below mmap_min_addr Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-10 20:24 ` [PATCH 3/6] landlock: Mediate CAP_SETPCAP for inheritable capabilities Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-10 20:24 ` [PATCH 4/6] landlock: Mediate CAP_SYS_ADMIN for the admin memory reserve Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-10 20:24 ` [PATCH 5/6] selftests/landlock: Test capability checks outside the capable hook Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-10 20:24 ` [PATCH 6/6] landlock: Fix capability restriction documentation Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-11 18:28 ` Serge Hallyn (AMD) [this message]
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