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From: "Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: Ada Smith <adasmithgt@gmail.com>,
	Hungyu Lin <dennylin0707@gmail.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Serge Hallyn <sergeh@kernel.org>,
	kernel-team@cloudflare.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/6] landlock: Mediate CAP_SETPCAP for inheritable capabilities
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 16:41:35 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <avx1r36MHsxhAzSf@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261117101157.2520463-4-mic@digikod.net>

On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 11:11:53AM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> A process in a domain that denies CAP_SETPCAP could still add
> capabilities outside of its permitted set to its inheritable set with
> capset(2), if it held CAP_SETPCAP.  cap_capset() checks CAP_SETPCAP with
> cap_capable() in cap_inh_is_capped(), so the check never reaches
> hook_capable().  Through file inheritable capabilities, such a set can
> grant new permitted capabilities on execve() when no_new_privs is not
> set, which is possible for a domain enforced by a task holding
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
> 
> Add a Landlock capset hook that checks CAP_SETPCAP against the domain
> under the same condition as cap_capset().  As with the mmap_addr hook,
> LSMs implement their own policy in this hook: SELinux checks capset with
> its own permission.
> 
> Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn (AMD) <sergeh@kernel.org>
> Fixes: 97c8386f1d74 ("landlock: Enforce capability restrictions")
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
> ---
> 
> Changes since v1:
> https://patch.msgid.link/20261110202436.2408244-4-mic@digikod.net
> - Add Serge Hallyn's Acked-by.
> ---
>  security/landlock/cap.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 30 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/security/landlock/cap.c b/security/landlock/cap.c
> index 10e1ca772b9c..c89e8d76db8c 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/cap.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/cap.c
> @@ -91,6 +91,35 @@ static int hook_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
>  	return check_cap(cred, cap, opts);
>  }
>  
> +/**
> + * hook_capset - Restrict inheritable capability changes
> + *
> + * @new: New credentials (unused).
> + * @old: Current credentials.
> + * @effective: New effective set (unused).
> + * @inheritable: New inheritable set.
> + * @permitted: New permitted set (unused).
> + *
> + * cap_capset() requires CAP_SETPCAP to add inheritable capabilities that are
> + * not in the old permitted set, but calls cap_capable() directly, which skips
> + * hook_capable().

It has taken me a bit of time to wrap my head around this one.

cap_capset() starts with:

	if (cap_inh_is_capped() &&
	    !cap_issubset(*inheritable,
			  cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable,
				      old->cap_permitted)))
		/* incapable of using this inheritable set */
		return -EPERM;

where cap_inh_is_capped() returns true if it does *not* have CAP_SETPCAP.

So when this Landlock hooks gets called, cap_capset() has already
checked that we either have CAP_SETPCAP or inheritable ⊆
(old->inheritable ⋃ old->permitted).  So the Landlock hook can check
for the cap_issubset(...) condition to see whether CAP_SETPCAP had to
be "used".

Maybe it would be easier to phrase it like that?


(A more specific nit about this comment, "calls cap_capable()
*directly*" has confused me a bit, since cap_capset() calls
cap_capable() only *indirectly* through cap_inh_is_capped().  Maybe
"promptly", or "immediately" would be better?)

> Check the same condition against the domain.  commoncap runs
> + * first, so this only sees requests that commoncap allowed.  capset(2) discards
> + * @new if this hook fails, so nothing is committed.
> + *
> + * Return: 0 if allowed, -EPERM if CAP_SETPCAP use is denied.
> + */
> +static int hook_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
> +		       const kernel_cap_t *effective,
> +		       const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
> +		       const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
> +{
> +	if (cap_issubset(*inheritable,
> +			 cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable, old->cap_permitted)))
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	return check_cap(old, CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_OPT_NONE);
> +}
> +
>  /**
>   * hook_mmap_addr - Restrict mappings below dac_mmap_min_addr
>   *
> @@ -113,6 +142,7 @@ static int hook_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
>  
>  static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, hook_capable),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, hook_capset),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, hook_mmap_addr),
>  };
>  
> -- 
> 2.56.0
> 

Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>

Code checks out, only minor comments about the documentation.  It has
taken me a bit to understand how the Landlock hook's logic matches the
one in cap_capset().

—Günther

  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-17 15:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-17 10:11 [PATCH v2 0/6] Fix Landlock mediation of commoncap's capability checks Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:11 ` [PATCH v2 1/6] landlock: Factor out capability denial checks Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 13:56   ` Günther Noack
2026-11-17 10:11 ` [PATCH v2 2/6] landlock: Mediate CAP_SYS_RAWIO for mappings below mmap_min_addr Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 14:23   ` Günther Noack
2026-11-17 10:11 ` [PATCH v2 3/6] landlock: Mediate CAP_SETPCAP for inheritable capabilities Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 15:41   ` Günther Noack [this message]
2026-11-17 10:11 ` [PATCH v2 4/6] landlock: Mediate CAP_SYS_ADMIN for the admin memory reserve Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 15:43   ` Günther Noack
2026-11-17 10:11 ` [PATCH v2 5/6] selftests/landlock: Test capability checks outside the capable hook Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:11 ` [PATCH v2 6/6] landlock: Fix capability restriction documentation Mickaël Salaün

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