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From: "Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: Ada Smith <adasmithgt@gmail.com>,
	Hungyu Lin <dennylin0707@gmail.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Serge Hallyn <sergeh@kernel.org>,
	kernel-team@cloudflare.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/6] landlock: Factor out capability denial checks
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 14:56:15 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <avxc_yI1fYx2qQ03@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261117101157.2520463-2-mic@digikod.net>

On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 11:11:51AM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> hook_capable() is the only place that checks a capability against a
> Landlock domain.  commoncap also makes capability decisions from other
> LSM hooks, and the following commits add Landlock counterparts for them.
> Move the check and its denial logging into check_cap() so that these
> hooks share it.
> 
> No functional change.
> 
> Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn (AMD) <sergeh@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
> ---
> 
> Changes since v1:
> https://patch.msgid.link/20261110202436.2408244-2-mic@digikod.net
> - Add Serge Hallyn's Acked-by.
> ---
>  security/landlock/cap.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
>  1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/landlock/cap.c b/security/landlock/cap.c
> index b4f491b09baa..fa59118e3486 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/cap.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/cap.c
> @@ -24,25 +24,21 @@ static const struct access_masks cap_permission = {
>  };
>  
>  /**
> - * hook_capable - Deny capability use for Landlock-sandboxed processes
> + * check_cap - Check a capability use against the domain of @cred
>   *
>   * @cred: Credentials being checked.
> - * @ns: Target user namespace (intentionally ignored; policy depends on the
> - *      acting credentials and @cap, not namespace ownership).
>   * @cap: Capability number (CAP_*).
>   * @opts: Capability check options.  CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT skips the denial record:
>   *        no audit record, no trace event, and no denial count.
>   *
>   * Pure bitmask check: denies the capability if it is not in the layer's allowed
> - * set.  This hook is purely restrictive: commoncap is registered with
> - * LSM_ORDER_FIRST so cap_capable() always runs first, which means Landlock can
> - * deny capabilities that commoncap would allow, but never grant capabilities
> - * that commoncap denied.
> + * set.  It does not check that @cred holds @cap: only call it for a capability
> + * that commoncap already granted.
>   *
>   * Return: 0 if allowed, -EPERM if capability use is denied.
>   */
> -static int hook_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> -			int cap, unsigned int opts)
> +static int check_cap(const struct cred *const cred, const int cap,
> +		     const unsigned int opts)
>  {
>  	const struct landlock_cred_security *subject;
>  	size_t denied_layer;
> @@ -72,6 +68,28 @@ static int hook_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
>  	return -EPERM;
>  }
>  
> +/**
> + * hook_capable - Deny capability use for Landlock-sandboxed processes
> + *
> + * @cred: Credentials being checked.
> + * @ns: Target user namespace (intentionally ignored; policy depends on the
> + *      acting credentials and @cap, not namespace ownership).
> + * @cap: Capability number (CAP_*).
> + * @opts: Capability check options, see check_cap().
> + *
> + * This hook is purely restrictive: commoncap is registered with LSM_ORDER_FIRST
> + * so cap_capable() always runs first, which means Landlock can deny
> + * capabilities that commoncap would allow, but never grant capabilities that
> + * commoncap denied.
> + *
> + * Return: 0 if allowed, -EPERM if capability use is denied.
> + */
> +static int hook_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> +			int cap, unsigned int opts)
> +{
> +	return check_cap(cred, cap, opts);
> +}
> +
>  static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, hook_capable),
>  };
> -- 
> 2.56.0
> 

Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>

  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-17 13:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-17 10:11 [PATCH v2 0/6] Fix Landlock mediation of commoncap's capability checks Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:11 ` [PATCH v2 1/6] landlock: Factor out capability denial checks Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 13:56   ` Günther Noack [this message]
2026-11-17 10:11 ` [PATCH v2 2/6] landlock: Mediate CAP_SYS_RAWIO for mappings below mmap_min_addr Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 14:23   ` Günther Noack
2026-11-17 10:11 ` [PATCH v2 3/6] landlock: Mediate CAP_SETPCAP for inheritable capabilities Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 15:41   ` Günther Noack
2026-11-17 10:11 ` [PATCH v2 4/6] landlock: Mediate CAP_SYS_ADMIN for the admin memory reserve Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 15:43   ` Günther Noack
2026-11-17 10:11 ` [PATCH v2 5/6] selftests/landlock: Test capability checks outside the capable hook Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:11 ` [PATCH v2 6/6] landlock: Fix capability restriction documentation Mickaël Salaün

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