From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Bradley Morgan <bradley.morgan@linux.dev>
Cc: "Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Josef Bacik" <josef@toxicpanda.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] userns: security: Inform LSMs of capability check during userns creation
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 09:15:30 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <avxvkuC5SP/0c+wr@hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5862E641-C0F8-45B2-B340-DF4506AC9FAF@linux.dev>
On Sat, Nov 14, 2026 at 02:44:24PM +0000, Bradley Morgan wrote:
> On 14 November 2026 14:34:07 GMT, Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> wrote:
> >Nov 13, 2026 15:54:37 Bradley Morgan <bradley.morgan@linux.dev>:
> >
> >> On 13 November 2026 21:39:33 GMT, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
> >> wrote:
> >>> On Wed, Nov 11, 2026 at 08:58:14PM +0000, Bradley Morgan wrote:
> >>>> Right now security_capable() gets called in create_user_ns() to
> >snapshot
> >>>> whether the parent could setfcap, but the LSM gets zero context on
> >where
> >>>> the check actually came from. It is the same story as setid: without a
> >>>> dedicated flag, security modules cannot tell this apart from regular
> >>>> capability checks.
> >>>>
> >>>> Add CAP_OPT_USERNS_CREATE and pass it along from create_user_ns().
> >>>
> >>> This should be patch 1/N in a set that introduces a user of it
> >>> in some lsm.
> >>
> >> hmm. Did you read Christians suggestion?
> >
> >I did, when he first sent it. Actually it seems to me that what the lsm
> >would really like to know is that this is not for an immediate use of
> >setfcap, but possible future use. But that doesn't really matter. I wasn't
> >judging the patch. I was just going by what i believe is general lsm
> >subsystem policy.
>
> ( my word wrapping client did not like that message :( )
Hm. yeah. (Do you mean word-wrapping or non-word-wrapping?) I see my
phone mailer made it all one line. I'll see if there's a setting for that.
> hmm, it's pre-reqed over the patch as on the lore link, so Christian may
> want to have a look at this obe
Did this line get cut off?
> >> Let's see if Christian or anyone
> >> else could suggest a nice little lsm user for this.
>
> >> If nobody responds, in coming days, I'll go and find and do a user for
> >it.
> >>
> >>>
> >>>> Suggested-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
> >>>> Link:
> >>>
> >https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261111-kommt-gischt-ohnedies-469998d2f219@brauner/
> >>>> Signed-off-by: Bradley Morgan <bradley.morgan@linux.dev>
> >>>> ---
> >>>> Thanks Christian for the suggestion :).
> >>>> ---
> >>>> include/linux/security.h | 2 ++
> >>>> kernel/user_namespace.c | 3 ++-
> >>>> 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >>>>
> >>>> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> >>>> index 40831fab54709..d24666a0b4833 100644
> >>>> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> >>>> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> >>>> @@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ struct nsset;
> >>>> #define CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT BIT(1)
> >>>> /* If capable is being called by a setid function */
> >>>> #define CAP_OPT_INSETID BIT(2)
> >>>> +/* Is capable being called from the user namespace creation path? */
> >>>> +#define CAP_OPT_USERNS_CREATE BIT(3)
> >>>>
> >>>> /* LSM Agnostic defines for security_sb_set_mnt_opts() flags */
> >>>> #define SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS 1
> >>>> diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> >>>> index 57b7f10be74e1..37480f6d8369f 100644
> >>>> --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
> >>>> +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> >>>> @@ -134,7 +134,8 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
> >>>> * audit: the creator may never map uid 0.
> >>>> */
> >>>> ns->parent_could_setfcap =
> >>>> - !security_capable(new, parent_ns, CAP_SETFCAP,
> >CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT);
> >>>> + !security_capable(new, parent_ns, CAP_SETFCAP,
> >>>> + CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT | CAP_OPT_USERNS_CREATE);
> >>>>
> >>>> ret = ns_common_init(ns);
> >>>> if (ret)
> >>>> --
> >>>> 2.53.0
> >>>
> >>
> >> --- Thanks!
> >
> >
>
> --- Thanks!
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-17 15:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-11 20:58 Bradley Morgan
2026-11-13 21:39 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2026-11-13 21:54 ` Bradley Morgan
2026-11-14 14:34 ` Serge Hallyn
2026-11-14 14:44 ` Bradley Morgan
2026-11-17 15:15 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
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