From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/kfence: Fix booting on 32bit non-PAE systems
Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2026 21:08:34 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <be707a1e-56c6-4174-b5d8-010a5380a4a3@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260126210612.2095681-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
On 26/01/2026 9:06 pm, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> The original patch inverted the PTE unconditionally to avoid
> L1TF-vulnerable PTEs, but Linux doesn't make this adjustment in 2-level
> paging.
>
> Adjust the logic to use the flip_protnone_guard() helper, which is a nop on
> 2-level paging but inverts the address bits in all other paging modes.
>
> This doesn't matter for the Xen aspect of the original change. Linux no
> longer supports running 32bit PV under Xen, and Xen doesn't support running
> any 32bit PV guests without using PAE paging.
>
> Fixes: b505f1944535 ("x86/kfence: avoid writing L1TF-vulnerable PTEs")
> Reported-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAKFNMokwjw68ubYQM9WkzOuH51wLznHpEOMSqtMoV1Rn9JV_gw@mail.gmail.com/
> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
> CC: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
> CC: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
> CC: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
> CC: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
> CC: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> CC: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
> CC: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
> CC: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
> CC: x86@kernel.org
> CC: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
> CC: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
> CC: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
> CC: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
> CC: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/kfence.h | 9 +++++----
> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kfence.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kfence.h
> index acf9ffa1a171..40cf6a5d781d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kfence.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kfence.h
> @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ static inline bool kfence_protect_page(unsigned long addr, bool protect)
> {
> unsigned int level;
> pte_t *pte = lookup_address(addr, &level);
> - pteval_t val;
> + pteval_t val, new;
>
> if (WARN_ON(!pte || level != PG_LEVEL_4K))
> return false;
> @@ -57,11 +57,12 @@ static inline bool kfence_protect_page(unsigned long addr, bool protect)
> return true;
>
> /*
> - * Otherwise, invert the entire PTE. This avoids writing out an
> - * L1TF-vulnerable PTE (not present, without the high address bits
> + * Otherwise, flip the Present bit, taking care to avoid writing an
> + * L1TF-vulenrable PTE (not present, without the high address bits
> * set).
> */
> - set_pte(pte, __pte(~val));
> + new = val ^ _PAGE_PRESENT;
> + set_pte(pte, __pte(flip_protnone_guard(val, new, PTE_PFN_MASK)));
>
> /*
> * If the page was protected (non-present) and we're making it
>
> base-commit: fcb70a56f4d81450114034b2c61f48ce7444a0e2
And I apparently can't spell. I'll do a v2 immediately, seeing as this
is somewhat urgent.
~Andrew
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-01-26 21:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-01-06 18:04 [PATCH] x86/kfence: Avoid writing L1TF-vulnerable PTEs Andrew Cooper
2026-01-07 11:31 ` Alexander Potapenko
2026-01-07 12:01 ` Andrew Cooper
2026-01-07 23:17 ` Andrew Morton
2026-01-26 19:07 ` [REGRESSION] x86_32 boot hang in 6.19-rc7 caused by b505f1944535 ("x86/kfence: avoid writing L1TF-vulnerable PTEs") Ryusuke Konishi
2026-01-26 19:39 ` Andrew Cooper
2026-01-26 19:52 ` Ryusuke Konishi
2026-01-26 19:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-01-26 20:22 ` Andrew Cooper
2026-01-26 20:41 ` Ryusuke Konishi
2026-01-26 20:43 ` Andrew Cooper
2026-01-26 20:25 ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-26 20:24 ` Andrew Morton
2026-01-26 20:36 ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-26 21:06 ` [PATCH] x86/kfence: Fix booting on 32bit non-PAE systems Andrew Cooper
2026-01-26 21:08 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2026-01-26 21:10 ` [PATCH v2] " Andrew Cooper
2026-01-26 21:24 ` Andrew Morton
2026-01-26 21:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-01-26 22:01 ` Andrew Cooper
2026-01-26 22:09 ` Borislav Petkov
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