mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Philipp Stanner <phasta@mailbox.org>
To: "Christian König" <christian.koenig@amd.com>,
	"Philipp Stanner" <phasta@kernel.org>,
	"Danilo Krummrich" <dakr@kernel.org>,
	"Maarten Lankhorst" <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>,
	"David Airlie" <airlied@gmail.com>,
	"Simona Vetter" <simona@ffwll.ch>,
	"Sumit Semwal" <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>,
	"Tvrtko Ursulin" <tvrtko.ursulin@igalia.com>,
	"Boris Brezillon" <boris.brezillon@collabora.com>,
	"Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] dma-buf/dma_fence: Make races for dma_fence_is_signaled() less likely
Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 12:04:32 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <bf3917fb3ba6bd34611f5aff63178d80c13ebc4d.camel@mailbox.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <600885fc-7e07-4713-b5c2-a470637040c8@amd.com>

On Mon, 2026-06-15 at 11:53 +0200, Christian König wrote:
> On 6/12/26 12:42, Philipp Stanner wrote:
> > dma_fence_is_signaled() returns whether a fence has been signaled
> > already. That function contains a fast path opportunistic check which is
> > not guarded by the lock and, according to Christian, cannot be guarded
> > by the lock without causing a massive performance regression.
> > 
> > This now means that dma_fence_is_signaled() can return true WHILE the
> > fence callbacks are still being executed. This is razy and has lead to
> > at least one bug solved in:
> > 
> > commit c8a5d5ea3ba6 ("nouveau: fix client work fence deletion race")
> > 
> > Make this race impossible, by simply setting the bit only once the
> > callbacks are actually completed.
> 
> Groundhog day, that has been suggested before and it simply doesn't work.
> 
> The flag is intentional set before calling the callbacks because the state needs to be visible.

It will be visible. Just later.

> 
> Just see dma_fence_default_wait() for an example why that approach doesn't work.

What's the issue? It will be set. Just later. Who is ordering with
whom?


I BTW suggest to write more code comments in the future to document all
these supposed pitfalls for those who will hack on that code base once
we have left.


P.

> 
> Regards,
> Christian.
> 
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Philipp Stanner <phasta@kernel.org>
> > ---
> >  drivers/dma-buf/dma-fence.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
> >  1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/drivers/dma-buf/dma-fence.c b/drivers/dma-buf/dma-fence.c
> > index c7ea1e75d38a..2416cc86ce93 100644
> > --- a/drivers/dma-buf/dma-fence.c
> > +++ b/drivers/dma-buf/dma-fence.c
> > @@ -359,8 +359,19 @@ void dma_fence_signal_timestamp_locked(struct dma_fence *fence,
> >  
> >  	dma_fence_assert_held(fence);
> >  
> > -	if (unlikely(test_and_set_bit(DMA_FENCE_FLAG_SIGNALED_BIT,
> > -				      &fence->flags)))
> > +	/*
> > +	 * First test the bit, so we don't signal an already signaled fence again.
> > +	 * The lock protects against multiple parties setting the bit. The bit
> > +	 * is then set at the end of the function.
> > +	 *
> > +	 * The background is that there is a fast path check in
> > +	 * dma_fence_is_signaled() which does not use lock protection and can
> > +	 * return true *while* the fence callbacks are still executing.
> > +	 *
> > +	 * This fast path check supposedly cannot be guarded by the lock because
> > +	 * of significant performance regressions.
> > +	 */
> > +	if (unlikely(test_bit(DMA_FENCE_FLAG_SIGNALED_BIT, &fence->flags)))
> >  		return;
> >  
> >  	trace_dma_fence_signaled(fence);
> > @@ -384,6 +395,9 @@ void dma_fence_signal_timestamp_locked(struct dma_fence *fence,
> >  		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cur->node);
> >  		cur->func(fence, cur);
> >  	}
> > +
> > +	// TODO: we need some barrier here, don't we?
> > +	set_bit(DMA_FENCE_FLAG_SIGNALED_BIT, &fence->flags);
> >  }
> >  EXPORT_SYMBOL(dma_fence_signal_timestamp_locked);
> >  

  reply	other threads:[~2026-06-15 10:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-06-12 10:42 Philipp Stanner
2026-06-15  9:53 ` Christian König
2026-06-15 10:04   ` Philipp Stanner [this message]
2026-06-15 10:09     ` Christian König
2026-06-15 10:36       ` Philipp Stanner
2026-06-15  9:56 ` Gary Guo
2026-06-15 14:16   ` Philipp Stanner
2026-06-15 11:11 ` Tvrtko Ursulin

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=bf3917fb3ba6bd34611f5aff63178d80c13ebc4d.camel@mailbox.org \
    --to=phasta@mailbox.org \
    --cc=airlied@gmail.com \
    --cc=boris.brezillon@collabora.com \
    --cc=christian.koenig@amd.com \
    --cc=dakr@kernel.org \
    --cc=dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=paulmck@kernel.org \
    --cc=phasta@kernel.org \
    --cc=simona@ffwll.ch \
    --cc=sumit.semwal@linaro.org \
    --cc=tvrtko.ursulin@igalia.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®