From: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@amd.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>,
Jiaxi Chen <jiaxi.chen@linux.intel.com>,
Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>,
Wyes Karny <wyes.karny@amd.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Santosh Shukla <santosh.shukla@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 10/11] KVM: SVM: implement support for vNMI
Date: Sun, 04 Dec 2022 19:18:55 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <c7629b0b246593ccf71661f2f8989e3a3acc3cbe.camel@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221129193717.513824-11-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
On Tue, 2022-11-29 at 21:37 +0200, Maxim Levitsky wrote:
> This patch implements support for injecting pending
> NMIs via the .kvm_x86_set_hw_nmi_pending using new AMD's vNMI
> feature.
>
> Note that the vNMI can't cause a VM exit, which is needed
> when a nested guest intercepts NMIs.
>
> Therefore to avoid breaking nesting, the vNMI is inhibited while
> a nested guest is running and instead, the legacy NMI window
> detection and delivery method is used.
>
> While it is possible to passthrough the vNMI if a nested guest
> doesn't intercept NMIs, such usage is very uncommon, and it's
> not worth to optimize for.
>
> Signed-off-by: Santosh Shukla <santosh.shukla@amd.com>
> Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c | 42 +++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 111 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 10 ++++
> 3 files changed, 140 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
> index e891318595113e..5bea672bf8b12d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
> @@ -623,6 +623,42 @@ static bool is_evtinj_nmi(u32 evtinj)
> return type == SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_NMI;
> }
Tiny bits of self review, I noticed some mistakes:
>
> +static void nested_svm_save_vnmi(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> +{
> + struct vmcb *vmcb01 = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
> +
> + /*
> + * Copy the vNMI state back to software NMI tracking state
> + * for the duration of the nested run
> + */
> +
> + svm->nmi_masked = vmcb01->control.int_ctl & V_NMI_MASK;
> + svm->vcpu.arch.nmi_pending += vmcb01->control.int_ctl & V_NMI_PENDING;
Sorry for a mistake here - this should be converted to a boolean first, something like that:
if (vmcb01->control.int_ctl & V_NMI_PENDING)
svm->vcpu.arch.nmi_pending++;
> +}
> +
> +static void nested_svm_restore_vnmi(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> +{
> + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
> + struct vmcb *vmcb01 = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
> +
> + /*
> + * Restore the vNMI state from the software NMI tracking state
> + * after a nested run
> + */
> +
> + if (svm->nmi_masked)
> + vmcb01->control.int_ctl |= V_NMI_MASK;
> + else
> + vmcb01->control.int_ctl &= ~V_NMI_MASK;
> +
> + if (vcpu->arch.nmi_pending) {
> + vcpu->arch.nmi_pending--;
> + vmcb01->control.int_ctl |= V_NMI_PENDING;
> + } else
> + vmcb01->control.int_ctl &= ~V_NMI_PENDING;
> +}
> +
> +
> static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
> unsigned long vmcb12_rip,
> unsigned long vmcb12_csbase)
> @@ -646,6 +682,9 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
> else
> int_ctl_vmcb01_bits |= (V_GIF_MASK | V_GIF_ENABLE_MASK);
>
> + if (vnmi)
> + nested_svm_save_vnmi(svm);
> +
> /* Copied from vmcb01. msrpm_base can be overwritten later. */
> vmcb02->control.nested_ctl = vmcb01->control.nested_ctl;
> vmcb02->control.iopm_base_pa = vmcb01->control.iopm_base_pa;
> @@ -1049,6 +1088,9 @@ int nested_svm_vmexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> svm_update_lbrv(vcpu);
> }
>
> + if (vnmi)
> + nested_svm_restore_vnmi(svm);
> +
> /*
> * On vmexit the GIF is set to false and
> * no event can be injected in L1.
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index cfed6ab29c839a..bf10adcf3170a8 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -230,6 +230,8 @@ module_param(dump_invalid_vmcb, bool, 0644);
> bool intercept_smi = true;
> module_param(intercept_smi, bool, 0444);
>
> +bool vnmi = true;
> +module_param(vnmi, bool, 0444);
>
> static bool svm_gp_erratum_intercept = true;
>
> @@ -1299,6 +1301,9 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
> avic_init_vmcb(svm, vmcb);
>
> + if (vnmi)
> + svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |= V_NMI_ENABLE;
> +
> if (vgif) {
> svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_STGI);
> svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CLGI);
> @@ -3487,6 +3492,39 @@ static void svm_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> ++vcpu->stat.nmi_injections;
> }
>
> +
> +static bool svm_get_hw_nmi_pending(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> + struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> +
> + if (!is_vnmi_enabled(svm))
> + return false;
> +
> + return !!(svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl & V_NMI_MASK);
> +}
> +
> +static bool svm_set_hw_nmi_pending(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> + struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> +
> + if (!is_vnmi_enabled(svm))
> + return false;
> +
> + if (svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl & V_NMI_PENDING)
> + return false;
> +
> + svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |= V_NMI_PENDING;
> + vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_INTR);
vmcb_mark_dirty is not needed I think now, as KVM always leaves the VMCB_INTR dirty bit
due to vTPR update.
Best regards,
Maxim Levitsky
> +
> + /*
> + * NMI isn't yet technically injected but
> + * this rough estimation should be good enough
> + */
> + ++vcpu->stat.nmi_injections;
> +
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> static void svm_inject_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool reinjected)
> {
> struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> @@ -3582,11 +3620,38 @@ static void svm_update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int tpr, int irr)
> svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_WRITE);
> }
>
> +static bool svm_get_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> + struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> +
> + if (is_vnmi_enabled(svm))
> + return svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl & V_NMI_MASK;
> + else
> + return svm->nmi_masked;
> +}
> +
> +static void svm_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked)
> +{
> + struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> +
> + if (is_vnmi_enabled(svm)) {
> + if (masked)
> + svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |= V_NMI_MASK;
> + else
> + svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl &= ~V_NMI_MASK;
> + } else {
> + svm->nmi_masked = masked;
> + if (masked)
> + svm_enable_iret_interception(svm);
> + else
> + svm_disable_iret_interception(svm);
> + }
> +}
> +
> bool svm_nmi_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> {
> struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb;
> - bool ret;
>
> if (!gif_set(svm))
> return true;
> @@ -3594,10 +3659,10 @@ bool svm_nmi_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_exit_on_nmi(svm))
> return false;
>
> - ret = (vmcb->control.int_state & SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK) ||
> - (svm->nmi_masked);
> + if (svm_get_nmi_mask(vcpu))
> + return true;
>
> - return ret;
> + return vmcb->control.int_state & SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK;
> }
>
> static int svm_nmi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
> @@ -3615,24 +3680,6 @@ static int svm_nmi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
> return 1;
> }
>
> -static bool svm_get_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> -{
> - return to_svm(vcpu)->nmi_masked;
> -}
> -
> -static void svm_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked)
> -{
> - struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> -
> - if (masked) {
> - svm->nmi_masked = true;
> - svm_enable_iret_interception(svm);
> - } else {
> - svm->nmi_masked = false;
> - svm_disable_iret_interception(svm);
> - }
> -}
> -
> bool svm_interrupt_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> {
> struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> @@ -3725,10 +3772,16 @@ static void svm_enable_nmi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> /*
> * Something prevents NMI from been injected. Single step over possible
> * problem (IRET or exception injection or interrupt shadow)
> + *
> + * With vNMI we should never need an NMI window
> + * (we can always inject vNMI either by setting VNMI_PENDING or by EVENTINJ)
> */
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(is_vnmi_enabled(svm)))
> + return;
> +
> svm->nmi_singlestep_guest_rflags = svm_get_rflags(vcpu);
> - svm->nmi_singlestep = true;
> svm->vmcb->save.rflags |= (X86_EFLAGS_TF | X86_EFLAGS_RF);
> + svm->nmi_singlestep = true;
> }
>
> static void svm_flush_tlb_current(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> @@ -4770,6 +4823,8 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
> .patch_hypercall = svm_patch_hypercall,
> .inject_irq = svm_inject_irq,
> .inject_nmi = svm_inject_nmi,
> + .get_hw_nmi_pending = svm_get_hw_nmi_pending,
> + .set_hw_nmi_pending = svm_set_hw_nmi_pending,
> .inject_exception = svm_inject_exception,
> .cancel_injection = svm_cancel_injection,
> .interrupt_allowed = svm_interrupt_allowed,
> @@ -5058,6 +5113,16 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
> pr_info("Virtual GIF supported\n");
> }
>
> +
> + vnmi = vgif && vnmi && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_VNMI);
> + if (vnmi)
> + pr_info("Virtual NMI enabled\n");
> +
> + if (!vnmi) {
> + svm_x86_ops.get_hw_nmi_pending = NULL;
> + svm_x86_ops.set_hw_nmi_pending = NULL;
> + }
> +
> if (lbrv) {
> if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LBRV))
> lbrv = false;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> index 587ddc150f9f34..0b7e1790fadde1 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ extern u32 msrpm_offsets[MSRPM_OFFSETS] __read_mostly;
> extern bool npt_enabled;
> extern int vgif;
> extern bool intercept_smi;
> +extern bool vnmi;
>
> enum avic_modes {
> AVIC_MODE_NONE = 0,
> @@ -553,6 +554,15 @@ static inline bool is_x2apic_msrpm_offset(u32 offset)
> (msr < (APIC_BASE_MSR + 0x100));
> }
>
> +static inline bool is_vnmi_enabled(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> +{
> + /* L1's vNMI is inhibited while nested guest is running */
> + if (is_guest_mode(&svm->vcpu))
> + return false;
> +
> + return !!(svm->vmcb01.ptr->control.int_ctl & V_NMI_ENABLE);
> +}
> +
> /* svm.c */
> #define MSR_INVALID 0xffffffffU
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-12-04 17:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 66+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-11-29 19:37 [PATCH v2 00/11] SVM: vNMI (with my fixes) Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-29 19:37 ` [PATCH v2 01/11] KVM: nSVM: don't sync back tlb_ctl on nested VM exit Maxim Levitsky
2022-12-05 14:05 ` Santosh Shukla
2022-12-06 12:13 ` Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-29 19:37 ` [PATCH v2 02/11] KVM: nSVM: clean up the copying of V_INTR bits from vmcb02 to vmcb12 Maxim Levitsky
2023-01-28 0:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-01-31 1:44 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-24 14:38 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-02-24 16:48 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-11-29 19:37 ` [PATCH v2 03/11] KVM: nSVM: explicitly raise KVM_REQ_EVENT on nested VM exit if L1 doesn't intercept interrupts Maxim Levitsky
2023-01-28 0:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-01-30 18:41 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-11-29 19:37 ` [PATCH v2 04/11] KVM: SVM: drop the SVM specific H_FLAGS Maxim Levitsky
2022-12-05 15:31 ` Santosh Shukla
2023-01-28 0:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-11-29 19:37 ` [PATCH v2 05/11] KVM: x86: emulator: stop using raw host flags Maxim Levitsky
2023-01-28 0:58 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-24 14:38 ` Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-29 19:37 ` [PATCH v2 06/11] KVM: SVM: add wrappers to enable/disable IRET interception Maxim Levitsky
2022-12-05 15:41 ` Santosh Shukla
2022-12-06 12:14 ` Maxim Levitsky
2022-12-08 12:09 ` Santosh Shukla
2022-12-08 13:44 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-01-31 21:07 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-13 14:50 ` Santosh Shukla
2022-11-29 19:37 ` [PATCH v2 07/11] KVM: x86: add a delayed hardware NMI injection interface Maxim Levitsky
2023-01-28 1:09 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-01-31 21:12 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-08 9:35 ` Santosh Shukla
2023-02-08 9:32 ` Santosh Shukla
2023-02-24 14:39 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-01-31 22:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-01 0:06 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-08 9:51 ` Santosh Shukla
2023-02-08 16:09 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-08 9:43 ` Santosh Shukla
2023-02-08 16:06 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-14 10:22 ` Santosh Shukla
2023-02-15 22:43 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-16 0:22 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-17 7:56 ` Santosh Shukla
2022-11-29 19:37 ` [PATCH v2 08/11] x86/cpu: Add CPUID feature bit for VNMI Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-29 19:37 ` [PATCH v2 09/11] KVM: SVM: Add VNMI bit definition Maxim Levitsky
2023-01-31 22:42 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-02 9:42 ` Santosh Shukla
2022-11-29 19:37 ` [PATCH v2 10/11] KVM: SVM: implement support for vNMI Maxim Levitsky
2022-12-04 17:18 ` Maxim Levitsky [this message]
2022-12-05 17:07 ` Santosh Shukla
2023-01-28 1:10 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-10 12:02 ` Santosh Shukla
2023-02-01 0:22 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-01 0:39 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-10 12:24 ` Santosh Shukla
2023-02-10 16:44 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-11-29 19:37 ` [PATCH v2 11/11] KVM: nSVM: implement support for nested VNMI Maxim Levitsky
2022-12-05 17:14 ` Santosh Shukla
2022-12-06 12:19 ` Maxim Levitsky
2022-12-08 12:11 ` Santosh Shukla
2023-02-01 0:44 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-12-06 9:58 ` [PATCH v2 00/11] SVM: vNMI (with my fixes) Santosh Shukla
2023-02-01 0:24 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-12-20 10:27 ` Maxim Levitsky
2022-12-21 18:44 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-01-15 9:05 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-01-28 1:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-01 19:13 ` Sean Christopherson
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=c7629b0b246593ccf71661f2f8989e3a3acc3cbe.camel@redhat.com \
--to=mlevitsk@redhat.com \
--cc=babu.moger@amd.com \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=jiaxi.chen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=jing2.liu@intel.com \
--cc=jmattson@google.com \
--cc=jpoimboe@kernel.org \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com \
--cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=sandipan.das@amd.com \
--cc=santosh.shukla@amd.com \
--cc=seanjc@google.com \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=wyes.karny@amd.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®