From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@huawei.com>,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, osalvador@suse.de,
nao.horiguchi@gmail.com, linmiaohe@huawei.com, mhocko@suse.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] hwpoison, memory_hotplug: lock folio before unmap hwpoisoned folio
Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2025 13:35:58 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <cbc86827-ee40-403e-8581-e415c534a990@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250113082718.1872494-3-mawupeng1@huawei.com>
On 13.01.25 09:27, Wupeng Ma wrote:
> From: Ma Wupeng <mawupeng1@huawei.com>
>
> Commit b15c87263a69 ("hwpoison, memory_hotplug: allow hwpoisoned pages to
> be offlined) add page poison checks in do_migrate_range in order to make
> offline hwpoisoned page possible by introducing isolate_lru_page and
> try_to_unmap for hwpoisoned page. However folio lock must be held before
> calling try_to_unmap. Add it to fix this problem.
>
> Waring will be produced if filio is not locked during unmap:
>
> ------------[ cut here ]------------
> kernel BUG at ./include/linux/swapops.h:400!
> Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
> Modules linked in:
> CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 411 Comm: bash Tainted: G W 6.13.0-rc1-00016-g3c434c7ee82a-dirty #41
> Tainted: [W]=WARN
> Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
> pstate: 40400005 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
> pc : try_to_unmap_one+0xb08/0xd3c
> lr : try_to_unmap_one+0x3dc/0xd3c
> Call trace:
> try_to_unmap_one+0xb08/0xd3c (P)
> try_to_unmap_one+0x3dc/0xd3c (L)
> rmap_walk_anon+0xdc/0x1f8
> rmap_walk+0x3c/0x58
> try_to_unmap+0x88/0x90
> unmap_poisoned_folio+0x30/0xa8
> do_migrate_range+0x4a0/0x568
> offline_pages+0x5a4/0x670
> memory_block_action+0x17c/0x374
> memory_subsys_offline+0x3c/0x78
> device_offline+0xa4/0xd0
> state_store+0x8c/0xf0
> dev_attr_store+0x18/0x2c
> sysfs_kf_write+0x44/0x54
> kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x118/0x1a8
> vfs_write+0x3a8/0x4bc
> ksys_write+0x6c/0xf8
> __arm64_sys_write+0x1c/0x28
> invoke_syscall+0x44/0x100
> el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0
> do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
> el0_svc+0x30/0xd0
> el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc8/0xcc
> el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
> Code: f9407be0 b5fff320 d4210000 17ffff97 (d4210000)
> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
>
> Fixes: b15c87263a69 ("hwpoison, memory_hotplug: allow hwpoisoned pages to be offlined")
> Signed-off-by: Ma Wupeng <mawupeng1@huawei.com>
> ---
> mm/memory_hotplug.c | 6 +++++-
> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/mm/memory_hotplug.c b/mm/memory_hotplug.c
> index 330668d37e44..9bedecfc3577 100644
> --- a/mm/memory_hotplug.c
> +++ b/mm/memory_hotplug.c
> @@ -1805,8 +1805,12 @@ static void do_migrate_range(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long end_pfn)
> (folio_test_large(folio) && folio_test_has_hwpoisoned(folio))) {
> if (WARN_ON(folio_test_lru(folio)))
> folio_isolate_lru(folio);
> - if (folio_mapped(folio))
> + if (folio_mapped(folio)) {
> + folio_lock(folio);
> unmap_poisoned_folio(folio, TTU_IGNORE_MLOCK | TTU_HWPOISON);
> + folio_unlock(folio);
> + }
The comment above says "have elevated reference counts", but I I wonder
if this code could race with un-poisoning (although probably a rare event).
If there is an elevated reference already, why not move that chunk after
the folio_try_get() and just drop the comment that describes the implied
magic?
I mean, migration of hwpoison is dangerous either way, so that's not the
biggest problem I guess :)
--
Cheers,
David / dhildenb
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-01-13 12:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-01-13 8:27 [PATCH 0/2] mm: memory_failure: unmap poisoned filio during migrate properly Wupeng Ma
2025-01-13 8:27 ` [PATCH 1/2] mm: memory_hotplug: add TTU_HWPOISON for poisoned folio during migrate Wupeng Ma
2025-01-13 13:02 ` David Hildenbrand
2025-01-14 3:37 ` mawupeng
2025-01-14 9:35 ` David Hildenbrand
2025-01-13 8:27 ` [PATCH 2/2] hwpoison, memory_hotplug: lock folio before unmap hwpoisoned folio Wupeng Ma
2025-01-13 12:35 ` David Hildenbrand [this message]
2025-01-14 9:08 ` mawupeng
2025-01-14 9:40 ` David Hildenbrand
2025-01-15 2:03 ` Miaohe Lin
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=cbc86827-ee40-403e-8581-e415c534a990@redhat.com \
--to=david@redhat.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=linmiaohe@huawei.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=mawupeng1@huawei.com \
--cc=mhocko@suse.com \
--cc=nao.horiguchi@gmail.com \
--cc=osalvador@suse.de \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®