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From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: tvrtko.ursulin@linux.intel.com,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	tursulin@ursulin.net, kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	acme@kernel.org, alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com,
	jolsa@redhat.com, namhyung@kernel.org, maddy@linux.vnet.ibm.com,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [RFC 0/5] perf: Per PMU access controls (paranoid setting)
Date: Mon, 1 Oct 2018 09:27:07 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <d7ae4c13-262c-a5fb-7e00-cda4b05772ad@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAG48ez0Ux6p-Bcu9ymNm_eMpydLm0-DSBYKp4XJRv27XO_QqeA@mail.gmail.com>

Hello Jann and Kees,

On 29.09.2018 1:02, Jann Horn wrote:
<SNIP>
> Ah, I guess the answer is "0", since you want to see data about what
> other users are doing.
> 
> Does the i915 PMU expose sampling events, counting events, or both?
> The thing about sampling events is that they AFAIK always let the user
> pick arbitrary data to collect - like register contents, or userspace
> stack memory -, and independent of the performance counter being
> monitored, this kind of access should not be permitted to other
> contexts. (But it might be that I misunderstand how perf works - I'm
> not super familiar with its API.)
> 

Currently *core* paranoid >= 1 (per-process mode) prevents simultaneous 
sampling on CPU events (perf record) and reading of uncore HW counters 
(perf stat -I), because uncore counters count system wide and that is 
allowed only when *core* paranoid <= 0.

Uncore counts collected simultaneously with CPU event samples can be 
correlated using timestamps taken from some common system clock e.g. 
CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW.

Could it be secure enough to still allow reading of system wide uncore 
HW counters when sampling of CPU events is limited to specific processes 
by *core* paranoid >= 1?

Thanks,
Alexey

  reply	other threads:[~2018-10-01  6:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-09-19 12:27 Tvrtko Ursulin
2018-09-19 12:27 ` [RFC 1/5] perf: Move some access checks later in perf_event_open Tvrtko Ursulin
2018-09-19 12:27 ` [RFC 2/5] perf: Pass pmu pointer to perf_paranoid_* helpers Tvrtko Ursulin
2018-09-19 12:27 ` [RFC 3/5] perf: Allow per PMU access control Tvrtko Ursulin
2018-09-27 20:15   ` Andi Kleen
2018-09-28  8:57     ` Tvrtko Ursulin
2018-09-19 12:27 ` [RFC 4/5] perf Documentation: Document the per PMU perf_event_paranoid interface Tvrtko Ursulin
2018-09-19 12:27 ` [RFC 5/5] tools/perf: Add support for per-PMU access control Tvrtko Ursulin
2018-09-28 10:26 ` [RFC 0/5] perf: Per PMU access controls (paranoid setting) Thomas Gleixner
2018-09-28 13:22   ` Tvrtko Ursulin
2018-09-28 14:02     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-09-28 14:56       ` Tvrtko Ursulin
2018-09-28 15:23         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-09-28 15:45       ` Alexey Budankov
2018-09-28 18:20         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-09-28 20:45           ` Andi Kleen
2018-09-29  6:19             ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-01  6:25           ` Alexey Budankov
2018-09-28 15:12     ` Jann Horn
2018-09-28 22:02       ` Jann Horn
2018-10-01  6:27         ` Alexey Budankov [this message]
2018-09-28 16:41   ` Mark Rutland
2018-09-28 17:23     ` Andi Kleen
2018-09-28 17:40       ` Mark Rutland
2018-09-28 20:49         ` Andi Kleen
2018-09-28 20:54           ` Jann Horn
2018-09-28 20:59             ` Andi Kleen
2018-09-28 21:22               ` Jann Horn
2018-09-28 21:27                 ` Andi Kleen
2018-10-01  6:25                   ` Alexey Budankov
2018-10-01 16:11                     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-01 16:15                       ` Jann Horn
2018-10-01 20:51                       ` Alexey Budankov
2018-10-02  6:40                         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-02 11:44                           ` Alexey Budankov
2018-10-03 17:01                         ` Jann Horn
2018-10-04 17:11                           ` Alexey Budankov
2018-09-29  6:30               ` Thomas Gleixner

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