From: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie@huawei.com>
To: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Yiqi Sun <sunyiqixm@gmail.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] arm64: syscall: Ensure saved x0 is kept in-sync with tracer updates
Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2026 20:28:26 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <da9c9d13-f23d-4e93-b4cc-9aae56fc678a@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260716120640.6590-1-will@kernel.org>
On 7/16/2026 8:06 PM, Will Deacon wrote:
> When seccomp support was originally added to arm64 in a1ae65b21941
> ("arm64: add seccomp support"), seccomp was erroneously called _before_
> the ptrace syscall-enter-stop and therefore the tracer could trivially
> manipulate the syscall register state after the seccomp check had
> passed. This was subsequently fixed in a5cd110cb836 ("arm64/ptrace: run
> seccomp after ptrace") by moving the seccomp check after the tracer has
> run. Unfortunately, a decade later, that fix has been reported to be
> incomplete.
>
> On arm64, both the first argument to a syscall and its eventual return
> value are allocated to register x0. In order to facilitate syscall
> restarting and querying of syscall arguments on the syscall exit path,
> the original value of x0 is stashed in 'struct pt_regs::orig_x0' early
> during the syscall entry path and is returned for the first argument by
> syscall_get_arguments(). Unlike 32-bit Arm, this stashed value is not
> directly exposed via ptrace() and so changes to register x0 made by the
> tracer on a syscall-enter-stop are not reflected in 'orig_x0'. This
> means that seccomp, syscall tracepoints and audit can observe a stale
> value for the register compared to the argument that will be observed by
> the actual syscall.
>
> Re-sync 'orig_x0' from x0 on the syscall entry path following a
> potential ptrace stop (i.e. PTRACE_EVENTMSG_SYSCALL_ENTRY or
> SECCOMP_RET_TRACE). This behaviour is limited to native tasks (because
> compat tasks expose 'orig_r0' to ptrace) where the syscall is not being
> skipped (because x0 is updated to hold the return value of -ENOSYS in
> that case).
>
> Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
> Cc: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie@huawei.com>
> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
> Reported-by: Yiqi Sun <sunyiqixm@gmail.com>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260529065444.1336608-1-sunyiqixm@gmail.com/
> Suggested-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
> Fixes: a5cd110cb836 ("arm64/ptrace: run seccomp after ptrace")
> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
> ---
>
> Changes since v1 (https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260714143600.23853-1-will@kernel.org):
> * Reworded and expanded comments and commit message per Jinjie's
> feedback
>
> arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
> index 4d08598e2891..390c9b2bd966 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
> @@ -2408,6 +2408,21 @@ static void report_syscall_exit(struct pt_regs *regs)
> }
> }
>
> +static void update_syscall_orig_x0_after_ptrace(struct pt_regs *regs)
> +{
> + /*
> + * Keep orig_x0 authoritative so that seccomp (via
> + * syscall_get_arguments()), audit and the restart path all see the same
> + * first argument the syscall is dispatched with, even if it has been
> + * updated by a tracer. Skip this for NO_SYSCALL (set either by the user
> + * or the tracer), as regs[0] holds the return value (see the comment in
> + * el0_svc_common()) and can be unwound using syscall_rollback().
> + * For compat tasks, orig_r0 is provided directly through GPR index 17.
> + */
> + if (!is_compat_task() && regs->syscallno != NO_SYSCALL)
> + regs->orig_x0 = regs->regs[0];
> +}
> +
> int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
> {
> unsigned long flags = read_thread_flags();
> @@ -2417,12 +2432,26 @@ int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
> ret = report_syscall_entry(regs);
> if (ret || (flags & _TIF_SYSCALL_EMU))
> return NO_SYSCALL;
> +
> + /*
> + * Ensure ptrace changes to x0 during a regular
> + * syscall-enter-stop (PTRACE_SYSCALL) are visible to
> + * subsequent seccomp checks, tracepoints and audit.
> + */
> + update_syscall_orig_x0_after_ptrace(regs);
> }
>
> /* Do the secure computing after ptrace; failures should be fast. */
> if (secure_computing() == -1)
> return NO_SYSCALL;
>
> + /*
> + * Ensure tracer changes to x0 during seccomp ptrace exit
> + * processing (SECCOMP_RET_TRACE) are visible to tracepoints and
> + * audit.
> + */
> + update_syscall_orig_x0_after_ptrace(regs);
LGTM
Reviewed-by: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie@huawei.com>
> +
> if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT))
> trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->syscallno);
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-16 12:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-16 12:06 Will Deacon
2026-07-16 12:28 ` Jinjie Ruan [this message]
2026-07-16 16:48 ` Will Deacon
2026-07-17 17:54 ` Will Deacon
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