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From: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
	Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>, Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>,
	David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Julia Cartwright <julia@ni.com>,
	Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>,
	Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>,
	Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 5/6] x86/alternative: Use a single access in text_poke() where possible
Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 13:10:52 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <e5ea3781-336d-7b03-a22e-5012e915affd@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190110180428.GG16556@linux.intel.com>



On 01/10/2019 07:04 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 12:57:57PM -0500, Steven Rostedt wrote:
>> On Thu, 10 Jan 2019 09:42:57 -0800
>> Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 12:32:43PM -0500, Steven Rostedt wrote:
>>>> On Thu, 10 Jan 2019 11:20:04 -0600
>>>> Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>> While I can't find a reason for hypervisors to emulate this instruction,
>>>>>> smarter people might find ways to turn it into a security exploit.
>>>>>
>>>>> Interesting point... but I wonder if it's a realistic concern.  BTW,
>>>>> text_poke_bp() also relies on undocumented behavior.
>>>>
>>>> But we did get an official OK from Intel that it will work. Took a bit
>>>> of arm twisting to get them to do so, but they did. And it really is
>>>> pretty robust.
>>>
>>> Did we (they?) list any caveats for this behavior?  E.g. I'm fairly
>>> certain atomicity guarantees go out the window if WC memtype is used.
>>
>> Note, the text_poke_bp() process was this: (nothing to do with atomic
>> guarantees)
>>
>> add breakpoint (one byte) to instruction.
>>
>> Sync all cores (send an IPI to each one).
>>
>> change the back half of the instruction (the rest of the instruction
>> after the breakpoint).
>>
>> Sync all cores
>>
>> Remove the breakpoint with the new byte of the new instruction.
>>
>>
>> What atomicity guarantee does the above require?
>
> I was asking in the context of static calls.  My understanding is that
> the write to change the imm32 of the CALL needs to be atomic from a
> code fetch perspective so that we don't jump to a junk address.
>

To avoid any issue with live patching the call instruction, what about
toggling between two call instructions: one would be the currently active
call, while the other would currently be inactive but to be used after a
change is made. You can safely patch the inactive call and then toggle
the call flow (using a jump label) between the active and inactive calls.

So instead of having a single call instruction:

	call function

You would have:

	STATIC_JUMP_IF_TRUE label, key
	call function1
	jmp done
label:
	call function2
done:

If the key is set so that function1 is currently called then you can
safely update the call instruction for function2. Once this is done,
just flip the key to make the function2 call active. On a next update,
you would, of course, have to switch and update the call for function1.


alex.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-01-11 12:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 90+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-01-09 22:59 [PATCH v3 0/6] Static calls Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-09 22:59 ` [PATCH v3 1/6] compiler.h: Make __ADDRESSABLE() symbol truly unique Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-09 22:59 ` [PATCH v3 2/6] static_call: Add basic static call infrastructure Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-10 14:03   ` Edward Cree
2019-01-10 18:37     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-09 22:59 ` [PATCH v3 3/6] x86/static_call: Add out-of-line static call implementation Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-10  0:16   ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-10 16:28     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-09 22:59 ` [PATCH v3 4/6] static_call: Add inline static call infrastructure Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-09 22:59 ` [PATCH v3 5/6] x86/alternative: Use a single access in text_poke() where possible Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-10  9:32   ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-10 17:20     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-10 17:29       ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-10 17:32       ` Steven Rostedt
2019-01-10 17:42         ` Sean Christopherson
2019-01-10 17:57           ` Steven Rostedt
2019-01-10 18:04             ` Sean Christopherson
2019-01-10 18:21               ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-10 18:24               ` Steven Rostedt
2019-01-11 12:10               ` Alexandre Chartre [this message]
2019-01-11 15:28                 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-11 16:46                   ` Alexandre Chartre
2019-01-11 16:57                     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-11 17:41                       ` Jason Baron
2019-01-11 17:54                         ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-15 11:10                       ` Alexandre Chartre
2019-01-15 16:19                         ` Steven Rostedt
2019-01-15 16:45                           ` Alexandre Chartre
2019-01-11  0:59           ` hpa
2019-01-11  1:34             ` Sean Christopherson
2019-01-11  8:13               ` hpa
2019-01-09 22:59 ` [PATCH v3 6/6] x86/static_call: Add inline static call implementation for x86-64 Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-10  1:21 ` [PATCH v3 0/6] Static calls Nadav Amit
2019-01-10 16:44   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-10 17:32     ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-10 18:18       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-10 19:45         ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-10 20:32           ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-10 20:48             ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-10 20:57               ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-10 21:47                 ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-10 17:31 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-01-10 20:51   ` H. Peter Anvin
2019-01-10 20:30 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-01-10 20:52   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-10 23:02     ` Linus Torvalds
2019-01-11  0:56       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-01-11  1:47         ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-11 15:15           ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-11 15:48             ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-11 16:07               ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-11 17:23                 ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-11 19:03             ` Linus Torvalds
2019-01-11 19:17               ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-11 19:23               ` hpa
2019-01-11 19:33                 ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-11 19:34                 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-01-13  0:34                   ` hpa
2019-01-13  0:36                   ` hpa
2019-01-11 19:39                 ` Jiri Kosina
2019-01-14  2:31                   ` H. Peter Anvin
2019-01-14  2:40                     ` H. Peter Anvin
2019-01-14 20:11                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-01-14 22:00                       ` H. Peter Anvin
2019-01-14 22:54                         ` H. Peter Anvin
2019-01-15  3:05                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-01-15  5:01                             ` H. Peter Anvin
2019-01-15  5:37                               ` H. Peter Anvin
2019-01-14 23:27                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-01-14 23:51                           ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-15  2:28                           ` hpa
2019-01-11 20:04               ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-11 20:12                 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-01-11 20:31                   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-11 20:46                     ` Linus Torvalds
2019-01-11 21:05                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-01-11 21:10                         ` Linus Torvalds
2019-01-11 21:32                           ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-14 12:28                         ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-01-11 21:22                       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-11 21:23                         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-11 21:25                         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-11 21:36                         ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-11 21:41                           ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-11 21:55                             ` Steven Rostedt
2019-01-11 21:59                               ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-11 21:56                             ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-12 23:54                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-02-17 21:10     ` Jann Horn
2020-02-17 21:57       ` Steven Rostedt

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