From: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, will@kernel.org,
catalin.marinas@arm.com
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V2] arm64/mm: Intercept pfn changes in set_pte_at()
Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2023 11:11:49 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <e924c1aa-5f04-fd7f-52d4-7cf22c476016@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230109052816.405335-1-anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
On 1/9/23 10:58, Anshuman Khandual wrote:
> Changing pfn on a user page table mapped entry, without first going through
> break-before-make (BBM) procedure is unsafe. This just updates set_pte_at()
> to intercept such changes, via an updated pgattr_change_is_safe(). This new
> check happens via __check_racy_pte_update(), which has now been renamed as
> __check_safe_pte_update().
>
> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
> ---
> This applies on v6.2-rc3. This patch had some test time on an internal CI
> system without any issues being reported.
Gentle ping, any updates on this patch ? Still any concerns ?
>
> Changes in V1:
>
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221116031001.292236-1-anshuman.khandual@arm.com/
>
> arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 8 ++++++--
> arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 8 +++++++-
> 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
> index b4bbeed80fb6..832c9c8fb58f 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
> @@ -275,6 +275,7 @@ static inline void set_pte(pte_t *ptep, pte_t pte)
> }
>
> extern void __sync_icache_dcache(pte_t pteval);
> +bool pgattr_change_is_safe(u64 old, u64 new);
>
> /*
> * PTE bits configuration in the presence of hardware Dirty Bit Management
> @@ -292,7 +293,7 @@ extern void __sync_icache_dcache(pte_t pteval);
> * PTE_DIRTY || (PTE_WRITE && !PTE_RDONLY)
> */
>
> -static inline void __check_racy_pte_update(struct mm_struct *mm, pte_t *ptep,
> +static inline void __check_safe_pte_update(struct mm_struct *mm, pte_t *ptep,
> pte_t pte)
> {
> pte_t old_pte;
> @@ -318,6 +319,9 @@ static inline void __check_racy_pte_update(struct mm_struct *mm, pte_t *ptep,
> VM_WARN_ONCE(pte_write(old_pte) && !pte_dirty(pte),
> "%s: racy dirty state clearing: 0x%016llx -> 0x%016llx",
> __func__, pte_val(old_pte), pte_val(pte));
> + VM_WARN_ONCE(!pgattr_change_is_safe(pte_val(old_pte), pte_val(pte)),
> + "%s: unsafe attribute change: 0x%016llx -> 0x%016llx",
> + __func__, pte_val(old_pte), pte_val(pte));
> }
>
> static inline void __set_pte_at(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
> @@ -346,7 +350,7 @@ static inline void __set_pte_at(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
> mte_sync_tags(old_pte, pte);
> }
>
> - __check_racy_pte_update(mm, ptep, pte);
> + __check_safe_pte_update(mm, ptep, pte);
>
> set_pte(ptep, pte);
> }
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
> index 14c87e8d69d8..a1d16b35c4f6 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
> @@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ static phys_addr_t __init early_pgtable_alloc(int shift)
> return phys;
> }
>
> -static bool pgattr_change_is_safe(u64 old, u64 new)
> +bool pgattr_change_is_safe(u64 old, u64 new)
> {
> /*
> * The following mapping attributes may be updated in live
> @@ -145,6 +145,12 @@ static bool pgattr_change_is_safe(u64 old, u64 new)
> if (old == 0 || new == 0)
> return true;
>
> + /* If old and new ptes are valid, pfn should not change */
> + if (pte_valid(__pte(old)) && pte_valid(__pte(new))) {
> + if (pte_pfn(__pte(old)) != pte_pfn(__pte(new)))
> + return false;
> + }
> +
> /* live contiguous mappings may not be manipulated at all */
> if ((old | new) & PTE_CONT)
> return false;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-01-24 5:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-01-09 5:28 Anshuman Khandual
2023-01-24 5:41 ` Anshuman Khandual [this message]
2023-01-26 13:33 ` Will Deacon
2023-01-27 12:43 ` Robin Murphy
2023-01-31 15:49 ` Will Deacon
2023-02-01 12:20 ` Catalin Marinas
2023-02-02 9:51 ` Muchun Song
2023-02-02 10:45 ` Catalin Marinas
2023-02-03 2:40 ` Muchun Song
2023-02-03 10:10 ` Will Deacon
2023-02-06 3:28 ` Muchun Song
2023-02-07 14:31 ` Will Deacon
2023-02-08 3:13 ` Muchun Song
2023-02-08 17:27 ` Mark Rutland
2023-02-10 6:50 ` Muchun Song
2023-01-27 15:16 ` Mark Rutland
2023-01-30 8:16 ` Anshuman Khandual
2023-01-30 10:08 ` Mark Rutland
2023-01-27 15:14 ` Mark Rutland
2023-01-31 2:57 ` Anshuman Khandual
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