mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: bot+bpf-ci@kernel.org
To: jarkko@kernel.org,linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: jarkko@kernel.org,bpf@vger.kernel.org,containers@lists.linux.dev,linux-api@vger.kernel.org,linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,linux-mm@kvack.org,linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,aleksa@amutable.com,alex@amutable.com,viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,luto@amacapital.net,arnd@arndb.de,brauner@kernel.org,dhowells@redhat.com,giuseppe@scrivano.org,hughd@google.com,jack@suse.cz,jlayton@kernel.org,corbet@lwn.net,josef@toxicpanda.com,kees@kernel.org,kpsingh@kernel.org,lennart@poettering.net,neal@gompa.dev,oleg@redhat.com,paul@paul-moore.com,ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com,sergeh@kernel.org,skhan@linuxfoundation.org,zygmunt.krynicki@canonical.com,ast@kernel.org,andrii@kernel.org,daniel@iogearbox.net,martin.lau@kernel.org,eddyz87@gmail.com,yonghong.song@linux.dev,mason@kernel.org,ihor.solodrai@linux.dev
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v6 02/26] userns: Add userns_set_idmap() system call
Date: Sun, 22 Nov 2026 02:13:49 +0000 (UTC)	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <fac042dcb631adc09d227a590d8790c36bf5aa71a7f047f7c07feef2cf8abc93@mail.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261122011809.2667684-3-jarkko@kernel.org>

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2053 bytes --]

> userns: Add userns_set_idmap() system call

TL;DR: Design nit only: the new idmap permission checks in userns_set_idmap()
seem to duplicate existing new_idmap_permitted()/verify_root_map() logic; the
review suggests a shared helper. No bug is claimed.

> diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
> +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c

[ ... ]

> +static bool idmap_maps_root(const struct uid_gid_map *new_map)
> +{
> +	unsigned int idx;
> +
> +	for (idx = 0; idx < new_map->nr_extents; idx++) {
> +		const struct uid_gid_extent *e;
> +
> +		if (new_map->nr_extents <= UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS)
> +			e = &new_map->extent[idx];
> +		else
> +			e = &new_map->forward[idx];
> +		if (e->lower_first == 0)
> +			return true;
> +	}
> +	return false;
> +}
> +
> +static bool caller_idmap_permitted(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid,
> +				   unsigned long ns_flags,
> +				   const struct uid_gid_map *new_map)
> +{
> +	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
> +
> +	if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID && idmap_maps_root(new_map)) {

[ ... ]

> +	if (new_map->nr_extents == 1 && new_map->extent[0].count == 1 &&
> +	    uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid)) {
> +		u32 id = new_map->extent[0].lower_first;

[ ... ]

This isn't a bug, but the root-mapping loop in idmap_maps_root() and the
single-extent unprivileged block here look like copies of the logic in
verify_root_map() and new_idmap_permitted(), differing only in where the
cred (current_cred() vs file->f_cred) and the setgroups flags (ns_flags
vs ns->flags) come from.

Could new_idmap_permitted()/verify_root_map() and
caller_idmap_permitted()/idmap_maps_root() share a helper that takes the
cred and the setgroups flags, so the unprivileged single-ID rule and the
root-mapping test are written only once?


---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md

CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/44972669664

  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-22  2:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-22  1:17 [RFC PATCH v6 00/26] userland: Userland containers Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 01/26] userns: Factor out idmap validation and commit helpers Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:57   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22  1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 02/26] userns: Add userns_set_idmap() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  2:13   ` bot+bpf-ci [this message]
2026-11-22  1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 03/26] arch: Wire up " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 04/26] mount: Add mnt_ns_get_root() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 05/26] mount: Enforce mount_too_revealing() for foreign mntns Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  2:13   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22  1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 06/26] mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS in move_mount() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  2:14   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22  1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 07/26] mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_CLONE with MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 08/26] userns: Factor out install_user_ns_cred() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 09/26] nsproxy: Expose create_new_namespaces() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 10/26] userland: Add core infrastructure Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 11/26] userland: Track init lifecycle via copy_process() and pid_namespace Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  2:13   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22  1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 12/26] userland: Add userland_open() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  2:13   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22  1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 13/26] userland: Add USERLAND_GET_NSFD ioctl Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  2:13   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22  1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 14/26] userland: Add USERLAND_SHARE_NSFD ioctl Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 15/26] exit: Support P_USERLAND in waitid() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  2:13   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22  1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 16/26] signal: Support userland fds in pidfd_send_signal() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  2:13   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22  1:18 ` [RFC PATCH v6 17/26] fork: Support CLONE_INTO_USERLAND in clone3() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  2:14   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22  1:18 ` [RFC PATCH v6 18/26] fs: Support FSCONFIG_SET_USERLAND in fsconfig() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  2:13   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22  1:18 ` [RFC PATCH v6 19/26] proc: Implement ->set_userland() fs_context operation Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:18 ` [RFC PATCH v6 20/26] ipc/mqueue: " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:18 ` [RFC PATCH v6 21/26] security: Add userland LSM hooks Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:18 ` [RFC PATCH v6 22/26] bpf: Register " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:18 ` [RFC PATCH v6 23/26] arch: Wire up userland_open() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:18 ` [RFC PATCH v6 24/26] docs: Document userland uAPI Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:56   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22  1:18 ` [RFC PATCH v6 25/26] selftests/userland: Add userland test suite Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  2:14   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22  1:18 ` [RFC PATCH v6 26/26] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for USERLAND Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22  1:58 ` [RFC PATCH v6 00/26] userland: Userland containers Jarkko Sakkinen

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=fac042dcb631adc09d227a590d8790c36bf5aa71a7f047f7c07feef2cf8abc93@mail.kernel.org \
    --to=bot+bpf-ci@kernel.org \
    --cc=aleksa@amutable.com \
    --cc=alex@amutable.com \
    --cc=andrii@kernel.org \
    --cc=arnd@arndb.de \
    --cc=ast@kernel.org \
    --cc=bpf@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=brauner@kernel.org \
    --cc=containers@lists.linux.dev \
    --cc=corbet@lwn.net \
    --cc=daniel@iogearbox.net \
    --cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
    --cc=eddyz87@gmail.com \
    --cc=giuseppe@scrivano.org \
    --cc=hughd@google.com \
    --cc=ihor.solodrai@linux.dev \
    --cc=jack@suse.cz \
    --cc=jarkko@kernel.org \
    --cc=jlayton@kernel.org \
    --cc=josef@toxicpanda.com \
    --cc=kees@kernel.org \
    --cc=kpsingh@kernel.org \
    --cc=lennart@poettering.net \
    --cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=luto@amacapital.net \
    --cc=martin.lau@kernel.org \
    --cc=mason@kernel.org \
    --cc=neal@gompa.dev \
    --cc=oleg@redhat.com \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com \
    --cc=sergeh@kernel.org \
    --cc=skhan@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
    --cc=yonghong.song@linux.dev \
    --cc=zygmunt.krynicki@canonical.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®