* [PATCH v2] af_key: Add check for the return value of pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx()
@ 2025-07-07 16:05 Haoxiang Li
2025-07-10 9:29 ` Paolo Abeni
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Haoxiang Li @ 2025-07-07 16:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: steffen.klassert, herbert, davem, edumazet, kuba, pabeni, horms
Cc: netdev, linux-kernel, Haoxiang Li
Add check for the return value of pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx()
in pfkey_compile_policy(), and set proper error flag.
Signed-off-by: Haoxiang Li <haoxiang_li2024@163.com>
---
Changes in v2:
- Set error flag '*dir' properly.
- Hi, Steffen! I know that inside pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx(), null
value check has been done. This patch does the null value check after
pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx() being called in pfkey_compile_policy().
Also, set proper error flag if pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx() returns
null. This patch code is similar to [1]. Thanks, Steffen!
[1]https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/master/net/key/af_key.c#L2404
---
net/key/af_key.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/key/af_key.c b/net/key/af_key.c
index efc2a91f4c48..9cd14a31a427 100644
--- a/net/key/af_key.c
+++ b/net/key/af_key.c
@@ -3335,6 +3335,11 @@ static struct xfrm_policy *pfkey_compile_policy(struct sock *sk, int opt,
if ((*dir = verify_sec_ctx_len(p)))
goto out;
uctx = pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx(sec_ctx, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!uctx) {
+ *dir = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
*dir = security_xfrm_policy_alloc(&xp->security, uctx, GFP_ATOMIC);
kfree(uctx);
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2] af_key: Add check for the return value of pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx()
2025-07-07 16:05 [PATCH v2] af_key: Add check for the return value of pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx() Haoxiang Li
@ 2025-07-10 9:29 ` Paolo Abeni
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Paolo Abeni @ 2025-07-10 9:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Haoxiang Li, steffen.klassert, herbert, davem, edumazet, kuba, horms
Cc: netdev, linux-kernel
On 7/7/25 6:05 PM, Haoxiang Li wrote:
> Add check for the return value of pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx()
> in pfkey_compile_policy(), and set proper error flag.
>
> Signed-off-by: Haoxiang Li <haoxiang_li2024@163.com>
> ---
> Changes in v2:
> - Set error flag '*dir' properly.
> - Hi, Steffen! I know that inside pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx(), null
> value check has been done. This patch does the null value check after
> pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx() being called in pfkey_compile_policy().
> Also, set proper error flag if pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx() returns
> null. This patch code is similar to [1]. Thanks, Steffen!
>
> [1]https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/master/net/key/af_key.c#L2404
> ---
> net/key/af_key.c | 5 +++++
> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/net/key/af_key.c b/net/key/af_key.c
> index efc2a91f4c48..9cd14a31a427 100644
> --- a/net/key/af_key.c
> +++ b/net/key/af_key.c
> @@ -3335,6 +3335,11 @@ static struct xfrm_policy *pfkey_compile_policy(struct sock *sk, int opt,
> if ((*dir = verify_sec_ctx_len(p)))
> goto out;
> uctx = pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx(sec_ctx, GFP_ATOMIC);
> + if (!uctx) {
> + *dir = -ENOMEM;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> *dir = security_xfrm_policy_alloc(&xp->security, uctx, GFP_ATOMIC);
AFAICS security_xfrm_policy_alloc() handle safely 'uctx' arguments ...
> kfree(uctx);
... and kfree, too.
This patch looks not needed.
/P
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
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2025-07-07 16:05 [PATCH v2] af_key: Add check for the return value of pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx() Haoxiang Li
2025-07-10 9:29 ` Paolo Abeni
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