* [PATCH 3.16 07/12] USB: serial: kl5kusb105: fix line-state error handling
2017-02-24 12:10 [PATCH 3.16 00/12] 3.16.41-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
@ 2017-02-24 12:10 ` Ben Hutchings
2017-02-24 12:10 ` [PATCH 3.16 06/12] selinux: fix off-by-one in setprocattr Ben Hutchings
` (11 subsequent siblings)
12 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2017-02-24 12:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable; +Cc: akpm, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Johan Hovold
3.16.41-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
commit 146cc8a17a3b4996f6805ee5c080e7101277c410 upstream.
The current implementation failed to detect short transfers when
attempting to read the line state, and also, to make things worse,
logged the content of the uninitialised heap transfer buffer.
Fixes: abf492e7b3ae ("USB: kl5kusb105: fix DMA buffers on stack")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
drivers/usb/serial/kl5kusb105.c | 9 +++++----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/kl5kusb105.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/kl5kusb105.c
@@ -195,10 +195,11 @@ static int klsi_105_get_line_state(struc
status_buf, KLSI_STATUSBUF_LEN,
10000
);
- if (rc < 0)
- dev_err(&port->dev, "Reading line status failed (error = %d)\n",
- rc);
- else {
+ if (rc != KLSI_STATUSBUF_LEN) {
+ dev_err(&port->dev, "reading line status failed: %d\n", rc);
+ if (rc >= 0)
+ rc = -EIO;
+ } else {
status = get_unaligned_le16(status_buf);
dev_info(&port->serial->dev->dev, "read status %x %x\n",
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 06/12] selinux: fix off-by-one in setprocattr
2017-02-24 12:10 [PATCH 3.16 00/12] 3.16.41-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
2017-02-24 12:10 ` [PATCH 3.16 07/12] USB: serial: kl5kusb105: fix line-state error handling Ben Hutchings
@ 2017-02-24 12:10 ` Ben Hutchings
2017-02-24 12:10 ` [PATCH 3.16 08/12] tmpfs: clear S_ISGID when setting posix ACLs Ben Hutchings
` (10 subsequent siblings)
12 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2017-02-24 12:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable; +Cc: akpm, Paul Moore, James Morris, Stephen Smalley
3.16.41-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
commit 0c461cb727d146c9ef2d3e86214f498b78b7d125 upstream.
SELinux tries to support setting/clearing of /proc/pid/attr attributes
from the shell by ignoring terminating newlines and treating an
attribute value that begins with a NUL or newline as an attempt to
clear the attribute. However, the test for clearing attributes has
always been wrong; it has an off-by-one error, and this could further
lead to reading past the end of the allocated buffer since commit
bb646cdb12e75d82258c2f2e7746d5952d3e321a ("proc_pid_attr_write():
switch to memdup_user()"). Fix the off-by-one error.
Even with this fix, setting and clearing /proc/pid/attr attributes
from the shell is not straightforward since the interface does not
support multiple write() calls (so shells that write the value and
newline separately will set and then immediately clear the attribute,
requiring use of echo -n to set the attribute), whereas trying to use
echo -n "" to clear the attribute causes the shell to skip the
write() call altogether since POSIX says that a zero-length write
causes no side effects. Thus, one must use echo -n to set and echo
without -n to clear, as in the following example:
$ echo -n unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 > /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
$ cat /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0
$ echo "" > /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
$ cat /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
Note the use of /proc/$$ rather than /proc/self, as otherwise
the cat command will read its own attribute value, not that of the shell.
There are no users of this facility to my knowledge; possibly we
should just get rid of it.
UPDATE: Upon further investigation it appears that a local process
with the process:setfscreate permission can cause a kernel panic as a
result of this bug. This patch fixes CVE-2017-2618.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: added the update about CVE-2017-2618 to the commit description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -5546,7 +5546,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct ta
return error;
/* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
- if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
+ if (size && str[0] && str[0] != '\n') {
if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
str[size-1] = 0;
size--;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 08/12] tmpfs: clear S_ISGID when setting posix ACLs
2017-02-24 12:10 [PATCH 3.16 00/12] 3.16.41-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
2017-02-24 12:10 ` [PATCH 3.16 07/12] USB: serial: kl5kusb105: fix line-state error handling Ben Hutchings
2017-02-24 12:10 ` [PATCH 3.16 06/12] selinux: fix off-by-one in setprocattr Ben Hutchings
@ 2017-02-24 12:10 ` Ben Hutchings
2017-02-24 12:10 ` [PATCH 3.16 09/12] ip6_gre: fix ip6gre_err() invalid reads Ben Hutchings
` (9 subsequent siblings)
12 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2017-02-24 12:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable; +Cc: akpm, Gu Zheng, Al Viro
3.16.41-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Gu Zheng <guzheng1@huawei.com>
commit 497de07d89c1410d76a15bec2bb41f24a2a89f31 upstream.
This change was missed the tmpfs modification in In CVE-2016-7097
commit 073931017b49 ("posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting
file permissions")
It can test by xfstest generic/375, which failed to clear
setgid bit in the following test case on tmpfs:
touch $testfile
chown 100:100 $testfile
chmod 2755 $testfile
_runas -u 100 -g 101 -- setfacl -m u::rwx,g::rwx,o::rwx $testfile
Signed-off-by: Gu Zheng <guzheng1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
fs/posix_acl.c | 9 ++++-----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/posix_acl.c
+++ b/fs/posix_acl.c
@@ -904,11 +904,10 @@ int simple_set_acl(struct inode *inode,
int error;
if (type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS) {
- error = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &inode->i_mode);
- if (error < 0)
- return 0;
- if (error == 0)
- acl = NULL;
+ error = posix_acl_update_mode(inode,
+ &inode->i_mode, &acl);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
}
inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 09/12] ip6_gre: fix ip6gre_err() invalid reads
2017-02-24 12:10 [PATCH 3.16 00/12] 3.16.41-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2017-02-24 12:10 ` [PATCH 3.16 08/12] tmpfs: clear S_ISGID when setting posix ACLs Ben Hutchings
@ 2017-02-24 12:10 ` Ben Hutchings
2017-02-24 12:10 ` [PATCH 3.16 12/12] tcp: avoid infinite loop in tcp_splice_read() Ben Hutchings
` (8 subsequent siblings)
12 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2017-02-24 12:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, David S. Miller, Andrey Konovalov, Eric Dumazet
3.16.41-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
commit 7892032cfe67f4bde6fc2ee967e45a8fbaf33756 upstream.
Andrey Konovalov reported out of bound accesses in ip6gre_err()
If GRE flags contains GRE_KEY, the following expression
*(((__be32 *)p) + (grehlen / 4) - 1)
accesses data ~40 bytes after the expected point, since
grehlen includes the size of IPv6 headers.
Let's use a "struct gre_base_hdr *greh" pointer to make this
code more readable.
p[1] becomes greh->protocol.
grhlen is the GRE header length.
Fixes: c12b395a4664 ("gre: Support GRE over IPv6")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Add #include <net/gre.h>, added earlier upstream
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
#include <net/ip6_fib.h>
#include <net/ip6_route.h>
#include <net/ip6_tunnel.h>
+#include <net/gre.h>
static bool log_ecn_error = true;
@@ -364,35 +365,37 @@ static void ip6gre_tunnel_uninit(struct
static void ip6gre_err(struct sk_buff *skb, struct inet6_skb_parm *opt,
- u8 type, u8 code, int offset, __be32 info)
+ u8 type, u8 code, int offset, __be32 info)
{
- const struct ipv6hdr *ipv6h = (const struct ipv6hdr *)skb->data;
- __be16 *p = (__be16 *)(skb->data + offset);
- int grehlen = offset + 4;
+ const struct gre_base_hdr *greh;
+ const struct ipv6hdr *ipv6h;
+ int grehlen = sizeof(*greh);
struct ip6_tnl *t;
+ int key_off = 0;
__be16 flags;
+ __be32 key;
- flags = p[0];
- if (flags&(GRE_CSUM|GRE_KEY|GRE_SEQ|GRE_ROUTING|GRE_VERSION)) {
- if (flags&(GRE_VERSION|GRE_ROUTING))
- return;
- if (flags&GRE_KEY) {
- grehlen += 4;
- if (flags&GRE_CSUM)
- grehlen += 4;
- }
+ if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, offset + grehlen))
+ return;
+ greh = (const struct gre_base_hdr *)(skb->data + offset);
+ flags = greh->flags;
+ if (flags & (GRE_VERSION | GRE_ROUTING))
+ return;
+ if (flags & GRE_CSUM)
+ grehlen += 4;
+ if (flags & GRE_KEY) {
+ key_off = grehlen + offset;
+ grehlen += 4;
}
- /* If only 8 bytes returned, keyed message will be dropped here */
- if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, grehlen))
+ if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, offset + grehlen))
return;
ipv6h = (const struct ipv6hdr *)skb->data;
- p = (__be16 *)(skb->data + offset);
+ greh = (const struct gre_base_hdr *)(skb->data + offset);
+ key = key_off ? *(__be32 *)(skb->data + key_off) : 0;
t = ip6gre_tunnel_lookup(skb->dev, &ipv6h->daddr, &ipv6h->saddr,
- flags & GRE_KEY ?
- *(((__be32 *)p) + (grehlen / 4) - 1) : 0,
- p[1]);
+ key, greh->protocol);
if (t == NULL)
return;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 12/12] tcp: avoid infinite loop in tcp_splice_read()
2017-02-24 12:10 [PATCH 3.16 00/12] 3.16.41-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2017-02-24 12:10 ` [PATCH 3.16 09/12] ip6_gre: fix ip6gre_err() invalid reads Ben Hutchings
@ 2017-02-24 12:10 ` Ben Hutchings
2017-02-24 12:10 ` [PATCH 3.16 03/12] ext4: validate s_first_meta_bg at mount time Ben Hutchings
` (7 subsequent siblings)
12 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2017-02-24 12:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, David S. Miller, Eric Dumazet, Dmitry Vyukov, Willy Tarreau
3.16.41-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
commit ccf7abb93af09ad0868ae9033d1ca8108bdaec82 upstream.
Splicing from TCP socket is vulnerable when a packet with URG flag is
received and stored into receive queue.
__tcp_splice_read() returns 0, and sk_wait_data() immediately
returns since there is the problematic skb in queue.
This is a nice way to burn cpu (aka infinite loop) and trigger
soft lockups.
Again, this gem was found by syzkaller tool.
Fixes: 9c55e01c0cc8 ("[TCP]: Splice receive support.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
net/ipv4/tcp.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
@@ -765,6 +765,12 @@ ssize_t tcp_splice_read(struct socket *s
ret = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
+ /* if __tcp_splice_read() got nothing while we have
+ * an skb in receive queue, we do not want to loop.
+ * This might happen with URG data.
+ */
+ if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue))
+ break;
sk_wait_data(sk, &timeo);
if (signal_pending(current)) {
ret = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 03/12] ext4: validate s_first_meta_bg at mount time
2017-02-24 12:10 [PATCH 3.16 00/12] 3.16.41-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2017-02-24 12:10 ` [PATCH 3.16 12/12] tcp: avoid infinite loop in tcp_splice_read() Ben Hutchings
@ 2017-02-24 12:10 ` Ben Hutchings
2017-02-24 12:10 ` [PATCH 3.16 01/12] mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts Ben Hutchings
` (6 subsequent siblings)
12 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2017-02-24 12:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Eryu Guan, Andreas Dilger, Theodore Ts'o, Ralf Spenneberg
3.16.41-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
commit 3a4b77cd47bb837b8557595ec7425f281f2ca1fe upstream.
Ralf Spenneberg reported that he hit a kernel crash when mounting a
modified ext4 image. And it turns out that kernel crashed when
calculating fs overhead (ext4_calculate_overhead()), this is because
the image has very large s_first_meta_bg (debug code shows it's
842150400), and ext4 overruns the memory in count_overhead() when
setting bitmap buffer, which is PAGE_SIZE.
ext4_calculate_overhead():
buf = get_zeroed_page(GFP_NOFS); <=== PAGE_SIZE buffer
blks = count_overhead(sb, i, buf);
count_overhead():
for (j = ext4_bg_num_gdb(sb, grp); j > 0; j--) { <=== j = 842150400
ext4_set_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, s++), buf); <=== buffer overrun
count++;
}
This can be reproduced easily for me by this script:
#!/bin/bash
rm -f fs.img
mkdir -p /mnt/ext4
fallocate -l 16M fs.img
mke2fs -t ext4 -O bigalloc,meta_bg,^resize_inode -F fs.img
debugfs -w -R "ssv first_meta_bg 842150400" fs.img
mount -o loop fs.img /mnt/ext4
Fix it by validating s_first_meta_bg first at mount time, and
refusing to mount if its value exceeds the largest possible meta_bg
number.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@os-t.de>
Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: use EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
fs/ext4/super.c | 9 +++++++++
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/ext4/super.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/super.c
@@ -3905,6 +3905,15 @@ static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_
(EXT4_MAX_BLOCK_FILE_PHYS / EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb)));
db_count = (sbi->s_groups_count + EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb) - 1) /
EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb);
+ if (EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb,EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_META_BG)) {
+ if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_meta_bg) >= db_count) {
+ ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
+ "first meta block group too large: %u "
+ "(group descriptor block count %u)",
+ le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_meta_bg), db_count);
+ goto failed_mount;
+ }
+ }
sbi->s_group_desc = ext4_kvmalloc(db_count *
sizeof(struct buffer_head *),
GFP_KERNEL);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 01/12] mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
2017-02-24 12:10 [PATCH 3.16 00/12] 3.16.41-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2017-02-24 12:10 ` [PATCH 3.16 03/12] ext4: validate s_first_meta_bg at mount time Ben Hutchings
@ 2017-02-24 12:10 ` Ben Hutchings
2017-02-24 12:10 ` [PATCH 3.16 10/12] ipv4: keep skb->dst around in presence of IP options Ben Hutchings
` (5 subsequent siblings)
12 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2017-02-24 12:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable; +Cc: akpm, Eric W. Biederman, CAI Qian
3.16.41-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
commit d29216842a85c7970c536108e093963f02714498 upstream.
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Use ACCESS_ONCE() instead of READ_ONCE()
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt | 7 +++++++
fs/mount.h | 2 ++
fs/namespace.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
fs/pnode.c | 2 +-
fs/pnode.h | 1 +
include/linux/mount.h | 2 ++
kernel/sysctl.c | 9 +++++++++
7 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt
@@ -265,6 +265,13 @@ aio-nr can grow to.
==============================================================
+mount-max:
+
+This denotes the maximum number of mounts that may exist
+in a mount namespace.
+
+==============================================================
+
2. /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc
----------------------------------------------------------
--- a/fs/mount.h
+++ b/fs/mount.h
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ struct mnt_namespace {
u64 seq; /* Sequence number to prevent loops */
wait_queue_head_t poll;
u64 event;
+ unsigned int mounts; /* # of mounts in the namespace */
+ unsigned int pending_mounts;
};
struct mnt_pcp {
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@
#include "pnode.h"
#include "internal.h"
+/* Maximum number of mounts in a mount namespace */
+unsigned int sysctl_mount_max __read_mostly = 100000;
+
static unsigned int m_hash_mask __read_mostly;
static unsigned int m_hash_shift __read_mostly;
static unsigned int mp_hash_mask __read_mostly;
@@ -811,6 +814,9 @@ static void commit_tree(struct mount *mn
list_splice(&head, n->list.prev);
+ n->mounts += n->pending_mounts;
+ n->pending_mounts = 0;
+
attach_shadowed(mnt, parent, shadows);
touch_mnt_namespace(n);
}
@@ -1284,9 +1290,14 @@ static void umount_tree(struct mount *mn
propagate_umount(&tmp_list);
hlist_for_each_entry(p, &tmp_list, mnt_hash) {
+ struct mnt_namespace *ns;
list_del_init(&p->mnt_expire);
list_del_init(&p->mnt_list);
- __touch_mnt_namespace(p->mnt_ns);
+ ns = p->mnt_ns;
+ if (ns) {
+ ns->mounts--;
+ __touch_mnt_namespace(ns);
+ }
p->mnt_ns = NULL;
if (how & UMOUNT_SYNC)
p->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT;
@@ -1641,6 +1652,28 @@ static int invent_group_ids(struct mount
return 0;
}
+int count_mounts(struct mnt_namespace *ns, struct mount *mnt)
+{
+ unsigned int max = ACCESS_ONCE(sysctl_mount_max);
+ unsigned int mounts = 0, old, pending, sum;
+ struct mount *p;
+
+ for (p = mnt; p; p = next_mnt(p, mnt))
+ mounts++;
+
+ old = ns->mounts;
+ pending = ns->pending_mounts;
+ sum = old + pending;
+ if ((old > sum) ||
+ (pending > sum) ||
+ (max < sum) ||
+ (mounts > (max - sum)))
+ return -ENOSPC;
+
+ ns->pending_mounts = pending + mounts;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* @source_mnt : mount tree to be attached
* @nd : place the mount tree @source_mnt is attached
@@ -1710,10 +1743,18 @@ static int attach_recursive_mnt(struct m
struct path *parent_path)
{
HLIST_HEAD(tree_list);
+ struct mnt_namespace *ns = dest_mnt->mnt_ns;
struct mount *child, *p;
struct hlist_node *n;
int err;
+ /* Is there space to add these mounts to the mount namespace? */
+ if (!parent_path) {
+ err = count_mounts(ns, source_mnt);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
if (IS_MNT_SHARED(dest_mnt)) {
err = invent_group_ids(source_mnt, true);
if (err)
@@ -1750,11 +1791,13 @@ static int attach_recursive_mnt(struct m
out_cleanup_ids:
while (!hlist_empty(&tree_list)) {
child = hlist_entry(tree_list.first, struct mount, mnt_hash);
+ child->mnt_parent->mnt_ns->pending_mounts = 0;
umount_tree(child, UMOUNT_SYNC);
}
unlock_mount_hash();
cleanup_group_ids(source_mnt, NULL);
out:
+ ns->pending_mounts = 0;
return err;
}
@@ -2586,6 +2629,8 @@ static struct mnt_namespace *alloc_mnt_n
init_waitqueue_head(&new_ns->poll);
new_ns->event = 0;
new_ns->user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns);
+ new_ns->mounts = 0;
+ new_ns->pending_mounts = 0;
return new_ns;
}
@@ -2635,6 +2680,7 @@ struct mnt_namespace *copy_mnt_ns(unsign
q = new;
while (p) {
q->mnt_ns = new_ns;
+ new_ns->mounts++;
if (new_fs) {
if (&p->mnt == new_fs->root.mnt) {
new_fs->root.mnt = mntget(&q->mnt);
@@ -2673,6 +2719,7 @@ static struct mnt_namespace *create_mnt_
struct mount *mnt = real_mount(m);
mnt->mnt_ns = new_ns;
new_ns->root = mnt;
+ new_ns->mounts++;
list_add(&mnt->mnt_list, &new_ns->list);
} else {
mntput(m);
--- a/fs/pnode.c
+++ b/fs/pnode.c
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ static int propagate_one(struct mount *m
read_sequnlock_excl(&mount_lock);
}
hlist_add_head(&child->mnt_hash, list);
- return 0;
+ return count_mounts(m->mnt_ns, child);
}
/*
--- a/fs/pnode.h
+++ b/fs/pnode.h
@@ -50,4 +50,5 @@ void mnt_set_mountpoint(struct mount *,
struct mount *copy_tree(struct mount *, struct dentry *, int);
bool is_path_reachable(struct mount *, struct dentry *,
const struct path *root);
+int count_mounts(struct mnt_namespace *ns, struct mount *mnt);
#endif /* _LINUX_PNODE_H */
--- a/include/linux/mount.h
+++ b/include/linux/mount.h
@@ -91,4 +91,6 @@ extern void mark_mounts_for_expiry(struc
extern dev_t name_to_dev_t(char *name);
+extern unsigned int sysctl_mount_max;
+
#endif /* _LINUX_MOUNT_H */
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/sched/sysctl.h>
#include <linux/kexec.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -1685,6 +1686,14 @@ static struct ctl_table fs_table[] = {
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax,
},
+ {
+ .procname = "mount-max",
+ .data = &sysctl_mount_max,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(unsigned int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+ .extra1 = &one,
+ },
{ }
};
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 10/12] ipv4: keep skb->dst around in presence of IP options
2017-02-24 12:10 [PATCH 3.16 00/12] 3.16.41-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2017-02-24 12:10 ` [PATCH 3.16 01/12] mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts Ben Hutchings
@ 2017-02-24 12:10 ` Ben Hutchings
2017-02-24 12:10 ` [PATCH 3.16 11/12] dccp: fix freeing skb too early for IPV6_RECVPKTINFO Ben Hutchings
` (4 subsequent siblings)
12 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2017-02-24 12:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Eric Dumazet, David S. Miller, Andrey Konovalov
3.16.41-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
commit 34b2cef20f19c87999fff3da4071e66937db9644 upstream.
Andrey Konovalov got crashes in __ip_options_echo() when a NULL skb->dst
is accessed.
ipv4_pktinfo_prepare() should not drop the dst if (evil) IP options
are present.
We could refine the test to the presence of ts_needtime or srr,
but IP options are not often used, so let's be conservative.
Thanks to syzkaller team for finding this bug.
Fixes: d826eb14ecef ("ipv4: PKTINFO doesnt need dst reference")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -1082,7 +1082,14 @@ void ipv4_pktinfo_prepare(const struct s
pktinfo->ipi_ifindex = 0;
pktinfo->ipi_spec_dst.s_addr = 0;
}
- skb_dst_drop(skb);
+ /* We need to keep the dst for __ip_options_echo()
+ * We could restrict the test to opt.ts_needtime || opt.srr,
+ * but the following is good enough as IP options are not often used.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(IPCB(skb)->opt.optlen))
+ skb_dst_force(skb);
+ else
+ skb_dst_drop(skb);
}
int ip_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 11/12] dccp: fix freeing skb too early for IPV6_RECVPKTINFO
2017-02-24 12:10 [PATCH 3.16 00/12] 3.16.41-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2017-02-24 12:10 ` [PATCH 3.16 10/12] ipv4: keep skb->dst around in presence of IP options Ben Hutchings
@ 2017-02-24 12:10 ` Ben Hutchings
2017-02-24 12:10 ` [PATCH 3.16 04/12] KVM: x86: fix emulation of "MOV SS, null selector" Ben Hutchings
` (3 subsequent siblings)
12 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2017-02-24 12:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: akpm, Eric Dumazet, David S. Miller, Andrey Konovalov
3.16.41-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
commit 5edabca9d4cff7f1f2b68f0bac55ef99d9798ba4 upstream.
In the current DCCP implementation an skb for a DCCP_PKT_REQUEST packet
is forcibly freed via __kfree_skb in dccp_rcv_state_process if
dccp_v6_conn_request successfully returns.
However, if IPV6_RECVPKTINFO is set on a socket, the address of the skb
is saved to ireq->pktopts and the ref count for skb is incremented in
dccp_v6_conn_request, so skb is still in use. Nevertheless, it gets freed
in dccp_rcv_state_process.
Fix by calling consume_skb instead of doing goto discard and therefore
calling __kfree_skb.
Similar fixes for TCP:
fb7e2399ec17f1004c0e0ccfd17439f8759ede01 [TCP]: skb is unexpectedly freed.
0aea76d35c9651d55bbaf746e7914e5f9ae5a25d tcp: SYN packets are now
simply consumed
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
net/dccp/input.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/dccp/input.c
+++ b/net/dccp/input.c
@@ -606,7 +606,8 @@ int dccp_rcv_state_process(struct sock *
if (inet_csk(sk)->icsk_af_ops->conn_request(sk,
skb) < 0)
return 1;
- goto discard;
+ consume_skb(skb);
+ return 0;
}
if (dh->dccph_type == DCCP_PKT_RESET)
goto discard;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 04/12] KVM: x86: fix emulation of "MOV SS, null selector"
2017-02-24 12:10 [PATCH 3.16 00/12] 3.16.41-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2017-02-24 12:10 ` [PATCH 3.16 11/12] dccp: fix freeing skb too early for IPV6_RECVPKTINFO Ben Hutchings
@ 2017-02-24 12:10 ` Ben Hutchings
2017-02-24 12:10 ` [PATCH 3.16 02/12] kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF) Ben Hutchings
` (2 subsequent siblings)
12 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2017-02-24 12:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable; +Cc: akpm, stable, Paolo Bonzini, Xiaohan Zhang
3.16.41-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
commit 33ab91103b3415e12457e3104f0e4517ce12d0f3 upstream.
This is CVE-2017-2583. On Intel this causes a failed vmentry because
SS's type is neither 3 nor 7 (even though the manual says this check is
only done for usable SS, and the dmesg splat says that SS is unusable!).
On AMD it's worse: svm.c is confused and sets CPL to 0 in the vmcb.
The fix fabricates a data segment descriptor when SS is set to a null
selector, so that CPL and SS.DPL are set correctly in the VMCS/vmcb.
Furthermore, only allow setting SS to a NULL selector if SS.RPL < 3;
this in turn ensures CPL < 3 because RPL must be equal to CPL.
Thanks to Andy Lutomirski and Willy Tarreau for help in analyzing
the bug and deciphering the manuals.
Reported-by: Xiaohan Zhang <zhangxiaohan1@huawei.com>
Fixes: 79d5b4c3cd809c770d4bf9812635647016c56011
Cc: stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
@@ -1439,7 +1439,6 @@ static int write_segment_descriptor(stru
&ctxt->exception);
}
-/* Does not support long mode */
static int __load_segment_descriptor(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
u16 selector, int seg, u8 cpl,
bool in_task_switch,
@@ -1475,20 +1474,34 @@ static int __load_segment_descriptor(str
rpl = selector & 3;
- /* NULL selector is not valid for TR, CS and SS (except for long mode) */
- if ((seg == VCPU_SREG_CS
- || (seg == VCPU_SREG_SS
- && (ctxt->mode != X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64 || rpl != cpl))
- || seg == VCPU_SREG_TR)
- && null_selector)
- goto exception;
-
/* TR should be in GDT only */
if (seg == VCPU_SREG_TR && (selector & (1 << 2)))
goto exception;
- if (null_selector) /* for NULL selector skip all following checks */
+ /* NULL selector is not valid for TR, CS and (except for long mode) SS */
+ if (null_selector) {
+ if (seg == VCPU_SREG_CS || seg == VCPU_SREG_TR)
+ goto exception;
+
+ if (seg == VCPU_SREG_SS) {
+ if (ctxt->mode != X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64 || rpl != cpl)
+ goto exception;
+
+ /*
+ * ctxt->ops->set_segment expects the CPL to be in
+ * SS.DPL, so fake an expand-up 32-bit data segment.
+ */
+ seg_desc.type = 3;
+ seg_desc.p = 1;
+ seg_desc.s = 1;
+ seg_desc.dpl = cpl;
+ seg_desc.d = 1;
+ seg_desc.g = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Skip all following checks */
goto load;
+ }
ret = read_segment_descriptor(ctxt, selector, &seg_desc, &desc_addr);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
@@ -1584,6 +1597,21 @@ static int load_segment_descriptor(struc
u16 selector, int seg)
{
u8 cpl = ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt);
+
+ /*
+ * None of MOV, POP and LSS can load a NULL selector in CPL=3, but
+ * they can load it at CPL<3 (Intel's manual says only LSS can,
+ * but it's wrong).
+ *
+ * However, the Intel manual says that putting IST=1/DPL=3 in
+ * an interrupt gate will result in SS=3 (the AMD manual instead
+ * says it doesn't), so allow SS=3 in __load_segment_descriptor
+ * and only forbid it here.
+ */
+ if (seg == VCPU_SREG_SS && selector == 3 &&
+ ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
+ return emulate_exception(ctxt, GP_VECTOR, 0, true);
+
return __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, selector, seg, cpl, false, NULL);
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 02/12] kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
2017-02-24 12:10 [PATCH 3.16 00/12] 3.16.41-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2017-02-24 12:10 ` [PATCH 3.16 04/12] KVM: x86: fix emulation of "MOV SS, null selector" Ben Hutchings
@ 2017-02-24 12:10 ` Ben Hutchings
2017-02-24 12:10 ` [PATCH 3.16 05/12] KVM: x86: Introduce segmented_write_std Ben Hutchings
2017-02-24 16:19 ` [PATCH 3.16 00/12] 3.16.41-rc1 review Guenter Roeck
12 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2017-02-24 12:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable; +Cc: akpm, Paolo Bonzini, Jim Mattson
3.16.41-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
commit ef85b67385436ddc1998f45f1d6a210f935b3388 upstream.
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 11 +++++------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -1073,10 +1073,10 @@ static inline int nested_cpu_has_ept(str
return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT);
}
-static inline bool is_exception(u32 intr_info)
+static inline bool is_nmi(u32 intr_info)
{
return (intr_info & (INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK))
- == (INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK);
+ == (INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK);
}
static void nested_vmx_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 exit_reason,
@@ -4838,7 +4838,7 @@ static int handle_exception(struct kvm_v
if (is_machine_check(intr_info))
return handle_machine_check(vcpu);
- if ((intr_info & INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK) == INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR)
+ if (is_nmi(intr_info))
return 1; /* already handled by vmx_vcpu_run() */
if (is_no_device(intr_info)) {
@@ -6888,7 +6888,7 @@ static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled(stru
switch (exit_reason) {
case EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI:
- if (!is_exception(intr_info))
+ if (is_nmi(intr_info))
return 0;
else if (is_page_fault(intr_info))
return enable_ept;
@@ -7185,8 +7185,7 @@ static void vmx_complete_atomic_exit(str
kvm_machine_check();
/* We need to handle NMIs before interrupts are enabled */
- if ((exit_intr_info & INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK) == INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR &&
- (exit_intr_info & INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK)) {
+ if (is_nmi(exit_intr_info)) {
kvm_before_handle_nmi(&vmx->vcpu);
asm("int $2");
kvm_after_handle_nmi(&vmx->vcpu);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3.16 05/12] KVM: x86: Introduce segmented_write_std
2017-02-24 12:10 [PATCH 3.16 00/12] 3.16.41-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (10 preceding siblings ...)
2017-02-24 12:10 ` [PATCH 3.16 02/12] kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF) Ben Hutchings
@ 2017-02-24 12:10 ` Ben Hutchings
2017-02-24 16:19 ` [PATCH 3.16 00/12] 3.16.41-rc1 review Guenter Roeck
12 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2017-02-24 12:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable; +Cc: akpm, Steve Rutherford, Dmitry Vyukov, Paolo Bonzini
3.16.41-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
commit 129a72a0d3c8e139a04512325384fe5ac119e74d upstream.
Introduces segemented_write_std.
Switches from emulated reads/writes to standard read/writes in fxsave,
fxrstor, sgdt, and sidt. This fixes CVE-2017-2584, a longstanding
kernel memory leak.
Since commit 283c95d0e389 ("KVM: x86: emulate FXSAVE and FXRSTOR",
2016-11-09), which is luckily not yet in any final release, this would
also be an exploitable kernel memory *write*!
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Fixes: 96051572c819194c37a8367624b285be10297eca
Fixes: 283c95d0e3891b64087706b344a4b545d04a6e62
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: drop changes to em_fxsave(), em_fxrstor()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
@@ -744,6 +744,20 @@ static int segmented_read_std(struct x86
return ctxt->ops->read_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception);
}
+static int segmented_write_std(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+ struct segmented_address addr,
+ void *data,
+ unsigned int size)
+{
+ int rc;
+ ulong linear;
+
+ rc = linearize(ctxt, addr, size, true, &linear);
+ if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+ return rc;
+ return ctxt->ops->write_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception);
+}
+
/*
* Fetch the next byte of the instruction being emulated which is pointed to
* by ctxt->_eip, then increment ctxt->_eip.
@@ -3268,8 +3282,8 @@ static int emulate_store_desc_ptr(struct
}
/* Disable writeback. */
ctxt->dst.type = OP_NONE;
- return segmented_write(ctxt, ctxt->dst.addr.mem,
- &desc_ptr, 2 + ctxt->op_bytes);
+ return segmented_write_std(ctxt, ctxt->dst.addr.mem,
+ &desc_ptr, 2 + ctxt->op_bytes);
}
static int em_sgdt(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 3.16 00/12] 3.16.41-rc1 review
2017-02-24 12:10 [PATCH 3.16 00/12] 3.16.41-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
` (11 preceding siblings ...)
2017-02-24 12:10 ` [PATCH 3.16 05/12] KVM: x86: Introduce segmented_write_std Ben Hutchings
@ 2017-02-24 16:19 ` Guenter Roeck
12 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Guenter Roeck @ 2017-02-24 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ben Hutchings, linux-kernel, stable; +Cc: torvalds, akpm
On 02/24/2017 04:10 AM, Ben Hutchings wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.16.41 release.
> There are 12 patches in this series, which will be posted as responses
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sun Feb 26 12:10:01 UTC 2017.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
Build results:
total: 140 pass: 140 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
total: 107 pass: 107 fail: 0
Details are available at http://kerneltests.org/builders.
Guenter
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread