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From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	"Benjamin Serebrin" <serebrin@google.com>,
	"Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Eric Northup" <digitaleric@google.com>,
	"Andrew Honig" <ahonig@google.com>,
	"Jim Mattson" <jmattson@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3.16 01/76] kvm: vmx: Scrub hardware GPRs at VM-exit
Date: Mon, 12 Mar 2018 03:06:12 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <lsq.1520823972.108025975@decadent.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <lsq.1520823971.5976735@decadent.org.uk>

3.16.56-rc1 review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>

commit 0cb5b30698fdc8f6b4646012e3acb4ddce430788 upstream.

Guest GPR values are live in the hardware GPRs at VM-exit.  Do not
leave any guest values in hardware GPRs after the guest GPR values are
saved to the vcpu_vmx structure.

This is a partial mitigation for CVE 2017-5715 and CVE 2017-5753.
Specifically, it defeats the Project Zero PoC for CVE 2017-5715.

Suggested-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Serebrin <serebrin@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
[Paolo: Add AMD bits, Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -3915,6 +3915,25 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu
 		"mov %%r14, %c[r14](%[svm]) \n\t"
 		"mov %%r15, %c[r15](%[svm]) \n\t"
 #endif
+		/*
+		* Clear host registers marked as clobbered to prevent
+		* speculative use.
+		*/
+		"xor %%" _ASM_BX ", %%" _ASM_BX " \n\t"
+		"xor %%" _ASM_CX ", %%" _ASM_CX " \n\t"
+		"xor %%" _ASM_DX ", %%" _ASM_DX " \n\t"
+		"xor %%" _ASM_SI ", %%" _ASM_SI " \n\t"
+		"xor %%" _ASM_DI ", %%" _ASM_DI " \n\t"
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+		"xor %%r8, %%r8 \n\t"
+		"xor %%r9, %%r9 \n\t"
+		"xor %%r10, %%r10 \n\t"
+		"xor %%r11, %%r11 \n\t"
+		"xor %%r12, %%r12 \n\t"
+		"xor %%r13, %%r13 \n\t"
+		"xor %%r14, %%r14 \n\t"
+		"xor %%r15, %%r15 \n\t"
+#endif
 		"pop %%" _ASM_BP
 		:
 		: [svm]"a"(svm),
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -7487,6 +7487,7 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struc
 		/* Save guest registers, load host registers, keep flags */
 		"mov %0, %c[wordsize](%%" _ASM_SP ") \n\t"
 		"pop %0 \n\t"
+		"setbe %c[fail](%0)\n\t"
 		"mov %%" _ASM_AX ", %c[rax](%0) \n\t"
 		"mov %%" _ASM_BX ", %c[rbx](%0) \n\t"
 		__ASM_SIZE(pop) " %c[rcx](%0) \n\t"
@@ -7503,12 +7504,23 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struc
 		"mov %%r13, %c[r13](%0) \n\t"
 		"mov %%r14, %c[r14](%0) \n\t"
 		"mov %%r15, %c[r15](%0) \n\t"
+		"xor %%r8d,  %%r8d \n\t"
+		"xor %%r9d,  %%r9d \n\t"
+		"xor %%r10d, %%r10d \n\t"
+		"xor %%r11d, %%r11d \n\t"
+		"xor %%r12d, %%r12d \n\t"
+		"xor %%r13d, %%r13d \n\t"
+		"xor %%r14d, %%r14d \n\t"
+		"xor %%r15d, %%r15d \n\t"
 #endif
 		"mov %%cr2, %%" _ASM_AX "   \n\t"
 		"mov %%" _ASM_AX ", %c[cr2](%0) \n\t"
 
+		"xor %%eax, %%eax \n\t"
+		"xor %%ebx, %%ebx \n\t"
+		"xor %%esi, %%esi \n\t"
+		"xor %%edi, %%edi \n\t"
 		"pop  %%" _ASM_BP "; pop  %%" _ASM_DX " \n\t"
-		"setbe %c[fail](%0) \n\t"
 		".pushsection .rodata \n\t"
 		".global vmx_return \n\t"
 		"vmx_return: " _ASM_PTR " 2b \n\t"

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-03-12  3:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 81+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-03-12  3:06 [PATCH 3.16 00/76] 3.16.56-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 46/76] module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 29/76] x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall indirect jumps Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 13/76] x86/alternatives: Guard NOPs optimization Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 45/76] KVM: VMX: Make indirect call speculation safe Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 39/76] x86/retpoline: Optimize inline assembler for vmexit_fill_RSB Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 31/76] x86/retpoline/irq32: Convert assembler indirect jumps Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 69/76] nospec: Kill array_index_nospec_mask_check() Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 44/76] KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 18/76] x86/cpu/AMD: Use LFENCE_RDTSC in preference to MFENCE_RDTSC Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 33/76] x86/retpoline: Remove compile time warning Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 27/76] x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace assembler indirect jumps Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 62/76] x86/kvm: Update spectre-v1 mitigation Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 61/76] x86/paravirt: Remove 'noreplace-paravirt' cmdline option Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 35/76] retpoline: Introduce start/end markers of indirect thunk Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 11/76] x86/cpu: Implement CPU vulnerabilites sysfs functions Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 53/76] x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 74/76] x86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end} Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 52/76] array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 02/76] x86/Documentation: Add PTI description Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 47/76] x86/nospec: Fix header guards names Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 09/76] x86/cpu: Merge bugs.c and bugs_64.c Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 28/76] x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert assembler indirect jumps Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 58/76] nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 36/76] kprobes/x86: Blacklist indirect thunk functions for kprobes Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 55/76] x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 08/76] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V[12] Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 24/76] x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 38/76] x86/pti: Document fix wrong index Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 60/76] x86/spectre: Fix spelling mistake: "vunerable"-> "vulnerable" Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 76/76] x86: fix build warnign with 32-bit PAE Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 72/76] x86: fix SMAP in 32-bit environments Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 65/76] x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 49/76] x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 07/76] x86/pti: Rename BUG_CPU_INSECURE to BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 51/76] Documentation: Document array_index_nospec Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 30/76] x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler indirect jumps Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 42/76] x86/cpu: Change type of x86_cache_size variable to unsigned int Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 56/76] x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  7:32   ` Jiri Slaby
2018-03-19  0:59     ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 32/76] x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 06/76] x86/cpu, x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on AMD processors Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 68/76] nospec: Move array_index_nospec() parameter checking into separate macro Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 12/76] sysfs/cpu: Fix typos in vulnerability documentation Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 73/76] x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 34/76] x86/retpoline: Add LFENCE to the retpoline/RSB filling RSB macros Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` Ben Hutchings [this message]
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 14/76] x86/alternatives: Fix ALTERNATIVE_2 padding generation properly Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 41/76] x86/retpoline: Fill RSB on context switch for affected CPUs Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 67/76] x86/spectre: Fix an error message Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 16/76] x86/alternatives: Fix optimize_nops() checking Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 59/76] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 21/76] x86: Clean up current_stack_pointer Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 43/76] x86/retpoline: Remove the esp/rsp thunk Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 04/76] x86/cpufeatures: Make CPU bugs sticky Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 20/76] kconfig.h: use __is_defined() to check if MODULE is defined Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 23/76] x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 17/76] x86/cpu/AMD: Make LFENCE a serializing instruction Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 70/76] nospec: Include <asm/barrier.h> dependency Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 26/76] x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry assembler indirect jumps Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 40/76] x86/cpu/intel: Introduce macros for Intel family numbers Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 22/76] x86/asm: Use register variable to get stack pointer value Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 64/76] x86/spectre: Simplify spectre_v2 command line parsing Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 48/76] x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 54/76] x86: Introduce barrier_nospec Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 25/76] x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 10/76] sysfs/cpu: Add vulnerability folder Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 57/76] vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 66/76] x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 05/76] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 15/76] x86/alternatives: Make optimize_nops() interrupt safe and synced Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 37/76] kprobes/x86: Disable optimizing on the function jumps to indirect thunk Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 71/76] x86: reorganize SMAP handling in user space accesses Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 63/76] x86/retpoline: Avoid retpolines for built-in __init functions Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 19/76] x86/asm: Make asm/alternative.h safe from assembly Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 75/76] x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 03/76] x86/cpu: Factor out application of forced CPU caps Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 15:00 ` [PATCH 3.16 00/76] 3.16.56-rc1 review Guenter Roeck
2018-03-12 16:45   ` Guenter Roeck
2018-03-20 17:25     ` Ben Hutchings

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