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From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, "Andi Kleen" <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org, arjan@linux.intel.com,
	jeyu@kernel.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
	"David Woodhouse" <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>
Subject: [PATCH 3.16 46/76] module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module
Date: Mon, 12 Mar 2018 03:06:12 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <lsq.1520823972.121191571@decadent.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <lsq.1520823971.5976735@decadent.org.uk>

3.16.56-rc1 review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>

commit caf7501a1b4ec964190f31f9c3f163de252273b8 upstream.

There's a risk that a kernel which has full retpoline mitigations becomes
vulnerable when a module gets loaded that hasn't been compiled with the
right compiler or the right option.

To enable detection of that mismatch at module load time, add a module info
string "retpoline" at build time when the module was compiled with
retpoline support. This only covers compiled C source, but assembler source
or prebuilt object files are not checked.

If a retpoline enabled kernel detects a non retpoline protected module at
load time, print a warning and report it in the sysfs vulnerability file.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]

Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: jeyu@kernel.org
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180125235028.31211-1-andi@firstfloor.org
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
 include/linux/module.h     |  9 +++++++++
 kernel/module.c            | 11 +++++++++++
 scripts/mod/modpost.c      |  9 +++++++++
 4 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/utsname.h>
 #include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
 
 #include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 #include <asm/cmdline.h>
@@ -155,6 +156,19 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[]
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V2 mitigation: " fmt
 
 static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+static bool spectre_v2_bad_module;
+
+#ifdef RETPOLINE
+bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline)
+{
+	if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE || has_retpoline)
+		return true;
+
+	pr_err("System may be vunerable to spectre v2\n");
+	spectre_v2_bad_module = true;
+	return false;
+}
+#endif
 
 static void __init spec2_print_if_insecure(const char *reason)
 {
@@ -340,6 +354,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct devic
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
 		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
 
-	return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled]);
+	return sprintf(buf, "%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
+		       spectre_v2_bad_module ? " - vulnerable module loaded" : "");
 }
 #endif
--- a/include/linux/module.h
+++ b/include/linux/module.h
@@ -656,4 +656,13 @@ static inline void module_bug_finalize(c
 static inline void module_bug_cleanup(struct module *mod) {}
 #endif	/* CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG */
 
+#ifdef RETPOLINE
+extern bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline);
+#else
+static inline bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline)
+{
+	return true;
+}
+#endif
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_MODULE_H */
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2494,6 +2494,15 @@ static int elf_header_check(struct load_
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static void check_modinfo_retpoline(struct module *mod, struct load_info *info)
+{
+	if (retpoline_module_ok(get_modinfo(info, "retpoline")))
+		return;
+
+	pr_warn("%s: loading module not compiled with retpoline compiler.\n",
+		mod->name);
+}
+
 /* Sets info->hdr and info->len. */
 static int copy_module_from_user(const void __user *umod, unsigned long len,
 				  struct load_info *info)
@@ -2698,6 +2707,8 @@ static int check_modinfo(struct module *
 	if (!get_modinfo(info, "intree"))
 		add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_OOT_MODULE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
 
+	check_modinfo_retpoline(mod, info);
+
 	if (get_modinfo(info, "staging")) {
 		add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_CRAP, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
 		pr_warn("%s: module is from the staging directory, the quality "
--- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c
+++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c
@@ -1952,6 +1952,14 @@ static void add_intree_flag(struct buffe
 		buf_printf(b, "\nMODULE_INFO(intree, \"Y\");\n");
 }
 
+/* Cannot check for assembler */
+static void add_retpoline(struct buffer *b)
+{
+	buf_printf(b, "\n#ifdef RETPOLINE\n");
+	buf_printf(b, "MODULE_INFO(retpoline, \"Y\");\n");
+	buf_printf(b, "#endif\n");
+}
+
 static void add_staging_flag(struct buffer *b, const char *name)
 {
 	static const char *staging_dir = "drivers/staging";
@@ -2282,6 +2290,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 
 		add_header(&buf, mod);
 		add_intree_flag(&buf, !external_module);
+		add_retpoline(&buf);
 		add_staging_flag(&buf, mod->name);
 		err |= add_versions(&buf, mod);
 		add_depends(&buf, mod, modules);

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-03-12  3:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 81+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-03-12  3:06 [PATCH 3.16 00/76] 3.16.56-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 16/76] x86/alternatives: Fix optimize_nops() checking Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 59/76] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 21/76] x86: Clean up current_stack_pointer Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 43/76] x86/retpoline: Remove the esp/rsp thunk Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 04/76] x86/cpufeatures: Make CPU bugs sticky Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 20/76] kconfig.h: use __is_defined() to check if MODULE is defined Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 23/76] x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 17/76] x86/cpu/AMD: Make LFENCE a serializing instruction Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 70/76] nospec: Include <asm/barrier.h> dependency Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 40/76] x86/cpu/intel: Introduce macros for Intel family numbers Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 26/76] x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry assembler indirect jumps Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 22/76] x86/asm: Use register variable to get stack pointer value Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 64/76] x86/spectre: Simplify spectre_v2 command line parsing Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 48/76] x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 54/76] x86: Introduce barrier_nospec Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 25/76] x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 10/76] sysfs/cpu: Add vulnerability folder Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 57/76] vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 66/76] x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 05/76] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 15/76] x86/alternatives: Make optimize_nops() interrupt safe and synced Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 37/76] kprobes/x86: Disable optimizing on the function jumps to indirect thunk Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 71/76] x86: reorganize SMAP handling in user space accesses Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 63/76] x86/retpoline: Avoid retpolines for built-in __init functions Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 19/76] x86/asm: Make asm/alternative.h safe from assembly Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 75/76] x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 03/76] x86/cpu: Factor out application of forced CPU caps Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 60/76] x86/spectre: Fix spelling mistake: "vunerable"-> "vulnerable" Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 72/76] x86: fix SMAP in 32-bit environments Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 76/76] x86: fix build warnign with 32-bit PAE Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 65/76] x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 51/76] Documentation: Document array_index_nospec Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 07/76] x86/pti: Rename BUG_CPU_INSECURE to BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 49/76] x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 30/76] x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler indirect jumps Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 42/76] x86/cpu: Change type of x86_cache_size variable to unsigned int Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 56/76] x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  7:32   ` Jiri Slaby
2018-03-19  0:59     ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 32/76] x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 06/76] x86/cpu, x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on AMD processors Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 68/76] nospec: Move array_index_nospec() parameter checking into separate macro Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 12/76] sysfs/cpu: Fix typos in vulnerability documentation Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 73/76] x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 34/76] x86/retpoline: Add LFENCE to the retpoline/RSB filling RSB macros Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 01/76] kvm: vmx: Scrub hardware GPRs at VM-exit Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 41/76] x86/retpoline: Fill RSB on context switch for affected CPUs Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 14/76] x86/alternatives: Fix ALTERNATIVE_2 padding generation properly Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 67/76] x86/spectre: Fix an error message Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 35/76] retpoline: Introduce start/end markers of indirect thunk Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 11/76] x86/cpu: Implement CPU vulnerabilites sysfs functions Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 53/76] x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 74/76] x86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end} Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 52/76] array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 02/76] x86/Documentation: Add PTI description Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 47/76] x86/nospec: Fix header guards names Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 09/76] x86/cpu: Merge bugs.c and bugs_64.c Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 28/76] x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert assembler indirect jumps Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 58/76] nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 36/76] kprobes/x86: Blacklist indirect thunk functions for kprobes Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 55/76] x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 08/76] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V[12] Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 24/76] x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 38/76] x86/pti: Document fix wrong index Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` Ben Hutchings [this message]
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 13/76] x86/alternatives: Guard NOPs optimization Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 29/76] x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall indirect jumps Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 45/76] KVM: VMX: Make indirect call speculation safe Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 31/76] x86/retpoline/irq32: Convert assembler indirect jumps Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 69/76] nospec: Kill array_index_nospec_mask_check() Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 39/76] x86/retpoline: Optimize inline assembler for vmexit_fill_RSB Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 44/76] KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 18/76] x86/cpu/AMD: Use LFENCE_RDTSC in preference to MFENCE_RDTSC Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 33/76] x86/retpoline: Remove compile time warning Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 27/76] x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace assembler indirect jumps Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 62/76] x86/kvm: Update spectre-v1 mitigation Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 61/76] x86/paravirt: Remove 'noreplace-paravirt' cmdline option Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 15:00 ` [PATCH 3.16 00/76] 3.16.56-rc1 review Guenter Roeck
2018-03-12 16:45   ` Guenter Roeck
2018-03-20 17:25     ` Ben Hutchings

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