From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, chrisw@sous-sol.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] [PATCH] file posix capabilities
Date: Mon, 14 Aug 2006 18:20:02 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <m1r6zirgst.fsf@ebiederm.dsl.xmission.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20060814220651.GA7726@sergelap.austin.ibm.com> (Serge E. Hallyn's message of "Mon, 14 Aug 2006 17:06:51 -0500")
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> writes:
> Quoting Serge E. Hallyn (serue@us.ibm.com):
>> This patch implements file (posix) capabilities. This allows
>> a binary to gain a subset of root's capabilities without having
>> the file actually be setuid root.
>>
>> There are some other implementations out there taking various
>> approaches. This patch keeps all the changes within the
>> capability LSM, and stores the file capabilities in xattrs
>> named "security.capability". First question is, do we want
>> this in the kernel? Second is, is this sort of implementation
>> we'd want?
>>
>> Some userspace tools to manipulate the fscaps are at
>> www.sr71.net/~hallyn/fscaps/. For instance,
>>
>> setcap writeroot "cap_dac_read_search,cap_dac_override+eip"
>>
>> allows the 'writeroot' testcase to write to /root/ab when
>> run as a normal user.
>>
>> This patch doesn't address the need to update
>> cap_bprm_secureexec().
Looking at your ondisk format it doesn't look like you include a
version. There is no reason to believe the current set of kernel
capabilities is fixed for all time. So we need some for of
forward/backward compatibility. Maybe in the cap name?
Eric
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2006-08-15 0:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2006-07-30 1:13 Serge E. Hallyn
2006-08-14 22:06 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2006-08-15 0:20 ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2006-08-15 2:06 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2006-08-15 3:29 ` Eric W. Biederman
2006-08-15 4:22 ` Nicholas Miell
2006-08-15 11:49 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2006-08-15 12:20 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2006-08-15 19:31 ` Nicholas Miell
2006-08-15 19:41 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2006-08-15 16:18 ` Stephen Smalley
2006-08-15 16:36 ` Casey Schaufler
2006-08-16 2:42 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2006-08-16 13:20 ` Stephen Smalley
2006-08-17 12:00 ` Joshua Brindle
2006-08-17 12:28 ` Stephen Smalley
2006-08-21 20:36 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2006-08-28 21:39 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2006-08-29 18:37 ` Seth Arnold
2006-08-29 19:58 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2006-08-19 2:02 ` Crispin Cowan
2006-08-19 17:08 ` Casey Schaufler
2006-08-22 2:50 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2006-08-22 3:19 ` Seth Arnold
2006-08-19 2:02 ` Crispin Cowan
[not found] ` <44E1153D.9000102@ak.jp.nec.com>
[not found] ` <20060815021612.GC16220@sergelap.austin.ibm.com>
2006-08-15 3:48 ` KaiGai Kohei
2006-08-15 12:04 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2006-08-15 16:02 ` Casey Schaufler
2006-08-16 2:25 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2006-08-16 2:43 Albert Cahalan
2006-08-16 3:23 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2006-08-16 3:44 ` Casey Schaufler
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