From: Edward Adam Davis <eadavis@qq.com>
To: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au
Cc: davem@davemloft.net, eadavis@qq.com,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
syzbot+e8bcd7ee3db6cb5cb875@syzkaller.appspotmail.com,
syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH V2] crypto: Mark intermediary memory as clean
Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2025 20:17:17 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <tencent_50604BE61B0A2525BA07BB9033239E401B08@qq.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <aKG_yEuG6F4cqFjf@gondor.apana.org.au>
On Sun, 17 Aug 2025 19:40:56 +0800, Herbert Xu wrote:
> > diff --git a/crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c b/crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c
> > index 1266eb790708..4020a6e41b0e 100644
> > --- a/crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c
> > +++ b/crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c
> > @@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ int jent_hash_time(void *hash_state, __u64 time, u8 *addtl,
> > pr_warn_ratelimited("Unexpected digest size\n");
> > return -EINVAL;
> > }
> > + kmsan_unpoison_memory(intermediary, SHA3_256_DIGEST_SIZE);
>
> Please change SHA3_256_DIGEST_SIZE to sizeof(intermediary).
Why?
Their values are equal, so why use sizeof to calculate?
Similarly, "if (sizeof(intermediary) != crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm)) {",
why not just use SHA3_256_DIGEST_SIZE?
BR,
Edward
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-08-18 12:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-08-08 8:07 [syzbot] [crypto?] KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in rng_recvmsg syzbot
2025-08-09 7:19 ` Edward Adam Davis
2025-08-09 9:52 ` syzbot
2025-08-09 9:59 ` [PATCH] crypto: Prevent " Edward Adam Davis
2025-08-16 9:17 ` Herbert Xu
2025-08-17 8:51 ` Herbert Xu
2025-08-17 10:59 ` [PATCH V2] crypto: Mark intermediary memory as clean Edward Adam Davis
2025-08-17 11:40 ` Herbert Xu
2025-08-18 12:17 ` Edward Adam Davis [this message]
2025-08-18 12:30 ` Herbert Xu
2025-08-18 12:43 ` Edward Adam Davis
2025-08-18 13:13 ` Stephan Mueller
2025-08-18 13:24 ` [PATCH V3] " Edward Adam Davis
2025-08-18 13:32 ` Stephan Mueller
2025-08-30 8:45 ` Herbert Xu
2025-08-26 13:51 ` [PATCH] crypto: Prevent kernel-infoleak in rng_recvmsg Ard Biesheuvel
2025-08-26 16:58 ` Kees Cook
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