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* [syzbot] [ntfs3?] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in decompress_lznt
@ 2024-05-14 16:19 syzbot
  2024-05-15 12:38 ` [PATCH] ntfs3: check if more than chunk-size bytes are written Andrew Ballance
                   ` (4 more replies)
  0 siblings, 5 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2024-05-14 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: almaz.alexandrovich, linux-kernel, ntfs3, syzkaller-bugs

Hello,

syzbot found the following issue on:

HEAD commit:    f4345f05c0df Merge tag 'block-6.9-20240510' of git://git.k..
git tree:       upstream
console+strace: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=15035598980000
kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=9d7ea7de0cb32587
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=39b2fb0f2638669008ec
compiler:       Debian clang version 15.0.6, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.40
syz repro:      https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=16375db8980000
C reproducer:   https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=16ef17a8980000

Downloadable assets:
disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/eab3aead3b47/disk-f4345f05.raw.xz
vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/64d327c02024/vmlinux-f4345f05.xz
kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/0191e269a6fd/bzImage-f4345f05.xz
mounted in repro #1: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/293e623536d7/mount_0.gz
mounted in repro #2: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/165c0c1a16ff/mount_1.gz

The issue was bisected to:

commit d68968440b1a75dee05cfac7f368f1aa139e1911
Author: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Date:   Mon Jan 29 07:30:09 2024 +0000

    fs/ntfs3: Update inode->i_size after success write into compressed file

bisection log:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/bisect.txt?x=13472020980000
final oops:     https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/report.txt?x=10c72020980000
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=17472020980000

IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: syzbot+39b2fb0f2638669008ec@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: d68968440b1a ("fs/ntfs3: Update inode->i_size after success write into compressed file")

------------[ cut here ]------------
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in fs/ntfs3/lznt.c:240:16
index 9 is out of range for type 'const size_t[9]' (aka 'const unsigned long[9]')
CPU: 1 PID: 5072 Comm: syz-executor335 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-00136-gf4345f05c0df #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
 ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:231 [inline]
 __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x121/0x150 lib/ubsan.c:429
 decompress_chunk fs/ntfs3/lznt.c:240 [inline]
 decompress_lznt+0x229/0xd50 fs/ntfs3/lznt.c:387
 ni_read_frame+0x1633/0x1c50 fs/ntfs3/frecord.c:2684
 ni_readpage_cmpr+0x38b/0xa60 fs/ntfs3/frecord.c:2143
 ntfs_read_folio+0x19e/0x210 fs/ntfs3/inode.c:725
 filemap_read_folio+0x1a0/0x790 mm/filemap.c:2331
 filemap_update_page mm/filemap.c:2415 [inline]
 filemap_get_pages+0x15a9/0x2090 mm/filemap.c:2529
 filemap_read+0x457/0xfa0 mm/filemap.c:2601
 __kernel_read+0x5c8/0xab0 fs/read_write.c:434
 integrity_kernel_read+0xb0/0x100 security/integrity/iint.c:28
 ima_calc_file_hash_tfm security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c:485 [inline]
 ima_calc_file_shash security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c:516 [inline]
 ima_calc_file_hash+0xadb/0x1b30 security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c:573
 ima_collect_measurement+0x535/0xa90 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c:291
 process_measurement+0x13ac/0x1f60 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:359
 ima_file_check+0xf2/0x170 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:559
 security_file_post_open+0x6d/0xa0 security/security.c:2981
 do_open fs/namei.c:3644 [inline]
 path_openat+0x28b7/0x3240 fs/namei.c:3799
 do_filp_open+0x235/0x490 fs/namei.c:3826
 do_sys_openat2+0x13e/0x1d0 fs/open.c:1406
 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1421 [inline]
 __do_sys_open fs/open.c:1429 [inline]
 __se_sys_open fs/open.c:1425 [inline]
 __x64_sys_open+0x225/0x270 fs/open.c:1425
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fbd0c2059b9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 61 17 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fffa3c72cd8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000002
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fffa3c72ea8 RCX: 00007fbd0c2059b9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000020000180
RBP: 00007fbd0c298610 R08: 00007fffa3c72ea8 R09: 00007fffa3c72ea8
R10: 00007fffa3c72ea8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 00007fffa3c72e98 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001
 </TASK>
---[ end trace ]---


---
This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot.
syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@googlegroups.com.

syzbot will keep track of this issue. See:
https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#status for how to communicate with syzbot.
For information about bisection process see: https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#bisection

If the report is already addressed, let syzbot know by replying with:
#syz fix: exact-commit-title

If you want syzbot to run the reproducer, reply with:
#syz test: git://repo/address.git branch-or-commit-hash
If you attach or paste a git patch, syzbot will apply it before testing.

If you want to overwrite report's subsystems, reply with:
#syz set subsystems: new-subsystem
(See the list of subsystem names on the web dashboard)

If the report is a duplicate of another one, reply with:
#syz dup: exact-subject-of-another-report

If you want to undo deduplication, reply with:
#syz undup

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

* [PATCH] ntfs3: check if more than chunk-size bytes are written
  2024-05-14 16:19 [syzbot] [ntfs3?] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in decompress_lznt syzbot
@ 2024-05-15 12:38 ` Andrew Ballance
  2024-05-15 12:59   ` [syzbot] [ntfs3?] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in decompress_lznt syzbot
  2024-07-01 21:55 ` [syzbot] test syzbot
                   ` (3 subsequent siblings)
  4 siblings, 1 reply; 36+ messages in thread
From: Andrew Ballance @ 2024-05-15 12:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: syzbot+39b2fb0f2638669008ec
  Cc: almaz.alexandrovich, linux-kernel, ntfs3, syzkaller-bugs, skhan,
	linux-kernel-mentees, Andrew Ballance

#syz test

a incorrectly formatted chunk may decompress into
more than LZNT_CHUNK_SIZE bytes and a index out of bounds
will occur in s_max_off.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Ballance <andrewjballance@gmail.com>
---
 fs/ntfs3/lznt.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/lznt.c b/fs/ntfs3/lznt.c
index 4aae598d6d88..fdc9b2ebf341 100644
--- a/fs/ntfs3/lznt.c
+++ b/fs/ntfs3/lznt.c
@@ -236,6 +236,9 @@ static inline ssize_t decompress_chunk(u8 *unc, u8 *unc_end, const u8 *cmpr,
 
 	/* Do decompression until pointers are inside range. */
 	while (up < unc_end && cmpr < cmpr_end) {
+		// return err if more than LZNT_CHUNK_SIZE bytes are written
+		if (up - unc > LZNT_CHUNK_SIZE)
+			return -EINVAL;
 		/* Correct index */
 		while (unc + s_max_off[index] < up)
 			index += 1;
-- 
2.45.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] [ntfs3?] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in decompress_lznt
  2024-05-15 12:38 ` [PATCH] ntfs3: check if more than chunk-size bytes are written Andrew Ballance
@ 2024-05-15 12:59   ` syzbot
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2024-05-15 12:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: almaz.alexandrovich, andrewjballance, linux-kernel-mentees,
	linux-kernel, ntfs3, skhan, syzkaller-bugs

Hello,

syzbot has tested the proposed patch and the reproducer did not trigger any issue:

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+39b2fb0f2638669008ec@syzkaller.appspotmail.com

Tested on:

commit:         1b294a1f Merge tag 'net-next-6.10' of git://git.kernel..
git tree:       upstream
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=15998648980000
kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=c0cd0c5dbf8ea592
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=39b2fb0f2638669008ec
compiler:       Debian clang version 15.0.6, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.40
patch:          https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/patch.diff?x=115b78f0980000

Note: testing is done by a robot and is best-effort only.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] test
  2024-05-14 16:19 [syzbot] [ntfs3?] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in decompress_lznt syzbot
  2024-05-15 12:38 ` [PATCH] ntfs3: check if more than chunk-size bytes are written Andrew Ballance
@ 2024-07-01 21:55 ` syzbot
  2024-08-23 16:04 ` [syzbot] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in decompress_lznt syzbot
                   ` (2 subsequent siblings)
  4 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2024-07-01 21:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com.

***

Subject: test
Author: mukattreyee@gmail.com

#syz test:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in decompress_lznt
  2024-05-14 16:19 [syzbot] [ntfs3?] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in decompress_lznt syzbot
  2024-05-15 12:38 ` [PATCH] ntfs3: check if more than chunk-size bytes are written Andrew Ballance
  2024-07-01 21:55 ` [syzbot] test syzbot
@ 2024-08-23 16:04 ` syzbot
  2026-04-17 10:12 ` Forwarded: [PATCH] ntfs3: fix " syzbot
  2026-04-17 16:20 ` Forwarded: Re: [syzbot] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds " syzbot
  4 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2024-08-23 16:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com.

***

Subject: UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in decompress_lznt
Author: almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com

#syz test: https://github.com/Paragon-Software-Group/linux-ntfs3.git master

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

* Forwarded: [PATCH] ntfs3: fix array-index-out-of-bounds in decompress_lznt
  2024-05-14 16:19 [syzbot] [ntfs3?] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in decompress_lznt syzbot
                   ` (2 preceding siblings ...)
  2024-08-23 16:04 ` [syzbot] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in decompress_lznt syzbot
@ 2026-04-17 10:12 ` syzbot
  2026-04-17 16:20 ` Forwarded: Re: [syzbot] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds " syzbot
  4 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2026-04-17 10:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com.

***

Subject: [PATCH] ntfs3: fix array-index-out-of-bounds in decompress_lznt
Author: tristmd@gmail.com

From: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>

#syz test: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master


The index correction loop in decompress_chunk() increments the index
variable without checking against the s_max_off[] array size:

    while (unc + s_max_off[index] < up)
        index += 1;

When a crafted NTFS image causes the decompressed output pointer (up) to
advance beyond unc + s_max_off[8] (0x1000), the loop reads s_max_off[9]
which is past the end of the 9-element array, triggering UBSAN:

  UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in fs/ntfs3/lznt.c:243:16
  index 9 is out of range for type 'const size_t[9]'

Commit 9931122d04c6 ("fs/ntfs3: Check if more than chunk-size bytes are
written") partially addressed this by adding a check for up - unc >
LZNT_CHUNK_SIZE before the loop.  However, this relies on the implicit
invariant that LZNT_CHUNK_SIZE equals s_max_off[ARRAY_SIZE(s_max_off)-1],
and the check uses strict greater-than which still allows index to reach
the boundary value in edge cases with concurrent modifications to the
unc_end bound.

Add a direct bounds check on index within the while loop condition to
make the code robust regardless of the relationship between
LZNT_CHUNK_SIZE and s_max_off[] values.  If index reaches the maximum,
break out of the correction loop -- the entry at s_max_off[8] (0x1000)
already covers the full chunk range.

Found by syzbot.

Reported-by: syzbot+39b2fb0f2638669008ec@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=39b2fb0f2638669008ec
Fixes: 522e010b5837 ("fs/ntfs3: Add compression")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
---
 fs/ntfs3/lznt.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/lznt.c b/fs/ntfs3/lznt.c
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
--- a/fs/ntfs3/lznt.c
+++ b/fs/ntfs3/lznt.c
@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ static inline ssize_t decompress_chunk(u8 *unc, u8 *unc_end, const u8 *cmpr,
 		if (up - unc > LZNT_CHUNK_SIZE)
 			return -EINVAL;
 		/* Correct index */
-		while (unc + s_max_off[index] < up)
+		while (index < ARRAY_SIZE(s_max_off) - 1 && unc + s_max_off[index] < up)
 			index += 1;

 		/* Check the current flag for zero. */
--
2.39.5


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

* Forwarded: Re: [syzbot] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in decompress_lznt
  2024-05-14 16:19 [syzbot] [ntfs3?] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in decompress_lznt syzbot
                   ` (3 preceding siblings ...)
  2026-04-17 10:12 ` Forwarded: [PATCH] ntfs3: fix " syzbot
@ 2026-04-17 16:20 ` syzbot
  4 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2026-04-17 16:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com.

***

Subject: Re: [syzbot] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in decompress_lznt
Author: tristmd@gmail.com

#syz test: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master
>From 6cfb2c5508cbe3c057fc4fe83808ef6cf8fc9868 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
Date: Fri, 17 Apr 2026 16:15:16 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] ntfs3: fix array-index-out-of-bounds in decompress_lznt
decompress_chunk() increments index without checking array bounds,
leading to an out-of-bounds access on s_max_off when processing
corrupted compressed data.
Add an upper bound check on index to prevent the overflow.
Reported-by: syzbot+39b2fb0f2638669008ec@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=39b2fb0f2638669008ec
Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
---
 fs/ntfs3/lznt.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/lznt.c b/fs/ntfs3/lznt.c
index fdc9b2e..f818d97 100644
--- a/fs/ntfs3/lznt.c
+++ b/fs/ntfs3/lznt.c
@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ static inline ssize_t decompress_chunk(u8 *unc, u8 *unc_end, const u8 *cmpr,
 		if (up - unc > LZNT_CHUNK_SIZE)
 			return -EINVAL;
 		/* Correct index */
-		while (unc + s_max_off[index] < up)
+		while (index < ARRAY_SIZE(s_max_off) - 1 && unc + s_max_off[index] < up)
 			index += 1;
 
 		/* Check the current flag for zero. */
-- 
2.47.3

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] test
  2024-09-22 17:46 [syzbot] [net?] KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in move_addr_to_user (7) syzbot
@ 2024-11-03 19:27 ` syzbot
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2024-11-03 19:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org.

***

Subject: test
Author: danielyangkang@gmail.com

#syz test

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] test
  2024-09-23 15:46 [syzbot] [net?] possible deadlock in gtp_encap_enable_socket syzbot
@ 2024-10-01  0:57 ` syzbot
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2024-10-01  0:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org.

***

Subject: test
Author: danielyangkang@gmail.com

#syz test

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] Test
  2024-05-12  9:19 [syzbot] [mm?] INFO: rcu detected stall in validate_mm (3) syzbot
  2024-07-03  7:32 ` [syzbot] Test syzbot
@ 2024-07-03  8:24 ` syzbot
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2024-07-03  8:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com.

***

Subject: Test
Author: radoslaw.zielonek@gmail.com

#syz test 

---
 include/linux/sched.h |  7 +++++++
 kernel/sched/core.c   |  1 +
 kernel/sched/rt.c     | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++---
 kernel/signal.c       |  9 +++++++++
 4 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 17cb0761ff65..123bc16ad3d0 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -1121,6 +1121,13 @@ struct task_struct {
 	size_t				sas_ss_size;
 	unsigned int			sas_ss_flags;
 
+	/*
+	 * Number of signals received by an RT task between scheduling ticks.
+	 * This counter is used to throttle RT tasks when too many signals
+	 * (e.g., POSIX timers) are sent to the task, which can cause an RCU stall.
+	 */
+	atomic_t rt_signals_recv_count; /* used outside of the rq lock */
+
 	struct callback_head		*task_works;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c
index d44efa0d0611..9def826bd35f 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/core.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
@@ -4779,6 +4779,7 @@ int sched_fork(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *p)
 			p->policy = SCHED_NORMAL;
 			p->static_prio = NICE_TO_PRIO(0);
 			p->rt_priority = 0;
+			atomic_set(&p->rt_signals_recv_count, 0);
 		} else if (PRIO_TO_NICE(p->static_prio) < 0)
 			p->static_prio = NICE_TO_PRIO(0);
 
diff --git a/kernel/sched/rt.c b/kernel/sched/rt.c
index 3261b067b67e..9b22d67d1746 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/rt.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/rt.c
@@ -24,6 +24,15 @@ int sysctl_sched_rt_period = 1000000;
  */
 int sysctl_sched_rt_runtime = 950000;
 
+/*
+ * To avoid an RCU stall due to a large number of signals received by RT tasks
+ * (e.g., POSIX timers), the RT task needs to be throttled.
+ * When the number of signals received by an RT task during a scheduling
+ * tick period exceeds the threshold, the RT task will be throttled.
+ * The value of 100 has not been thoroughly tested and may need adjustment.
+ */
+#define RT_RECV_SGINAL_THROTTLE_THRESHOLD 100
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
 static int sysctl_sched_rr_timeslice = (MSEC_PER_SEC * RR_TIMESLICE) / HZ;
 static int sched_rt_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer,
@@ -951,7 +960,7 @@ static inline int rt_se_prio(struct sched_rt_entity *rt_se)
 	return rt_task_of(rt_se)->prio;
 }
 
-static int sched_rt_runtime_exceeded(struct rt_rq *rt_rq)
+static int sched_rt_runtime_exceeded(struct rt_rq *rt_rq, int rt_signal_recv)
 {
 	u64 runtime = sched_rt_runtime(rt_rq);
 
@@ -966,7 +975,15 @@ static int sched_rt_runtime_exceeded(struct rt_rq *rt_rq)
 	if (runtime == RUNTIME_INF)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (rt_rq->rt_time > runtime) {
+	/*
+	 * When a large number of signals are sent to this task (e.g., POSIX timers)
+	 * the delta time deviates significantly from real time due to the overhead
+	 * of handling signals. For RT tasks, this can cause an RCU stall.
+	 * To avoid this, throttle the task when the number of signals received
+	 * exceeds a certain threshold.
+	 */
+	if (rt_rq->rt_time > runtime ||
+		rt_signal_recv >= RT_RECV_SGINAL_THROTTLE_THRESHOLD) {
 		struct rt_bandwidth *rt_b = sched_rt_bandwidth(rt_rq);
 
 		/*
@@ -1021,7 +1038,9 @@ static void update_curr_rt(struct rq *rq)
 		if (sched_rt_runtime(rt_rq) != RUNTIME_INF) {
 			raw_spin_lock(&rt_rq->rt_runtime_lock);
 			rt_rq->rt_time += delta_exec;
-			exceeded = sched_rt_runtime_exceeded(rt_rq);
+			exceeded = sched_rt_runtime_exceeded(
+						rt_rq,
+						atomic_read(&curr->rt_signals_recv_count));
 			if (exceeded)
 				resched_curr(rq);
 			raw_spin_unlock(&rt_rq->rt_runtime_lock);
@@ -1029,6 +1048,7 @@ static void update_curr_rt(struct rq *rq)
 				do_start_rt_bandwidth(sched_rt_bandwidth(rt_rq));
 		}
 	}
+	atomic_set(&curr->rt_signals_recv_count, 0);
 }
 
 static void
diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
index bdca529f0f7b..d58e0ba9336c 100644
--- a/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -629,6 +629,15 @@ int dequeue_signal(struct task_struct *tsk, sigset_t *mask,
 	bool resched_timer = false;
 	int signr;
 
+	/*
+	 * To prevent an RCU stall due to receiving too many signals by RT tasks,
+	 * count all signals regardless of their type.
+	 * Based on this counter, the RT scheduler will decide whether the task
+	 * should be throttled or not.
+	 */
+	if (tsk->policy == SCHED_FIFO || tsk->policy == SCHED_RR)
+		atomic_inc(&tsk->rt_signals_recv_count);
+
 	/* We only dequeue private signals from ourselves, we don't let
 	 * signalfd steal them
 	 */
-- 
2.43.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] Test
  2024-05-12  9:19 [syzbot] [mm?] INFO: rcu detected stall in validate_mm (3) syzbot
@ 2024-07-03  7:32 ` syzbot
  2024-07-03  8:24 ` syzbot
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2024-07-03  7:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com.

***

Subject: Test
Author: radoslaw.zielonek@gmail.com

#syz test https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git dccb07f2914cdab2ac3a5b6c98406f765acab803

---
 include/linux/sched.h |  7 +++++++
 kernel/sched/core.c   |  1 +
 kernel/sched/rt.c     | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++---
 kernel/signal.c       |  9 +++++++++
 4 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 17cb0761ff65..123bc16ad3d0 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -1121,6 +1121,13 @@ struct task_struct {
 	size_t				sas_ss_size;
 	unsigned int			sas_ss_flags;
 
+	/*
+	 * Number of signals received by an RT task between scheduling ticks.
+	 * This counter is used to throttle RT tasks when too many signals
+	 * (e.g., POSIX timers) are sent to the task, which can cause an RCU stall.
+	 */
+	atomic_t rt_signals_recv_count; /* used outside of the rq lock */
+
 	struct callback_head		*task_works;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c
index d44efa0d0611..9def826bd35f 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/core.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
@@ -4779,6 +4779,7 @@ int sched_fork(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *p)
 			p->policy = SCHED_NORMAL;
 			p->static_prio = NICE_TO_PRIO(0);
 			p->rt_priority = 0;
+			atomic_set(&p->rt_signals_recv_count, 0);
 		} else if (PRIO_TO_NICE(p->static_prio) < 0)
 			p->static_prio = NICE_TO_PRIO(0);
 
diff --git a/kernel/sched/rt.c b/kernel/sched/rt.c
index 3261b067b67e..9b22d67d1746 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/rt.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/rt.c
@@ -24,6 +24,15 @@ int sysctl_sched_rt_period = 1000000;
  */
 int sysctl_sched_rt_runtime = 950000;
 
+/*
+ * To avoid an RCU stall due to a large number of signals received by RT tasks
+ * (e.g., POSIX timers), the RT task needs to be throttled.
+ * When the number of signals received by an RT task during a scheduling
+ * tick period exceeds the threshold, the RT task will be throttled.
+ * The value of 100 has not been thoroughly tested and may need adjustment.
+ */
+#define RT_RECV_SGINAL_THROTTLE_THRESHOLD 100
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
 static int sysctl_sched_rr_timeslice = (MSEC_PER_SEC * RR_TIMESLICE) / HZ;
 static int sched_rt_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer,
@@ -951,7 +960,7 @@ static inline int rt_se_prio(struct sched_rt_entity *rt_se)
 	return rt_task_of(rt_se)->prio;
 }
 
-static int sched_rt_runtime_exceeded(struct rt_rq *rt_rq)
+static int sched_rt_runtime_exceeded(struct rt_rq *rt_rq, int rt_signal_recv)
 {
 	u64 runtime = sched_rt_runtime(rt_rq);
 
@@ -966,7 +975,15 @@ static int sched_rt_runtime_exceeded(struct rt_rq *rt_rq)
 	if (runtime == RUNTIME_INF)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (rt_rq->rt_time > runtime) {
+	/*
+	 * When a large number of signals are sent to this task (e.g., POSIX timers)
+	 * the delta time deviates significantly from real time due to the overhead
+	 * of handling signals. For RT tasks, this can cause an RCU stall.
+	 * To avoid this, throttle the task when the number of signals received
+	 * exceeds a certain threshold.
+	 */
+	if (rt_rq->rt_time > runtime ||
+		rt_signal_recv >= RT_RECV_SGINAL_THROTTLE_THRESHOLD) {
 		struct rt_bandwidth *rt_b = sched_rt_bandwidth(rt_rq);
 
 		/*
@@ -1021,7 +1038,9 @@ static void update_curr_rt(struct rq *rq)
 		if (sched_rt_runtime(rt_rq) != RUNTIME_INF) {
 			raw_spin_lock(&rt_rq->rt_runtime_lock);
 			rt_rq->rt_time += delta_exec;
-			exceeded = sched_rt_runtime_exceeded(rt_rq);
+			exceeded = sched_rt_runtime_exceeded(
+						rt_rq,
+						atomic_read(&curr->rt_signals_recv_count));
 			if (exceeded)
 				resched_curr(rq);
 			raw_spin_unlock(&rt_rq->rt_runtime_lock);
@@ -1029,6 +1048,7 @@ static void update_curr_rt(struct rq *rq)
 				do_start_rt_bandwidth(sched_rt_bandwidth(rt_rq));
 		}
 	}
+	atomic_set(&curr->rt_signals_recv_count, 0);
 }
 
 static void
diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
index bdca529f0f7b..d58e0ba9336c 100644
--- a/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -629,6 +629,15 @@ int dequeue_signal(struct task_struct *tsk, sigset_t *mask,
 	bool resched_timer = false;
 	int signr;
 
+	/*
+	 * To prevent an RCU stall due to receiving too many signals by RT tasks,
+	 * count all signals regardless of their type.
+	 * Based on this counter, the RT scheduler will decide whether the task
+	 * should be throttled or not.
+	 */
+	if (tsk->policy == SCHED_FIFO || tsk->policy == SCHED_RR)
+		atomic_inc(&tsk->rt_signals_recv_count);
+
 	/* We only dequeue private signals from ourselves, we don't let
 	 * signalfd steal them
 	 */
-- 
2.43.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] Test
  2024-03-29  0:16 [syzbot] [mm?] INFO: rcu detected stall in sys_clone (8) syzbot
  2024-05-27 12:29 ` [syzbot] Test syzbot
@ 2024-07-03  7:26 ` syzbot
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2024-07-03  7:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com.

***

Subject: Test
Author: radoslaw.zielonek@gmail.com

#syz test https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git fe46a7dd189e25604716c03576d05ac8a5209743

---
 include/linux/sched.h |  7 +++++++
 kernel/sched/core.c   |  1 +
 kernel/sched/rt.c     | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++---
 kernel/signal.c       |  9 +++++++++
 4 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 17cb0761ff65..123bc16ad3d0 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -1121,6 +1121,13 @@ struct task_struct {
 	size_t				sas_ss_size;
 	unsigned int			sas_ss_flags;
 
+	/*
+	 * Number of signals received by an RT task between scheduling ticks.
+	 * This counter is used to throttle RT tasks when too many signals
+	 * (e.g., POSIX timers) are sent to the task, which can cause an RCU stall.
+	 */
+	atomic_t rt_signals_recv_count; /* used outside of the rq lock */
+
 	struct callback_head		*task_works;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c
index d44efa0d0611..9def826bd35f 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/core.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
@@ -4779,6 +4779,7 @@ int sched_fork(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *p)
 			p->policy = SCHED_NORMAL;
 			p->static_prio = NICE_TO_PRIO(0);
 			p->rt_priority = 0;
+			atomic_set(&p->rt_signals_recv_count, 0);
 		} else if (PRIO_TO_NICE(p->static_prio) < 0)
 			p->static_prio = NICE_TO_PRIO(0);
 
diff --git a/kernel/sched/rt.c b/kernel/sched/rt.c
index 3261b067b67e..9b22d67d1746 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/rt.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/rt.c
@@ -24,6 +24,15 @@ int sysctl_sched_rt_period = 1000000;
  */
 int sysctl_sched_rt_runtime = 950000;
 
+/*
+ * To avoid an RCU stall due to a large number of signals received by RT tasks
+ * (e.g., POSIX timers), the RT task needs to be throttled.
+ * When the number of signals received by an RT task during a scheduling
+ * tick period exceeds the threshold, the RT task will be throttled.
+ * The value of 100 has not been thoroughly tested and may need adjustment.
+ */
+#define RT_RECV_SGINAL_THROTTLE_THRESHOLD 100
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
 static int sysctl_sched_rr_timeslice = (MSEC_PER_SEC * RR_TIMESLICE) / HZ;
 static int sched_rt_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer,
@@ -951,7 +960,7 @@ static inline int rt_se_prio(struct sched_rt_entity *rt_se)
 	return rt_task_of(rt_se)->prio;
 }
 
-static int sched_rt_runtime_exceeded(struct rt_rq *rt_rq)
+static int sched_rt_runtime_exceeded(struct rt_rq *rt_rq, int rt_signal_recv)
 {
 	u64 runtime = sched_rt_runtime(rt_rq);
 
@@ -966,7 +975,15 @@ static int sched_rt_runtime_exceeded(struct rt_rq *rt_rq)
 	if (runtime == RUNTIME_INF)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (rt_rq->rt_time > runtime) {
+	/*
+	 * When a large number of signals are sent to this task (e.g., POSIX timers)
+	 * the delta time deviates significantly from real time due to the overhead
+	 * of handling signals. For RT tasks, this can cause an RCU stall.
+	 * To avoid this, throttle the task when the number of signals received
+	 * exceeds a certain threshold.
+	 */
+	if (rt_rq->rt_time > runtime ||
+		rt_signal_recv >= RT_RECV_SGINAL_THROTTLE_THRESHOLD) {
 		struct rt_bandwidth *rt_b = sched_rt_bandwidth(rt_rq);
 
 		/*
@@ -1021,7 +1038,9 @@ static void update_curr_rt(struct rq *rq)
 		if (sched_rt_runtime(rt_rq) != RUNTIME_INF) {
 			raw_spin_lock(&rt_rq->rt_runtime_lock);
 			rt_rq->rt_time += delta_exec;
-			exceeded = sched_rt_runtime_exceeded(rt_rq);
+			exceeded = sched_rt_runtime_exceeded(
+						rt_rq,
+						atomic_read(&curr->rt_signals_recv_count));
 			if (exceeded)
 				resched_curr(rq);
 			raw_spin_unlock(&rt_rq->rt_runtime_lock);
@@ -1029,6 +1048,7 @@ static void update_curr_rt(struct rq *rq)
 				do_start_rt_bandwidth(sched_rt_bandwidth(rt_rq));
 		}
 	}
+	atomic_set(&curr->rt_signals_recv_count, 0);
 }
 
 static void
diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
index bdca529f0f7b..d58e0ba9336c 100644
--- a/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -629,6 +629,15 @@ int dequeue_signal(struct task_struct *tsk, sigset_t *mask,
 	bool resched_timer = false;
 	int signr;
 
+	/*
+	 * To prevent an RCU stall due to receiving too many signals by RT tasks,
+	 * count all signals regardless of their type.
+	 * Based on this counter, the RT scheduler will decide whether the task
+	 * should be throttled or not.
+	 */
+	if (tsk->policy == SCHED_FIFO || tsk->policy == SCHED_RR)
+		atomic_inc(&tsk->rt_signals_recv_count);
+
 	/* We only dequeue private signals from ourselves, we don't let
 	 * signalfd steal them
 	 */
-- 
2.43.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] Test
  2024-03-29  0:16 [syzbot] [mm?] INFO: rcu detected stall in sys_clone (8) syzbot
@ 2024-05-27 12:29 ` syzbot
  2024-07-03  7:26 ` syzbot
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2024-05-27 12:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com.

***

Subject: Test
Author: radoslaw.zielonek@gmail.com

#syz test https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git 71b1543c83d65af8215d7558d70fc2ecbee77dcf

---
 net/sched/sch_taprio.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/sched/sch_taprio.c b/net/sched/sch_taprio.c
index a0d54b422186..41add4a1d407 100644
--- a/net/sched/sch_taprio.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_taprio.c
@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ static struct static_key_false taprio_have_working_mqprio;
 	(TCA_TAPRIO_ATTR_FLAG_TXTIME_ASSIST | TCA_TAPRIO_ATTR_FLAG_FULL_OFFLOAD)
 #define TAPRIO_FLAGS_INVALID U32_MAX
 
+#define TAPRIO_MAX_NUM_SCHEDULES_BEFORE_NOW 10
+
 struct sched_entry {
 	/* Durations between this GCL entry and the GCL entry where the
 	 * respective traffic class gate closes
@@ -62,6 +64,8 @@ struct sched_entry {
 	u32 gate_mask;
 	u32 interval;
 	u8 command;
+	/* Used to skip some cycles to prevent other tasks from starving */
+	u8 num_schedules_before_now;
 };
 
 struct sched_gate_list {
@@ -111,6 +115,9 @@ struct __tc_taprio_qopt_offload {
 	struct tc_taprio_qopt_offload offload;
 };
 
+static void setup_txtime(struct taprio_sched *q,
+			 struct sched_gate_list *sched, ktime_t base);
+
 static void taprio_calculate_gate_durations(struct taprio_sched *q,
 					    struct sched_gate_list *sched)
 {
@@ -919,6 +926,7 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart advance_sched(struct hrtimer *timer)
 	struct sched_entry *entry, *next;
 	struct Qdisc *sch = q->root;
 	ktime_t end_time;
+	ktime_t basenow;
 	int tc;
 
 	spin_lock(&q->current_entry_lock);
@@ -977,6 +985,23 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart advance_sched(struct hrtimer *timer)
 	taprio_set_budgets(q, oper, next);
 
 first_run:
+	basenow = ktime_get();
+	if (ktime_before(end_time, basenow))
+	{
+		next->num_schedules_before_now++;
+		if (next->num_schedules_before_now >= TAPRIO_MAX_NUM_SCHEDULES_BEFORE_NOW)
+		{
+			end_time = ktime_add_ns(basenow, oper->cycle_time);
+			next->end_time = end_time;
+			next->num_schedules_before_now = 0;
+			setup_txtime(q, oper, basenow);
+		}
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		next->num_schedules_before_now = 0;
+	}
+
 	rcu_assign_pointer(q->current_entry, next);
 	spin_unlock(&q->current_entry_lock);
 
@@ -1074,6 +1099,7 @@ static int parse_sched_entry(struct taprio_sched *q, struct nlattr *n,
 	}
 
 	entry->index = index;
+	entry->num_schedules_before_now = 0;
 
 	return fill_sched_entry(q, tb, entry, extack);
 }
-- 
2.43.0



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] test
  2024-04-15  1:54 [syzbot] [input?] WARNING in bcm5974_start_traffic/usb_submit_urb (2) syzbot
@ 2024-04-15 10:18 ` syzbot
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2024-04-15 10:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com.

***

Subject: test
Author: mukattreyee@gmail.com

#syz test:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] test
  2024-04-14  6:05 [syzbot] [bluetooth?] WARNING in hci_conn_set_handle syzbot
@ 2024-04-15  9:33 ` syzbot
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2024-04-15  9:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com.

***

Subject: test
Author: mukattreyee@gmail.com

#syz test:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] Test
  2024-04-09 22:42 [syzbot] [ntfs3?] WARNING in do_open_execat (2) syzbot
@ 2024-04-15  5:22 ` syzbot
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2024-04-15  5:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com.

***

Subject: Test
Author: mukattreyee@gmail.com

#syz test:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] Test
  2023-08-19 10:47 [syzbot] [ntfs3?] WARNING in do_symlinkat (2) syzbot
@ 2023-11-28 17:38 ` syzbot
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2023-11-28 17:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com.

***

Subject: Test
Author: tintinm2017@gmail.com

#syz test:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

* [syzbot] Test
@ 2023-11-19 12:31 syzbot
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2023-11-19 12:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com.

***

Subject: Test
Author: tintinm2017@gmail.com

#syz test:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] test
  2023-10-05 19:47 [syzbot] [ntfs3?] WARNING in attr_data_get_block (3) syzbot
@ 2023-11-19 11:27 ` syzbot
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2023-11-19 11:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com.

***

Subject: test
Author: tintinm2017@gmail.com

#syz test:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] Test
  2023-07-11  1:53 [syzbot] [bpf?] [reiserfs?] WARNING: locking bug in corrupted (2) syzbot
@ 2023-11-17 14:27 ` syzbot
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2023-11-17 14:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com.

***

Subject: Test
Author: tintinm2017@gmail.com

#syz test:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] Test
  2023-09-24  7:49 [syzbot] [mm?] [hfs?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in generic_perform_write syzbot
@ 2023-11-17 14:24 ` syzbot
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2023-11-17 14:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com.

***

Subject: Test
Author: tintinm2017@gmail.com

#syz test:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] Test
  2023-10-16 17:01 [syzbot] [usb?] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in usbhid_parse syzbot
@ 2023-11-17 14:23 ` syzbot
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2023-11-17 14:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com.

***

Subject: Test
Author: tintinm2017@gmail.com

#syz test:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] Test
  2023-09-11 13:35 [syzbot] [ext4?] WARNING in ext4_discard_allocated_blocks syzbot
@ 2023-11-17 14:17 ` syzbot
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2023-11-17 14:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com.

***

Subject: Test
Author: tintinm2017@gmail.com

#syz test:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] Test
  2023-11-16 11:09 [syzbot] [kernel?] inconsistent lock state in ptrace_attach syzbot
@ 2023-11-17 13:51 ` syzbot
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2023-11-17 13:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com.

***

Subject: Test
Author: tintinm2017@gmail.com

#syz test:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] Test
  2023-11-16 11:08 [syzbot] [cgroups?] possible deadlock in cgroup_free syzbot
@ 2023-11-17 10:58 ` syzbot
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2023-11-17 10:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com.

***

Subject: Test
Author: tintinm2017@gmail.com

#syz test:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] Test
  2023-11-17  5:01 [syzbot] [kvm?] WARNING in kvm_mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start (3) syzbot
@ 2023-11-17 10:55 ` syzbot
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2023-11-17 10:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org.

***

Subject: Test
Author: tintinm2017@gmail.com

#syz test:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] Test
  2023-09-16  1:22 [syzbot] [dri?] WARNING in drm_gem_object_handle_put_unlocked syzbot
@ 2023-11-15  6:33 ` syzbot
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2023-11-15  6:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com.

***

Subject: Test
Author: mukattreyee@gmail.com

#syz test:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] Test
  2023-11-08 12:38 [syzbot] [wireless?] [net?] WARNING in ieee80211_rfkill_poll syzbot
@ 2023-11-15  6:33 ` syzbot
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2023-11-15  6:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com.

***

Subject: Test
Author: mukattreyee@gmail.com

#syz test:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] test
  2023-09-25  5:15 [syzbot] [bluetooth?] possible deadlock in hci_dev_do_close syzbot
@ 2023-11-15  5:18 ` syzbot
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2023-11-15  5:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org.

***

Subject: test
Author: mukattreyee@gmail.com

#syz test:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] test
  2023-11-03 23:11 [syzbot] [bpf?] [net?] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference in sk_psock_verdict_data_ready syzbot
@ 2023-11-13 11:16 ` syzbot
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2023-11-13 11:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com.

***

Subject: test
Author: mukattreyee@gmail.com

#syz test:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] Test
  2023-10-26 18:32 [syzbot] [bpf?] [net?] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference in sk_msg_recvmsg syzbot
@ 2023-11-06 13:35 ` syzbot
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2023-11-06 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com.

***

Subject: Test
Author: yuran.pereira@hotmail.com

#syz test: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] Test
  2022-02-10 18:27 [syzbot] general protection fault in l2cap_chan_timeout (3) syzbot
@ 2023-11-06 13:01 ` syzbot
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2023-11-06 13:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com.

***

Subject: Test
Author: yuran.pereira@hotmail.com

#syz test: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] test
  2022-10-21  4:45 [syzbot] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in diWrite syzbot
                   ` (2 preceding siblings ...)
  2023-11-03  7:18 ` syzbot
@ 2023-11-03  7:29 ` syzbot
  3 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2023-11-03  7:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org.

***

Subject: test
Author: ghandatmanas@gmail.com

#syz test:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] test
  2022-10-21  4:45 [syzbot] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in diWrite syzbot
  2023-11-02 15:02 ` [syzbot] test syzbot
  2023-11-03  3:12 ` syzbot
@ 2023-11-03  7:18 ` syzbot
  2023-11-03  7:29 ` syzbot
  3 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2023-11-03  7:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org.

***

Subject: test
Author: ghandatmanas@gmail.com

#syz test: 
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] test
  2022-10-21  4:45 [syzbot] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in diWrite syzbot
  2023-11-02 15:02 ` [syzbot] test syzbot
@ 2023-11-03  3:12 ` syzbot
  2023-11-03  7:18 ` syzbot
  2023-11-03  7:29 ` syzbot
  3 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2023-11-03  3:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org.

***

Subject: test
Author: ghandatmanas@gmail.com

#syz test: 
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

* Re: [syzbot] test
  2022-10-21  4:45 [syzbot] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in diWrite syzbot
@ 2023-11-02 15:02 ` syzbot
  2023-11-03  3:12 ` syzbot
                   ` (2 subsequent siblings)
  3 siblings, 0 replies; 36+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2023-11-02 15:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org.

***

Subject: test
Author: ghandatmanas@gmail.com

#syz test: 
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 36+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2026-04-17 16:20 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2024-05-14 16:19 [syzbot] [ntfs3?] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in decompress_lznt syzbot
2024-05-15 12:38 ` [PATCH] ntfs3: check if more than chunk-size bytes are written Andrew Ballance
2024-05-15 12:59   ` [syzbot] [ntfs3?] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in decompress_lznt syzbot
2024-07-01 21:55 ` [syzbot] test syzbot
2024-08-23 16:04 ` [syzbot] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in decompress_lznt syzbot
2026-04-17 10:12 ` Forwarded: [PATCH] ntfs3: fix " syzbot
2026-04-17 16:20 ` Forwarded: Re: [syzbot] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds " syzbot
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2024-09-23 15:46 [syzbot] [net?] possible deadlock in gtp_encap_enable_socket syzbot
2024-10-01  0:57 ` [syzbot] test syzbot
2024-09-22 17:46 [syzbot] [net?] KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in move_addr_to_user (7) syzbot
2024-11-03 19:27 ` [syzbot] test syzbot
2024-05-12  9:19 [syzbot] [mm?] INFO: rcu detected stall in validate_mm (3) syzbot
2024-07-03  7:32 ` [syzbot] Test syzbot
2024-07-03  8:24 ` syzbot
2024-04-15  1:54 [syzbot] [input?] WARNING in bcm5974_start_traffic/usb_submit_urb (2) syzbot
2024-04-15 10:18 ` [syzbot] test syzbot
2024-04-14  6:05 [syzbot] [bluetooth?] WARNING in hci_conn_set_handle syzbot
2024-04-15  9:33 ` [syzbot] test syzbot
2024-04-09 22:42 [syzbot] [ntfs3?] WARNING in do_open_execat (2) syzbot
2024-04-15  5:22 ` [syzbot] Test syzbot
2024-03-29  0:16 [syzbot] [mm?] INFO: rcu detected stall in sys_clone (8) syzbot
2024-05-27 12:29 ` [syzbot] Test syzbot
2024-07-03  7:26 ` syzbot
2023-11-19 12:31 syzbot
2023-11-17  5:01 [syzbot] [kvm?] WARNING in kvm_mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start (3) syzbot
2023-11-17 10:55 ` [syzbot] Test syzbot
2023-11-16 11:09 [syzbot] [kernel?] inconsistent lock state in ptrace_attach syzbot
2023-11-17 13:51 ` [syzbot] Test syzbot
2023-11-16 11:08 [syzbot] [cgroups?] possible deadlock in cgroup_free syzbot
2023-11-17 10:58 ` [syzbot] Test syzbot
2023-11-08 12:38 [syzbot] [wireless?] [net?] WARNING in ieee80211_rfkill_poll syzbot
2023-11-15  6:33 ` [syzbot] Test syzbot
2023-11-03 23:11 [syzbot] [bpf?] [net?] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference in sk_psock_verdict_data_ready syzbot
2023-11-13 11:16 ` [syzbot] test syzbot
2023-10-26 18:32 [syzbot] [bpf?] [net?] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference in sk_msg_recvmsg syzbot
2023-11-06 13:35 ` [syzbot] Test syzbot
2023-10-16 17:01 [syzbot] [usb?] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in usbhid_parse syzbot
2023-11-17 14:23 ` [syzbot] Test syzbot
2023-10-05 19:47 [syzbot] [ntfs3?] WARNING in attr_data_get_block (3) syzbot
2023-11-19 11:27 ` [syzbot] test syzbot
2023-09-25  5:15 [syzbot] [bluetooth?] possible deadlock in hci_dev_do_close syzbot
2023-11-15  5:18 ` [syzbot] test syzbot
2023-09-24  7:49 [syzbot] [mm?] [hfs?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in generic_perform_write syzbot
2023-11-17 14:24 ` [syzbot] Test syzbot
2023-09-16  1:22 [syzbot] [dri?] WARNING in drm_gem_object_handle_put_unlocked syzbot
2023-11-15  6:33 ` [syzbot] Test syzbot
2023-09-11 13:35 [syzbot] [ext4?] WARNING in ext4_discard_allocated_blocks syzbot
2023-11-17 14:17 ` [syzbot] Test syzbot
2023-08-19 10:47 [syzbot] [ntfs3?] WARNING in do_symlinkat (2) syzbot
2023-11-28 17:38 ` [syzbot] Test syzbot
2023-07-11  1:53 [syzbot] [bpf?] [reiserfs?] WARNING: locking bug in corrupted (2) syzbot
2023-11-17 14:27 ` [syzbot] Test syzbot
2022-10-21  4:45 [syzbot] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in diWrite syzbot
2023-11-02 15:02 ` [syzbot] test syzbot
2023-11-03  3:12 ` syzbot
2023-11-03  7:18 ` syzbot
2023-11-03  7:29 ` syzbot
2022-02-10 18:27 [syzbot] general protection fault in l2cap_chan_timeout (3) syzbot
2023-11-06 13:01 ` [syzbot] Test syzbot

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