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From: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	pbonzini@redhat.com, weijiang.yang@intel.com,
	rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, seanjc@google.com, x86@kernel.org,
	thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 7/9] x86/sev-es: Include XSS value in GHCB CPUID request
Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 20:14:05 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <015ee02a072460b9e844278f5cc4c3b3618f5e9e.camel@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231017184932.GBZS7XPESSMgPoCysY@fat_crate.local>

On Tue, 2023-10-17 at 20:49 +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 17, 2023 at 01:12:30PM -0500, John Allen wrote:
> > I looked into using __rdmsr in an earlier revision of the patch, but
> > found that it causes a build warning:
> > 
> > ld: warning: orphan section `__ex_table' from `arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.o' being placed in section `__ex_table'
> > 
> > This is due to the __ex_table section not being used during
> > decompression boot. Do you know of a way around this?
> 
> Yeah, arch/x86/boot/msr.h.
> 
> We did those a while ago. I guess they could be moved to
> asm/shared/msr.h and renamed to something that is not a
> "boot_" prefix.
> 
> Something like
> 
> rdmsr_without_any_exception_handling_and_other_gunk_don_t_you_even_think_of_adding()
> 
> ...
> 
> But srsly:
> 
> raw_rdmsr()
> raw_wrmsr()
> 
> should be good, as tglx suggests offlist.
> 
> You can do that in one patch and prepend your set with it.
> 
> Thx.
> 


Assuming that we will actually allow the guest to read the IA32_XSS, then it is correct,
but otherwise we will need to return some cached value of IA32_XSS,
the same as the guest wrote last time.

Or another option: KVM can cache the last value that the guest wrote to IA32_XSS (I assume that
the guest can write msrs by sharing the address and value via GHCB), and then use it
when it constructs the CPUID.

Best regards,
	Maxim Levitsky




  reply	other threads:[~2023-11-02 18:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-10-10 20:02 [PATCH 0/9] SVM guest shadow stack support John Allen
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 1/9] KVM: x86: SVM: Emulate reads and writes to shadow stack MSRs John Allen
2023-11-02 18:00   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 2/9] KVM: x86: SVM: Update dump_vmcb with shadow stack save area additions John Allen
2023-11-02 18:00   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 3/9] KVM: x86: SVM: Pass through shadow stack MSRs John Allen
2023-10-12  9:01   ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-10-17 18:17     ` John Allen
2023-10-18 11:27       ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-11-02 18:05         ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-06 16:45           ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-07 18:20             ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-07 23:10               ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 4/9] KVM: SVM: Rename vmplX_ssp -> plX_ssp John Allen
2023-11-02 18:06   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 5/9] KVM: SVM: Save shadow stack host state on VMRUN John Allen
2023-11-02 18:07   ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-02-26 16:56     ` John Allen
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 6/9] KVM: SVM: Add MSR_IA32_XSS to the GHCB for hypervisor kernel John Allen
2023-10-14  0:31   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-02 18:10   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-02 23:22     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-07 18:20       ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-02-15 17:39         ` John Allen
2024-02-20 16:20           ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-20 16:33             ` John Allen
2024-02-21 16:38     ` John Allen
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 7/9] x86/sev-es: Include XSS value in GHCB CPUID request John Allen
2023-10-12 12:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-17 18:12     ` John Allen
2023-10-17 18:49       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-02 18:14         ` Maxim Levitsky [this message]
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 8/9] KVM: SVM: Use KVM-governed features to track SHSTK John Allen
2023-11-02 18:07   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 9/9] KVM: SVM: Add CET features to supported_xss John Allen
2023-11-02 18:07   ` Maxim Levitsky

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