From: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
pbonzini@redhat.com, weijiang.yang@intel.com,
rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, seanjc@google.com, x86@kernel.org,
thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 7/9] x86/sev-es: Include XSS value in GHCB CPUID request
Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2023 13:12:30 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZS7OjlhJKI2xlbY/@johallen-workstation> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231012125924.GFZSftrGx43ALVCtfS@fat_crate.local>
On Thu, Oct 12, 2023 at 02:59:24PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 10, 2023 at 08:02:18PM +0000, John Allen wrote:
> > When a guest issues a cpuid instruction for Fn0000000D_x0B (CetUserOffset), the
> > hypervisor may intercept and access the guest XSS value. For SEV-ES, this is
> > encrypted and needs to be included in the GHCB to be visible to the hypervisor.
> > The rdmsr instruction needs to be called directly as the code may be used in
> > early boot in which case the rdmsr wrappers should be avoided as they are
> > incompatible with the decompression boot phase.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
> > 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
> > index 2eabccde94fb..e38a1d049bc1 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
> > @@ -890,6 +890,21 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb,
> > /* xgetbv will cause #GP - use reset value for xcr0 */
> > ghcb_set_xcr0(ghcb, 1);
> >
> > + if (has_cpuflag(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && regs->ax == 0xd && regs->cx <= 1) {
> > + unsigned long lo, hi;
> > + u64 xss;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * Since vc_handle_cpuid may be used during early boot, the
> > + * rdmsr wrappers are incompatible and should not be used.
> > + * Invoke the instruction directly.
> > + */
> > + asm volatile("rdmsr" : "=a" (lo), "=d" (hi)
> > + : "c" (MSR_IA32_XSS));
>
> Does __rdmsr() work too?
>
> I know it has exception handling but a SEV-ES guest should not fault
> when accessing MSR_IA32_XSS anyway, especially if it has shadow stack
> enabled. And if it does fault, your version would explode too but
> __rdmsr() would be at least less code. :)
I looked into using __rdmsr in an earlier revision of the patch, but
found that it causes a build warning:
ld: warning: orphan section `__ex_table' from `arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.o' being placed in section `__ex_table'
This is due to the __ex_table section not being used during
decompression boot. Do you know of a way around this?
Thanks,
John
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-10-17 18:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-10-10 20:02 [PATCH 0/9] SVM guest shadow stack support John Allen
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 1/9] KVM: x86: SVM: Emulate reads and writes to shadow stack MSRs John Allen
2023-11-02 18:00 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 2/9] KVM: x86: SVM: Update dump_vmcb with shadow stack save area additions John Allen
2023-11-02 18:00 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 3/9] KVM: x86: SVM: Pass through shadow stack MSRs John Allen
2023-10-12 9:01 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-10-17 18:17 ` John Allen
2023-10-18 11:27 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-11-02 18:05 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-06 16:45 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-07 18:20 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-07 23:10 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 4/9] KVM: SVM: Rename vmplX_ssp -> plX_ssp John Allen
2023-11-02 18:06 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 5/9] KVM: SVM: Save shadow stack host state on VMRUN John Allen
2023-11-02 18:07 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-02-26 16:56 ` John Allen
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 6/9] KVM: SVM: Add MSR_IA32_XSS to the GHCB for hypervisor kernel John Allen
2023-10-14 0:31 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-02 18:10 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-02 23:22 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-07 18:20 ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-02-15 17:39 ` John Allen
2024-02-20 16:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-20 16:33 ` John Allen
2024-02-21 16:38 ` John Allen
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 7/9] x86/sev-es: Include XSS value in GHCB CPUID request John Allen
2023-10-12 12:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-17 18:12 ` John Allen [this message]
2023-10-17 18:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-02 18:14 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 8/9] KVM: SVM: Use KVM-governed features to track SHSTK John Allen
2023-11-02 18:07 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 9/9] KVM: SVM: Add CET features to supported_xss John Allen
2023-11-02 18:07 ` Maxim Levitsky
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