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From: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
To: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com,
	weijiang.yang@intel.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com,
	seanjc@google.com, x86@kernel.org, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
	bp@alien8.de
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/9] KVM: SVM: Save shadow stack host state on VMRUN
Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 20:07:20 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <cc44a4a7e7a4cabacad76c875e50cc5ff19c6e23.camel@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231010200220.897953-6-john.allen@amd.com>

On Tue, 2023-10-10 at 20:02 +0000, John Allen wrote:
> When running as an SEV-ES guest, the PL0_SSP, PL1_SSP, PL2_SSP, PL3_SSP,
> and U_CET fields in the VMCB save area are type B, meaning the host
> state is automatically loaded on a VMEXIT, but is not saved on a VMRUN.
> The other shadow stack MSRs, S_CET, SSP, and ISST_ADDR are type A,
> meaning they are loaded on VMEXIT and saved on VMRUN. PL0_SSP, PL1_SSP,
> and PL2_SSP are currently unused. Manually save the other type B host
> MSR values before VMRUN.
> 
> Signed-off-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 9 +++++++++
>  1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index b9a0a939d59f..bb4b18baa6f7 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -3098,6 +3098,15 @@ void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa)
>  		hostsa->dr2_addr_mask = amd_get_dr_addr_mask(2);
>  		hostsa->dr3_addr_mask = amd_get_dr_addr_mask(3);
>  	}
> +
> +	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
> +		/*
> +		 * MSR_IA32_U_CET and MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP are restored on VMEXIT,
> +		 * save the current host values.
> +		 */
> +		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, hostsa->u_cet);
> +		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, hostsa->pl3_ssp);
> +	}
>  }


Do we actually need this patch?

Host FPU state is not encrypted, and as far as I understood from the common CET patch series,
that on return to userspace these msrs will be restored.

Best regards,
	Maxim Levitsky


PS: AMD's APM is silent on how 'S_CET, SSP, and ISST_ADDR' are saved/restored for non encrypted guests.
Are they also type A?

Can the VMSA table be trusted in general to provide the same swap type as for the non encrypted guests?


>  
>  void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector)



  reply	other threads:[~2023-11-02 18:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-10-10 20:02 [PATCH 0/9] SVM guest shadow stack support John Allen
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 1/9] KVM: x86: SVM: Emulate reads and writes to shadow stack MSRs John Allen
2023-11-02 18:00   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 2/9] KVM: x86: SVM: Update dump_vmcb with shadow stack save area additions John Allen
2023-11-02 18:00   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 3/9] KVM: x86: SVM: Pass through shadow stack MSRs John Allen
2023-10-12  9:01   ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-10-17 18:17     ` John Allen
2023-10-18 11:27       ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-11-02 18:05         ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-06 16:45           ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-07 18:20             ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-07 23:10               ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 4/9] KVM: SVM: Rename vmplX_ssp -> plX_ssp John Allen
2023-11-02 18:06   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 5/9] KVM: SVM: Save shadow stack host state on VMRUN John Allen
2023-11-02 18:07   ` Maxim Levitsky [this message]
2024-02-26 16:56     ` John Allen
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 6/9] KVM: SVM: Add MSR_IA32_XSS to the GHCB for hypervisor kernel John Allen
2023-10-14  0:31   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-02 18:10   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-02 23:22     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-07 18:20       ` Maxim Levitsky
2024-02-15 17:39         ` John Allen
2024-02-20 16:20           ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-20 16:33             ` John Allen
2024-02-21 16:38     ` John Allen
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 7/9] x86/sev-es: Include XSS value in GHCB CPUID request John Allen
2023-10-12 12:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-17 18:12     ` John Allen
2023-10-17 18:49       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-02 18:14         ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 8/9] KVM: SVM: Use KVM-governed features to track SHSTK John Allen
2023-11-02 18:07   ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-10-10 20:02 ` [PATCH 9/9] KVM: SVM: Add CET features to supported_xss John Allen
2023-11-02 18:07   ` Maxim Levitsky

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