From: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <x86@kernel.org>, <tglx@kernel.org>, <mingo@redhat.com>,
<bp@alien8.de>, <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <hpa@zytor.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/microcode/intel: Panic on partial microcode update
Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2026 12:02:48 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <03e30d36-1960-4f36-a058-98ce58923344@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c939bfd7-2cde-4777-8eb2-d47c9e2ba480@intel.com>
On 6/30/2026 2:47 PM, Dave Hansen wrote:
>
> I mean, the ucode update guys themselves could definitely have reset the
> system if it needed to. They also know when it is dangerous to keep the
> CPU running. They obviously don't think that this partial update thing
> is *THAT* dangerous or they wouldn't have even let the CPU keep
> churning. Right?
A revision of the spec doc adds some description of the severity, which
looks worth referencing here for the review / decision.
Spec - https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/782715
There are two bits in MSR_IA32_MCU_STATUS:
* Bit 0 indicates a partial update occured
* Bit 1 indicates authentication failed _after_ the update was
committed and the revision ID was updated.
Section 2.7 summarizes the implications:
+----------------+----------------+--------------------------+
| partial update | authentication | note / recommendation |
+----------------+----------------+--------------------------+
| no | fail | impossible |
|----------------+----------------+--------------------------|
| yes | success | log the error |
|----------------+----------------+--------------------------|
| yes | fail | raise a fatal error |
+----------------+----------------+--------------------------+
It could be an option to handle those cases separately. But yes, a sane
ucode can escalate an unrecoverable condition via #MC. I'll revise V2 to
simply taint the kernel (TAINT_WARN) on any of those.
Thanks,
Chang
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-01 19:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-30 19:13 Chang S. Bae
2026-06-30 21:38 ` Dave Hansen
2026-06-30 21:47 ` Dave Hansen
2026-06-30 23:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-07-01 19:02 ` Chang S. Bae [this message]
2026-07-08 21:18 ` [PATCH v2] x86/microcode/intel: Taint kernel on partial update Chang S. Bae
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