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From: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
To: "jgg@nvidia.com" <jgg@nvidia.com>,
	"Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	"akpm@linux-foundation.org" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "ljs@kernel.org" <ljs@kernel.org>,
	"dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"david@kernel.org" <david@kernel.org>,
	"linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	"kernel-team@meta.com" <kernel-team@meta.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"rppt@kernel.org" <rppt@kernel.org>,
	"bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>, "kas@kernel.org" <kas@kernel.org>,
	"leon@kernel.org" <leon@kernel.org>,
	"stable@vger.kernel.org" <stable@vger.kernel.org>,
	"gourry@gourry.net" <gourry@gourry.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm/hmm: reject shadow-stack mappings
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 20:40:48 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <0c6fcb3daeab0ab3df0593cf389124e38e1d7f3f.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <55034934-8aab-4e8a-a74a-b30c977670ed@intel.com>

On Thu, 2026-11-19 at 12:05 -0800, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 11/14/26 17:01, Andrew Morton wrote:
> > On x86, a shadow-stack PTE has its ordinary write bit clear.  The CPU
> > rejects ordinary stores, but pte_write() reports it writable because
> > shadow-stack instructions can write it.  HMM consequently sets
> > HMM_PFN_WRITE.  Nouveau uses that flag for GPU write permission, and
> > RDMA on-demand paging can use it to grant device write permission to a
> > registered memory region.  A device, or an RDMA peer with write access
> > to that region, can then overwrite the process's shadow stack,
> > potentially corrupting return addresses or bypassing that protection.
> > 
> > Reject shadow-stack VMAs in hmm_vma_walk_test(), including read access.
> > A requested fault returns -EFAULT; a snapshot records HMM_PFN_ERROR.
> 
> This is a fun one.
> 
> I almost wonder if we want to go one step further and disallow GUPs with
> FOLL_WRITE on these PTEs. There should be precious few reasons for
> devices to be writing to shadow stack pages.
> 
> Isn't this a bigger issue than HMM? Should the fix be in HMM?

We do reject GUPs to shadow stack PTEs with FOLL_WRITE, unless FOLL_FORCE is
passed. The tricky thing as mentioned my others in this thread is that shadow
stack memory *is* writable by userspace. But also the kernel should not treat it
as such

A false negative for pte_write() is dangerous when the kernel needs to decide
when to revoke access. (i.e. fork) I think a mistake there is somewhat worse
then missing an exotic way to cajole the kernel into writing to a user's shadow
stack like this. So I think pte_write() being true for shadow stacks is the
correct implementation.

But, maybe the problem is that pte_write() is doing the job of two separate
concepts. What if there was a pte_userspace_could_write() and a
pte_kernel_should_not_write()? Names would need some work...

  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-11-19 20:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-13 19:55 Gregory Price (Meta)
2026-11-13 19:57 ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-11-13 20:15   ` Gregory Price (Meta)
2026-11-13 20:03 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-11-13 20:42   ` Gregory Price (Meta)
2026-11-13 21:19     ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-11-13 20:03 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-13 20:41   ` Gregory Price (Meta)
2026-11-14  0:20     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-14  2:10       ` Andrew Morton
2026-11-15  0:00         ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-15  1:01           ` Andrew Morton
2026-11-15 23:27             ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-19 20:05             ` Dave Hansen
2026-11-19 20:16               ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-11-19 20:40               ` Edgecombe, Rick P [this message]
2026-11-19 22:19                 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-11-19 20:33             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2026-11-14  7:25       ` Gregory Price (Meta)
2026-11-14 11:11         ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-11-15 23:48           ` Alistair Popple
2026-11-16 16:09             ` Gregory Price (Meta)

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